JFK: A President Betrayed (2013) Movie Script
male narrator: IN THE EARLY
1960s, MANY AMERICANS FEARED
THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS
PLANNING A SURPRISE NUCLEAR
ATTACK ON THE UNITED STATES.
WHAT THEY DIDN'T KNOW WAS
THAT THEIR OWN GOVERNMENWAS CONSIDERING LAUNCHING
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINSTHE SOVIET UNION FIRST.
ON JULY 20, 1961,
HIGH-RANKING OFFICIALS INCLUDING
THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS
OF STAFF PRESENTED A PLAN
FOR A NUCLEAR FIRST STRIKE
TO PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY.
THE MEETING WAS TOP SECRET.
NO OFFICIAL RECORD
OF ITS CONTENT WAS FOUND
...UNTIL 1993.
THIS WAS A MEETING THAT WAS
HELD AT A TIME WHEN KENNEDY
WAS RECEIVING VERY BELLIGERENADVICE FROM SOME SENIOR
ADVISORS.
A MEMORANDUM WAS PREPARED
FOR VICE PRESIDENT JOHNSON
SUMMARIZING THE SEQUENCE OF
DISCUSSION AT THE MEETING
AND THAT MEMORANDUM WAS
DECLASSIFIED IN 1993.
UNTIL WE HAD THE BURRIS
MEMORANDUM, WE DIDN'T HAVE
A NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF
WHAT WAS SAID.
PRESIDENT KENNEDY WAS BEING
PRESENTED WITH A SCENARIO FOR
LAUNCHING A PRE-EMPTIVE SURPRISE
ATTACK BY THE UNITED STATES
ON THE SOVIET UNION.
THE SOVIETS WERE LAGGING
BEHIND IN THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE,
AND TOP U.S. MILITARY OFFICIALS
SUGGESTED A NUCLEAR FIRSSTRIKE MIGHT BE THE BEST OPTION
BEFORE THEY CAUGHT UP.
THE UNITED STATES HAD B-52s
CIRCLING THE SOVIET UNION
IN THE AIR ON A ROTATION BASIS.
EACH ONE OF THE BOMBS THAONE B-52 CARRIED HAD MANY
TIMES THE FIREPOWER
OF ONE HIROSHIMA.
YOU ALSO HAVE TO REMEMBER
THERE WERE FIXED MISSILES,
AND THERE WERE MISSILES
IN SUBMARINES.
THE PLAN SUGGESTED A SURPRISE
ATTACK IN LATE 1963.
THE COST WOULD BE CATASTROPHIC.
IN A FULL-SCALE NUCLEAR EXCHANGE
AN ESTIMATED 300 MILLION
PEOPLE WOULD DIE.
FACED WITH THE HORROR OF NUCLEAR
FALLOUT INCLUDING CANCER,
LEUKEMIA, AND BIRTH DEFECTS,
THE SURVIVORS WOULD ENVY
THE DEAD.
IT'S VERY HARD TO IMAGINE
THAT ANY SIGNIFICANORGANIZED HUMAN SOCIETY
WOULD HAVE SURVIVED.
THIS IS A QUESTION OF WHETHER
HUMAN LIFE, IN ANY CIVILIZED
FORM, IS GOING TO SURVIVE
AT ALL.
SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN RUSK
WROTE IN HIS MEMOIR THAAS THEY LEFT THE MEETING,
KENNEDY SAID TO HIM IN
DISPARAGING TONES,
"AND WE CALL OURSELVES
THE HUMAN RACE".
KENNEDY HAD AN ENTIRELY
DIFFERENT VIEW
ABOUT THE STRATEGIC FUTURE.
IT'S, I THINK, VERY CLEAR
THAT THIS MEETING INTENSIFIED
FOR HIM THE SENSE OF DANGER
THAT A WAR MIGHT BE UNLEASHED
IN CIRCUMSTANCES THAT HE
MIGHT NOT BE FULLY IN
CONTROL OF.
EVERY MAN, WOMAN, AND CHILD
LIVES UNDER A NUCLEAR SOROF DAMOCLES, HANGING BY THE
SLENDEREST OF THREADS,
CAPABLE OF BEING CUT AT ANY
MOMENT, BY ACTION,
OR MISCALCULATION,
OR BY MADNESS.
THE WEAPONS OF WAR MUST BE
ABOLISHED, BEFORE THEY
ABOLISH US.
IN 1961, THE UNITED STATES
WAS ENGAGED IN A PROTRACTED
COLD WAR WITH THE SOVIET UNION,
RED CHINA,
AND THE COMMUNIST BLOC.
THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF
PRESIDENTS HARRY TRUMAN
AND DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
HAD TRIED TO CONTAIN COMMUNISM
...THEN ROLL IT BACK.
BUT SOVIET PREMIERE
NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV
REMAINED DEFIANT.
WITH BOTH SIDES
ESCALATING THE PRODUCTION
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS,
CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE
SUPERPOWERS IN CUBA, BERLIN,
AND VIETNAM THREATENED
TO TURN THE COLD WAR HOT.
IT WAS INTO THESE CIRCUMSTANCES
THAT JOHN F. KENNEDY,
AT THE AGE OF 43,
WAS ELECTED THE 35TH PRESIDENOF THE UNITED STATES.
THE SCENE ON JANUARY 19, 1961
WAS A REMARKABLE ONE.
THERE WAS THE OLDEST PRESIDENIN THE HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES, AGE 70,
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER,
SITTING DOWN WITH THE
YOUNGEST PRESIDENT EVER
TO BE ELECTED, JOHN F. KENNEDY,
THE DAY BEFORE HIS INAUGURATION,
AND SHARING WITH HIM THE MOSINTIMATE CONVERSATION A
PRESIDENT THOSE DAYS COULD HAVE,
WHICH IS:
WHAT DO YOU DO IF IT COMES
TO MAKING A DECISION ABOUNUCLEAR USE?
HE OPENS UP THE SATCHEL
IN WHICH THE COMPUTER-LIKE
DEVICE IS IN THAT'S KNOWN
AS A "NUCLEAR FOOTBALL".
GENERAL POWER, THE HEAD OF THE
U.S. STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND,
HAS STARTED ROUND-THE-CLOCK
BOMBER PROTECTION OF THE
UNITED STATES AGAINSA POTENTIAL NUCLEAR ATTACK
BY THE SOVIETS.
EISENHOWER SAYS WHAT HE WANTS
KENNEDY TO KNOW ABOUKHRUSHCHEV IS,
"HE'S BRUTAL, INCALCULABLE;
HE'S GONNA RUN HOT AND COLD
ON YOU."
IT STRUCK KENNEDY THAEISENHOWER WAS REFERRING
TO THE SOVIETS MORE AS ANIMALS
TO BE TAMED RATHER THAN
NEGOTIATING PARTNERS.
I REMEMBER, YOU KNOW, BEING
THERE AT INAUGURATION DAY.
OH, BOY, IT WAS COLD.
I REMEMBER HE SAID, "WE MUSNEVER NEGOTIATE OUT OF FEAR."
LET US NEVER NEGOTIATE OUOF FEAR, BUT LET US NEVER
FEAR TO NEGOTIATE.
BUT THEN HE WENT ON TO SAY,
"BUT WE MUST NEVER FEAR
TO NEGOTIATE,"
AND I SAID, "UH OH.
THERE'S SOMETHING NEW.
WE'VE JUST TURNED,
TURNED THE PAGE."
KENNEDY, THE FIRST U.S.
PRESIDENT BORN IN THE 20th
CENTURY, INSPIRED A YOUTHFUL
GENERATION EAGER FOR
FRESH LEADERSHIP.
THERE WAS A FEELING AT THE
BEGINNING OF THE KENNEDY
ADMINISTRATION THAT A NEW ERA
HAD BEGUN.
JOHN F. KENNEDY CAME
PROMISING A NEW FRONTIER.
IT WAS GOING TO BE A TIME
OF ENDLESS OPPORTUNITY.
AND TO BE PART OF THAT ERA
WAS ONE OF THE GREAT HONORS
OF ONE'S LIFE.
I'LL NEVER FORGET THE FIRSTIME I WALKED INTO THE
WHITE HOUSE TO SEE MY OLD
FRIEND KEN O'DONNELL,
WHO WAS PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S
APPOINTMENT SECRETARY.
WE JUST LOOKED AT EACH OTHER
AND BURST OUT LAUGHING.
YOU KNOW, WHAT ARE PEOPLE LIKE
US DOING IN A PLACE LIKE THIS?
I WAS THE YOUNGEST MEMBER
OF THE KENNEDY WHITE HOUSE.
I HAD GRADUATED FROM COLLEGE...
LAST.
EVERYBODY WAS VERY EXCITED.
WE KNEW WE WERE MAKING HISTORY.
WE WERE READY TO GO.
I TRAVELED EVERYWHERE
WITH HIM.
HE WAS SUCH AN EXCITING MAN,
BUT ALSO ONE OF GREAT PRINCIPLE.
WE WERE CALLED SPECIAL
COUNCIL, AND I WAS ASSISTANSPECIAL COUNCIL.
IT WAS JUST PERFECTLY OBVIOUS
THE GUY HAD A FIRST-RATE MIND,
AND HE KNEW HOW TO USE IT.
FOR EXAMPLE TAKING
ARTHUR SCHLESINGER,
THE MOST RENOWNED
HISTORIAN IN THE COUNTRY
AND MAKING HIM A SPECIAL
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENIN THE WHITE HOUSE SO THATHE PRESIDENT HAD REFERENCE
TO A HISTORIAN WHO COULD PUEVENTS IN PERSPECTIVE.
JFK PULLED DAD ASIDE
AND SAID, "BOBBY TELLS ME THAYOU'RE GONNA COME WORK
IN THE WHITE HOUSE."
AND DAD SAID, "WELL, OBVIOUSLY
AS A HISTORIAN IT'S A GREAOPPORTUNITY, I'M VERY EXCITED
ABOUT IT, BUT I REALLY DON'KNOW WHAT I'LL BE DOING."
AND KENNEDY SAID, "WELL, I DON'KNOW WHAT I WILL BE DOING
EITHER, BUT I'M SURE THERE
WILL BE PLENTY OF WORK
FOR BOTH OF US."
DURING THE KENNEDY YEARS,
I WAS A CORRESPONDENT ASSIGNED
TO JOHN KENNEDY FOR THE
1960 CAMPAIGN.
I WENT WITH HIM INTO THE
WHITE HOUSE BECAUSE I HAD
ALREADY BEEN COVERING
EISENHOWER AT THE WHITE HOUSE.
KENNEDY WAS A FORCE
IN THIS TOWN--
WELL-VERSED ON FOREIGN POLICY
AND VERY ARTICULATE.
FROM THE OUTSET OF HIS
PRESIDENCY, KENNEDY KNEW
IT WAS IMPORTANT TO FULLY
ASSESS HIS COLD WAR ADVERSARY,
NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV.
ADVISERS HAD WARNED HIM THAT THE
HOT-TEMPERED SOVIET LEADER
WOULD USE THREATS AND
INTIMIDATION TO IMPOSE HIS WILL.
CAREFULLY WEIGHING
KHRUSHCHEV'S WORDS AND ACTIONS,
KENNEDY HOPED TO GAIN A TRUE
MEASURE OF THE MAN.
PRESIDENT KENNEDY WASN'T EVEN
HOME FROM HIS INAUGURAL DAY
PARTIES WHEN KHRUSHCHEV DECIDED
TO SHOWER HIM WITH CONCILIATION.
FIRST AND FOREMOST,
HE DECIDED TO PUBLISH
THE ENTIRE INAUGURAL SPEECH.
THEN HE WAS READY TO RELEASE
TWO CAPTURED AIRMEN FROM THE
RECONNAISSANCE PLANE THAT HAD
BEEN SHOT DOWN THE PREVIOUS
AUGUST.
HE'D BEEN HOLDING THESE AIRMEN
SO AS NOT TO HELP VICE PRESIDENNIXON IN HIS CAMPAIGN AGAINSKENNEDY.
AND THIS WAS NOW GOING TO BE
HIS INAUGURAL GIFT.
THEREAFTER, HE ALSO MADE KNOWN
THAT 500 ELDERLY SOVIETS
WOULD BE ABLE TO REUNITE WITH
THEIR FAMILIES IN THE U.S.
KHRUSHCHEV IS
ESSENTIALLY SAYING,
"WE WANT A NEW START.
WE HAVE GREAT HOPES IN
THIS RELATIONSHIP.
WE REALLY ARE GOING TO WORK
VERY EARLY IN YOUR
ADMINISTRATION FOR SOME
BREAKTHROUGHS."
NIKITA IST IN DIE
WELTGESCHICHTE MIT SEINEM
SCHUH EINGEGANGEN.
MY FATHER WANTED TO
IMPROVE RELATIONS
WITH UNITED STATES.
FIRST OF ALL,
HE WAS A REFORMER BECAUSE
HE REALLY STARTED REFORMATION
OF RUSSIA WHEN HE CAME TO
THE POWER AFTER THE STALIN DAYS.
AND SECONDLY,
MY FATHER WAS IN TWO WARS,
AND HE EVEN COULD NOT WATCH
MOVIE ABOUT THE WAR BECAUSE
IT CAME BACK IN HIS MEMORY
WHAT REALLY HAPPENED,
AND HE COULD NOT SLEEP AFTER
THIS, SO HE WANT TO SHOW
TO THE NEW PRESIDENHIS POSITIVE FEELINGS
TOWARD THE UNITED STATES.
WHILE KHRUSHCHEV'S GOODWILL
GESTURES APPEARED TO SIGNAL
A DESIRE FOR A NEW BEGINNING,
KENNEDY PLACED GREATER EMPHASIS
ON AN INFLAMMATORY SPEECH
THE SOVIET LEADER HAD GIVEN
ONLY A FEW WEEKS EARLIER.
IN IT, KHRUSHCHEV HAD SAID
HE INTENDED TO BEATHE UNITED STATES WITH
"SMALL WARS OF LIBERATION"
ALL OVER THE WORLD.
CHAIRMAN KHRUSHCHEV THREW
DOWN THE GAUNTLET IN THE THIRD
WORLD BY ESSENTIALLY ARGUING
THAT THE SOVIET UNION'S FOREIGN
POLICY NOW INCREASINGLY
WOULD BE TO SUPPORT NATIONAL
INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENTS WHERE
THE SUPER POWERS BOTH
ESSENTIALLY TRIED TO GAIN
INFLUENCE.
KENNEDY WAS REALLY QUITE UPSEABOUT THIS SPEECH, AND HE GAVE
THE TEXT OF THIS SPEECH TO ALL
OF HIS ADVISORS AND SAID,
"YOU NEED TO READ THIS."
KENNEDY ENDS UP CARRYING THIS
SPEECH AROUND IN HIS POCKET,
AND HE PULLS IT OUT WITH EXPERTS
IN HIS NEW ADMINISTRATION, AND
HE READS FROM THE SPEECH
HE'S SO OBSESSED WITH THE
MESSAGE THAT KHRUSHCHEV IS
TRYING TO SEND HIM.
IN A DRAMATIC SHIFT IN TONE,
KENNEDY USED TOUGH LANGUAGE
TO CONFRONT THE SOVIET THREAT,
AND AT HIS FIRSSTATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS,
HE ANNOUNCED HIS INTENTION
TO ACCELERATE U.S. MISSILE
AND SUBMARINE PRODUCTION.
EACH DAY, WE DRAW NEARER
THE HOUR OF MAXIMUM DANGER
AS WEAPONS SPREAD AND
HOSTILE FORCES GROW STRONGER.
I FEEL I MUST INFORM THE
CONGRESS THAT OUR ANALYSIS
OVER THE LAST TEN DAYS
MAKE IT CLEAR THAT IN EACH
OF THE PRINCIPLE AREAS
OF CRISIS, THE TIDE OF EVENTS
HAS BEEN RUNNING OUT, AND TIME
HAS NOT BEEN OUR FRIEND.
THE LANGUAGE OF THE STATE
OF THE UNION WAS ALMOSAPOCALYPTIC IN NATURE AND
SUCH A SHIFT FROM CONCILIATION
TO CONFRONTATION.
AND HE IGNORES THE CONCILIATORY
GESTURES AND NEVER REALLY
ADEQUATELY TESTS THEM--
MAYBE THEY WOULD HAVE AMOUNTED
TO NOTHING, BUT WE'LL NEVER
KNOW BECAUSE HE NEVER REALLY
TESTED THEM.
KENNEDY'S STRUGGLE
TO UNDERSTAND HOW BEST TO DEAL
WITH THE SOVIETS
WAS ONLY JUST BEGINNING.
KENNEDY'S PRESIDENCY WAS VERY
SUBSTANTIALLY ABSORBED BY
THE CHALLENGE OF THE COLD WAR,
WHICH PLAYED ITSELF OUT ON
STAGES ALL OVER THE WORLD:
BERLIN, CUBA, VIETNAM.
AND HE'S OBLIGED TO KEEP TABS
ON THESE MATTERS CONTINUALLY.
BERLIN...
NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV CALLED I"THE MOST DANGEROUS PLACE
ON EARTH."
SINCE THE END OF THE SECOND
WORLD WAR, SOVIET, BRITISH,
FRENCH AND AMERICAN FORCES
HAD STOOD FACE-TO-FACE IN THE
STREETS OF THE OCCUPIED CITY.
AND THE SITUATION WAS
GROWING TENSER BY THE DAY.
ONE THING KENNEDY BROUGHWITH HIM INTO THE ADMINISTRATION
WAS AN AWARENESS OF THE
VULNERABILITY OF BERLIN AND
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE AMERICAN
COMMITMENT IN BERLIN.
IN 1961,
BERLIN IS AN ISLAND INSIDE
OF EAST GERMANY WITH AN
OPEN BORDER.
BERLIN WAS DIVIDED INTO
4 SECTORS,
THE SOVIET SECTOR HOUSING
THE COMMUNIST GOVERNMENOF EAST GERMANY.
BUT THE OTHER SECTORS WERE
IN THE OCCUPATION OF THE
UNITED STATES, BRITAIN,
AND FRANCE.
AND KHRUSHCHEV WANTED TO
END THAT SITUATION.
BERLIN WAS ALWAYS A SYMBOL
TO THE SOVIET UNION
OF COMMUNIST FAILURES.
THE SOVIETS WERE BEING
EMBARRASSED BY THE NUMBERS
OF PEOPLE TRYING TO GET OUFROM COMMUNIST CONTROL.
THEY WERE LOSING SOME HUNDRED
THOUSAND PEOPLE EVERY YEAR--
MORE THAN 10,000 EVERY MONTH.
IT'S THE BEST DOCTORS,
IT'S THE BEST FARMERS,
IT'S THE BEST TEACHERS,
SO THE FRONT LINE OF THE
SOVIET EMPIRE IS BEING DRAINED
OF ITS INTELLECTUAL AND
PROFESSIONAL LIFE BLOOD,
THEREFORE THREATENING THE
ENTIRE SOVIET CONSTRUCT.
IF KHRUSHCHEV WERE TO USE
MILITARY FORCE IN BERLIN,
KENNEDY AND HIS WESTERN ALLIES
HAD FEW OPTIONS.
IF THEY MARCH ON BERLIN,
WE DON'T HAVE THE TROOPS
TO FEND THEM OFF.
WHAT ARE WE GOING TO HAVE TO DO?
WE'RE GONNA HAVE TO USE
NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
AND WHAT DOES THAT DO?
KENNEDY WAS LOOKING FOR
A CAPABLE ADVISOR WHO COULD
PROVIDE A COHERENT POLICY
FOR DEALING WITH BERLIN.
PRESIDENT KENNEDY BRINGS
DEAN ACHESON BACK INTO SERVICE,
THE LEGENDARY SECRETARY OF STATE
OF HARRY TRUMAN,
A HAWK'S HAWK WHEN IT COMES TO
DEALING WITH THE SOVIET UNION.
ACHESON WAS A TOUGH OLD HAWK
WHO BELIEVED THAT YOU DIDN'NEGOTIATE WITH THE SOVIETS,
THAT THEY ONLY UNDERSTOOD POWER.
YOU HAD TO BE WILLING TO FIGHT,
TO GO TO THE BRINK,
TO SHOW THEM THAT YOU HAVE
THE MILITARY CAPACITY
AND THE WILLINGNESS TO USE IT.
ACHESON PRODUCES A MEMO
THAT'S TOUGH--
ESSENTIALLY SAYS YOU CAN'T GIVE
AN INCH TO THE SOVIET UNION
IN BERLIN BECAUSE THIS IS
ABOUT THE GLOBE.
IF YOU START IN BERLIN,
AND YOU GIVE GROUND IN BERLIN,
ITALY'S NEXT, FRANCE,
THE REST OF GERMANY,
WHO KNOWS WHERE ELSE.
OF COURSE,
WITHIN WEEKS
WE HAD THE BAY OF PIGS.
IN THE YEARS PRECEDING 1961,
A REVOLUTION ON THE CARIBBEAN
ISLAND OF CUBA,
LED BY FIDEL CASTRO,
OUSTED THE COUNTRY'S REPRESSIVE
DICTATORSHIP AND SEIZED
ALL FOREIGN-OWNED PROPERTY.
THE UNITED STATES IMPOSED
AN EMBARGO ON CASTRO'S REGIME,
FREEZING CUBAN ASSETS AND
SEVERING DIPLOMATIC TIES
WITH HAVANA.
THE CUBANS TURNED TO THE
SOVIET UNION FOR SUPPORT.
ON CUBA, WE KNOW FOR A FACTHAT KENNEDY ACTUALLY VIEWED
FIDEL CASTRO, IN 1960,
AS SOMEBODY WHOSE REVOLUTION
REALLY REPRESENTED THE
ASPIRATIONS, BROADLY SPEAKING,
OF THE VAST MAJORITY
OF THE CUBAN PEOPLE.
HE HAD NO DOUBT ABOUT THAT.
AND, AND HE BELIEVED THAT IF
THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENHAD HANDLED CASTRO RIGHT THAHE WOULDN'T HAVE TURNED TO THE
SOVIET UNION, AND OF COURSE
THERE'S PLENTY OF EVIDENCE
TO SUPPORT THAT POINT OF VIEW,
BUT VERY EARLY ON HE REALIZED
THAT POLITICALLY HE COULDN'TAKE THAT POSITION PUBLICLY.
ONLY MONTHS INTO
HIS ADMINISTRATION,
KENNEDY WOULD DISCOVER
THAT THE CUBAN PROBLEM
MIGHT LEAD TO HIS UNDOING.
AS SOON AS THE KENNEDYS GOINTO OFFICE THEY HAD TO WORRY
ABOUT CUBA.
THE CIA HAD COOKED UP A PLAN
TO INVADE CUBA WITH A FORCE
OF EXILES, AND THE CIA
WAS ITCHING TO USE THIS FORCE
AND OVERTHROW FIDEL CASTRO.
HE HAD INHERITED THE WHOLE
THING FROM THE EISENHOWER
ADMINISTRATION.
HE HAD BEEN TOLD THIS PLAN
FOR LANDING AT THE BAY OF PIGS
WAS GOING TO BE SUCCESSFUL.
THERE WAS NO NEED FOR HIM TO
CONSIDER THE NECESSITY FOR
USE OF MILITARY FORCE
BY THE UNITED STATES,
WE DIDN'T HAVE TO BE DIRECTLY
INVOLVED, THAT WAS THE PREMISE.
BUT PRESIDENT KENNEDY
WAS MISLED.
HIS LEADING ADVISORS,
PARTICULARLY HIS MILITARY
ADVISORS, HAD NOT GIVEN HIM
THE TRUTH--
SAME THING WAS TRUE FOR THE CIA,
BY THE WAY.
THE BASIC ISSUE IN CUBA
IS NOT ONE BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA.
IT IS BETWEEN THE CUBANS
THEMSELVES.
AND I INTEND TO SEE THAT WE
ADHERE TO THAT PRINCIPLE,
AND AS I UNDERSTAND IT,
THIS ADMINISTRATION'S ATTITUDE
IS SO UNDERSTOOD AND SHARED
BY THE ANTI-CASTRO EXILES
FROM CUBA IN THIS COUNTRY.
THE PLANNING HAD BEEN THAT IF
THE INVASION DIDN'T SUCCEED,
THE UNITED STATES WOULD
INTRODUCE ITS OWN FORCES.
BUT THE CIA NEVER CLEARLY
COMMUNICATED THIS RATHER
ESSENTIAL FACT TO THE PRESIDENT.
PERSUADED BY CIA OFFICIALS
WHO WERE WITHHOLDING VITAL
INFORMATION AND CONCERNED
ABOUT THE POLITICAL FALL-OUOF APPEARING WEAK ON COMMUNISM,
THE PRESIDENT AUTHORIZED THE
CIA PLAN FOR AN INVASION
OF ARMED CUBAN EX-PATRIOTS
AT THE BAY OF PIGS.
THE CUBAN EXILES LANDED
AT THE BAY OF PIGS.
IT WAS A DISASTER FROM
THE GET-GO.
A THOUSAND OF THEM WERE
BASICALLY DRIVEN INTO THE SEA
OR CAPTURED.
MOST IMPORTANTLY,
THERE WAS NO AIR COVER.
MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE
OFFICIALS REPEATEDLY PRESSURED
THE PRESIDENT TO AUTHORIZE
U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTION.
KENNEDY REFUSED.
HIS ARGUMENT AT THE TIME
IS, IF THE U.S. GETS DIRECTLY
INVOLVED, IF AMERICAN
FINGERPRINTS ARE TOO CLEARLY
ON THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION,
THAT KHRUSHCHEV WILL USE THAAS AN EXCUSE TO ACT ON BERLIN.
KENNEDY WAS WORRIED BECAUSE
HE WAS COMING UP TO A SUMMIMEETING, HE HOPED, WITH
KHRUSHCHEV, AND HE DIDN'WANT TO DISTRACT FROM THASUMMIT MEETING BY HAVING
TOO MUCH ATTENTION BE PAID
TO CUBA.
WHAT THIS BAY OF PIGS QUICKLY
SHOWED WAS THAT THE
DOMINANT FORCES IN THE
ADMINISTRATION WERE PEOPLE
THAT KENNEDY HAD NEVER APPOINTED
THAT HE HAD INHERITED FROM
HIS PREDECESSORS IN THE CIA
AND THE MILITARY,
AND THEY BASICALLY WERE
ASSUMING THAT THEY COULD
PUSH KENNEDY AROUND.
THERE WAS A KIND OF ENTRAPMENBUILT INTO THE WHOLE SCENARIO,
AND KENNEDY REALIZED THAT, TOO,
AND WAS NOT ABOUT TO BECOME
A PRESIDENT THAT WAS ENTRAPPED.
JOHN F. KENNEDY CLEARLY FELTHAT HE HAD BEEN MISLEAD,
THAT HIS LEADING ADVISORS
HAD NOT GIVEN HIM THE TRUTH
AND THAT HE HAD TO BE VERY
CAUTIOUS IN THE FUTURE
ABOUT ACCEPTING ANYTHING
THAT THEY SAID.
THE CIA WAS VERY UNHAPPY
BECAUSE THEY HAD CONFIDENTLY
ASSUMED THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD
APPROVE OF AIR STRIKES AGAINSCASTRO'S FORCES IF THE BRIGADE
GOT IN TROUBLE ON THE BEACH.
THE BAY OF PIGS WAS A MAJOR
DISASTER FOR THE UNITED STATES,
NOT NECESSARILY BECAUSE WE
HAD BEEN DEFEATED,
BUT BECAUSE IT SHOWED THE
WORLD OUR BALD AGGRESSION
AGAINST CUBA.
AND IT GAVE CUBA A VICTORY
OVER THE GOLIATH OF THE NORTH.
KENNEDY TOOK THAT DISASTER
VERY, VERY PERSONALLY
BECAUSE HE SAW IT AS
A PERSONAL FAILURE.
YOU KNOW, YOU DO THE BEST YOU
CAN AND THINGS DON'T WORK OUSOMETIMES, WELL, OKAY.
BUT THAT WASN'T THE CASE HERE.
AND HE BLAMED HIMSELF,
HE BLAMED HIMSELF FOR
NOT ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS.
NOBODY LIKES TO TAKE A HIT,
ESPECIALLY WHEN YOU'RE SO
PUBLICLY EXPOSED.
BUT YEAH, I THINK HE LEARNED,
AND WHAT HE LEARNED IS...
KNOW WHOSE ADVICE TO RELY ON.
KENNEDY RALLIED IN A
NUMBER OF WAYS.
FOR ONE THING, HE TOLD THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE THAT IT WAS
HIS RESPONSIBILITY.
HE USED A FAMOUS PHRASE,
THAT A "VICTORY HAS A THOUSAND
FATHERS BUT DEFEAT IS AN
ORPHAN."
BUT HE TOOK RESPONSIBILITY
FOR IT, AND INTERESTINGLY,
HIS POLL RATINGS SHOT UP
TO ABOUT 90%.
AMERICANS LIKE IT WHEN
POLITICIANS TAKE RESPONSIBILITY.
THE FAILED BAY OF PIGS
OPERATION HAD ENORMOUS INFLUENCE
ON KENNEDY'S IMAGE AS A
FOREIGN POLICY MAKER.
THE JOINT CHIEFS FELT THAHE WAS SOFT, HE SHOWED THAHE WAS SOFT ON COMMUNISM.
HE DID NOT HAVE THE CREDENTIALS,
FROM THEIR POINT OF VIEW,
TO BE ABLE TO STAND UP.
THERE WAS AMBIVALENCE
ABOUT JFK.
HE WAS A WHIPPERSNAPPER.
HE WAS GREEN.
HE'D BEEN A LT. J.G.
IN WORLD WAR II.
HE SAID, "I WAS A LIEUTENANJUNIOR GRADE, AND THOSE GUYS
WERE RUNNING THE WAR.
AND I JUST DIDN'ASK THE QUESTIONS THAI HAD ON MY MIND.
JOHN F. KENNEDY EMERGED
FROM THAT CATASTROPHIC FOREIGN
POLICY FAILURE
CHASTENED IN TERMS OF THE
PITFALLS OF THE USE OF FORCE
AND WITH A DEGREE OF WISDOM
ABOUT LISTENING TO THE
ADVICE OF HIS TOP GENERALS,
HIS TOP CIA OFFICIALS,
AND OTHER ADVISORS RATHER
THAN LISTENING TO HIS GUT.
AFTER THE BAY OF PIGS,
JACK KENNEDY SAID HE WANTED
TO BREAK THE CIA INTO A
THOUSAND PIECES HE WAS SO MAD
AT THEM,
AND HE ALMOST DID.
HE GOT RID OF ALLEN DULLES,
THE DIRECTOR OF THE CIA,
AND RICHARD BISSELL,
THE COVERT OPERATIONS CHIEF.
FOLLOWING THE BAY OF PIGS
FIASCO, KENNEDY SENT SIGNALS
THAT HE WAS INTERESTED IN
HOLDING A SUMMIT MEETING WITH
NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV.
FRUSTRATED BY THE SLOW PACE
OF BUREAUCRACY AT THE
STATE DEPARTMENT,
THE PRESIDENT DECIDED TO REACH
OUT TO THE SOVIET LEADER
THROUGH UNOFFICIAL CHANNELS.
KENNEDY WAS DETERMINED TO
ESTABLISH A DIALOGUE WITH
THE SOVIET UNION
AND TO SEE IF THERE WERE
ISSUES THAT COULD BE RESOLVED
AND RECONCILED WITHOUCONSTANT MILITARY CONFRONTATION.
THE KENNEDYS OPERATED ON MANY
LEVELS, AND THEY LIKED BACK
CHANNELS AS A WAY OF DOING
BUSINESS.
AND THEY FOUND ONE ALMOSBY ACCIDENT.
IT WAS ONE OF THE MOSUNUSUAL BACK CHANNELS AMONG
MAJOR LEADERS IN HISTORY,
OF HIS BROTHER THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
BOBBY KENNEDY, WHO KNOWS
ALL OF JOHN F. KENNEDY'S
MOST INTIMATE THOUGHTS
AND A SOVIET MILITARY SPY,
GEORGI BOLSHAKOV, BASED IN
WASHINGTON, WHO REALLY CAN'KNOW ANYTHING VERY INTIMATELY
ABOUT KHRUSHCHEV.
ROBERT KENNEDY, WHEN HE MEWITH BOLSHAKOV, WANTED TO
COMMUNICATE A COUPLE OF THINGS:
ONE, THAT CUBA WAS A MISTAKE,
BUT ALSO THAT HE WANTED
TO HAVE A SUMMIT.
THE PRESIDENT WANTED TO MEEKHRUSHCHEV AT THE SUMMITHAT JUNE, AND THAT SET IN
MOTION THE SUMMIT MEETING.
THE KENNEDYS ARRIVED FROM
PARIS ON SATURDAY THE 3rd OF
JUNE AND WENT DIRECTLY TO THE
RESIDENCE OF THE U.S. AMBASSADOR
IN HIETZING, WHICH IS A
BEAUTIFUL AREA,
VERY POSH AREA IN VIENNA.
KENNEDY HAD THE SEVERE BACK
PROBLEMS IN VIENNA,
WHICH IS SOMETHING THAT THE
PUBLIC DIDN'T KNOW AT ALL.
HIS DOCTORS RECOMMENDED HIM
TO USE CRUTCHES, BUT KENNEDY,
OF COURSE, DID NOT TAKE CRUTCHES
ON TO VIENNA.
IF YOU ASK ME WHAT THE
MYSTERIOUS TERM "CHARISMA" IS,
I WOULD SAY THAT'S KENNEDY.
VICTOR SUKHODREV WAS
WITH KENNEDY AND KHRUSHCHEV
DURING ALL THESE CONVERSATIONS.
HE WAS YOUNG, ENERGETIC,
YET HUMAN...
AND COULD BE FRAIL,
AS ALL HUMANS ARE AT SOME POINT.
MY AMERICAN COUNTERPART WAS
ALEXANDER AKALOVSKY
ON THE AMERICAN SIDE.
I HAD MET KHRUSHCHEV ON A
NUMBER OF OCCASIONS BEFORE,
SO I KNEW HOW HE BEHAVES.
HE WAS A VERY VOLATILE PERSON.
HE COULD, YOU KNOW, BE ENRAGED
THEN CALM DOWN RIGHT AWAY,
AND SAY, "LET'S MAKE PEACE,"
AND THINGS LIKE THAT.
DURING THEIR OPENING REMARKS,
KHRUSHCHEV LOOKED INTENTLY
AT THE PRESIDENT AND THEN ASKED,
"MR. PRESIDENT,
HOW OLD ARE YOU?"
AND KENNEDY SAID,
"WELL, I'M FORTY-FOUR."
THERE CAME INTO KHRUSHCHEV'S
EYES A VERY WISTFUL LOOK
AND HE SAID, "YES, FORTY-FOUR.
WELL, YOU KNOW, MY SON
WOULD HAVE BEEN THAT AGE,
BUT HE WAS KILLED IN THE WAR."
IN THE FIRST MEETING OF HIS
CONVERSATIONS WITH KHRUSHCHEV,
KENNEDY GOT OFF ON THE WRONG
FOOT BECAUSE THEY ENGAGED
IN A PRETTY INTENSE
IDEOLOGICAL DEBATE.
PEOPLE LIKE KHRUSHCHEV,
THEY KNOW MARXIST IDEOLOGY
VERY WELL.
YOU CAN'T REALLY HOLD YOUR
OWN AGAINST THEM
IN SUCH A DISCUSSION.
KENNEDY,
HE BEGAN TO FIDGET IN HIS CHAIR;
I LATER LEARNED THAT THAT WAS
BECAUSE HIS BACK WAS HURTING.
AFTER THE FIRST ROUND OF
TALKS, AS A FORM OF RELAXATION
THEY WENT OUT INTO THE GARDEN
AT THE AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE.
THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION
ABOUT MISCALCULATION.
THE PRESIDENT USED THAA NUMBER OF TIMES--
THAT TERM "MISCALCULATION."
AND KHRUSHCHEV SAID HE COULDN'REALLY UNDERSTAND WHATHAT MEANT.
AND AT THAT POINT HE SAID,
"WELL, YOU KNOW, FOR EXAMPLE,
I MADE A MISJUDGMENT IN CUBA."
HE SAID "WHAT HAPPENED IN
CUBA, THE BAY OF PIGS."
THE INFERENCE WAS THAT HE HAD
INHERITED THAT PROBLEM FROM THE
PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION.
IT WAS NOT REALLY OF HIS DOING.
INHERITED OR NOT,
KHRUSHCHEV SUGGESTED THAT A GAP
EXISTED BETWEEN AMERICAN IDEALS
AND AMERICAN SELF-INTEREST.
WITH LITTLE ACCOMPLISHED,
THE TWO LEADERS RESOLVED
TO RESUME THEIR TALKS
THE FOLLOWING DAY.
ON THE 2ND DAY TAKING PLACE
AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY,
ALL THE TALK WAS ABOUT BERLIN.
KHRUSHCHEV WENT INTO THIS
TIRADE ABOUT BERLIN.
HE KEPT REITERATING THABY THAT VERY WINTER
THE SOVIET UNION WOULD
BLOCK OFF WEST BERLIN,
WHILE EAST BERLIN WOULD BECOME
THE OFFICIAL SEAT OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF EAST GERMANY.
KHRUSHCHEV KEPT SAYING THATHE DECISION TO CONCLUDE
A PEACE TREATY WITH EAST GERMANY
WAS IRREVOCABLE;
IT WILL HAPPEN,
NOBODY COULD STOP HIM--
NOBODY IN THE WORLD.
THAT'S HIS WORDS.
AND KENNEDY WAS UNPREPARED
FOR THIS AND WAS SHOCKED
AT THE IDEA THAT HIS LEADING
COUNTERPART IN THE COLD WAR
WAS SEEMINGLY SO IRRATIONAL.
KHRUSHCHEV AT ONE POINT SAID,
"YOU KNOW, BERLIN IS LIKE
THE SCROTUM IN OUR HANDS,
WHICH WE CAN SQUEEZE AT ANY
TIME WE WANT."
HOW THE PRESIDENT TOOK IT:
HE TURNED TO ME AND HE ASKED,
"ALEX, IS HE ALWAYS LIKE THAT?"
KHRUSHCHEV RESORTED TO
WARNINGS THAT HE ISSUED ABOUPOTENTIAL WAR.
KHRUSHCHEV LOOKED KENNEDY
IN THE EYE AND SAID,
"IF IT'S GOT TO BE WAR,
IT MIGHT AS WELL BE NOW."
KENNEDY, WITH HIS HANDS
IN HIS COAT POCKETS
IN A TYPICALLY KENNEDY-ESQUE
GESTURE REMARKED,
"WELL, IT'S GONNA BE
A COLD WINTER."
JOHN F. KENNEDY WAS A VERY
CONFIDENT MAN IN SO MANY WAYS,
EVEN COCKY, BUT HE WAS HUMBLED
BY HIS EARLY FOREIGN POLICY
EXPERIENCES.
TO HAVE THE FIASCO
OF THE BAY OF PIGS AND THEN
GET BULLIED BY KHRUSHCHEV
AT VIENNA WAS A PRETTY TOUGH
ONE-TWO PUNCH THAT MADE HIM FEAR
FOR THE SAFETY OF THE WORLD.
YOU REALLY SEE A PRESIDENON EMOTIONAL EDGE FEELING
THAT HE'S FAILED IN THE MOSIMPORTANT MOMENT OF HIS
PRESIDENCY AND BELIEVING
THE STAKES ARE NUCLEAR.
WHEN THE PRESIDENT RETURNED
FROM VIENNA, HIS BROTHER,
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,
FOUND HIM AT THE WHITE HOUSE,
AND PRESIDENT KENNEDY WAS
IN TEARS.
AND HE SAID, "YOU KNOW, BOBBY,
YOU AND ARE ADULTS,
WE'VE HAD A GOOD LIFE.
BUT I JUST--
OUR CHILDREN, I JUST CAN'STOMACH THE IDEA OF OUR
CHILDREN NOT HAVING A CHANCE.
THE SUMMER OF 1961 WAS A TIME
FRAUGHT WITH GREAT DANGER.
PRESIDENT KENNEDY GOT HIS
ADVISORS TOGETHER.
THERE WERE A SERIES OF
MEETINGS ABOUT WHAT TO DO
ABOUT BERLIN.
ON THE ONE HAND, YOU HAVE
THE HARDLINERS ON BERLIN,
LED BY DEAN ACHESON.
AND THEN YOU HAVE THE
SOFTLINERS ON BERLIN,
LED BY ARTHUR SCHLESINGER.
BUT ACHESON WAS THE ONLY
ONE WITH A PLAN.
AND IT'S A TOUGH ONE.
ACHESON WANTED THE PRESIDENOF THE UNITED STATES TO DECLARE
A NATIONAL EMERGENCY,
RAISE TAXES, FULLY MOBILIZE THE
MILITARY, INCREASE THE DEFENSE
SPENDING BY FIVE BILLION
DOLLARS, GO EVERYTHING
RIGHT UP TO THE EDGE OF WAR.
WHAT IS KENNEDY DOING
IN THIS THING?
AGAIN, HE'S ASKING QUESTIONS,
CONSTANTLY ASKING QUESTIONS.
AND THE QUESTION HE'S CONSTANTLY
COMING BACK TO IS:
WHAT DOES THE OTHER GUY DO
IF WE DO THIS?
THE WORLD IS NOT DECEIVED
BY THE COMMUNIST ATTEMPTO LABEL BERLIN AS A HOT BED
OF WAR.
THERE IS PEACE IN BERLIN TODAY.
THE SOURCE OF WORLD TROUBLE
AND TENSION IS MOSCOW,
NOT BERLIN.
AND IF WAR BEGINS,
IT WILL HAVE BEGUN IN MOSCOW
AND NOT BERLIN.
I THINK KHRUSHCHEV
MISCALCULATED WITH JOHN KENNEDY.
HE WAS A LOT TOUGHER THAN
KHRUSHCHEV THOUGHT HE WAS.
KENNEDY CLEARLY WANTED
TO SEND A SIGNAL
TO KHRUSHCHEV.
HE WAS READY TO CONFRONT HIM
MILITARILY IF THAT IS WHAT HE
CHOSE; IF HE WANTED WAR,
THE UNITED STATES
WOULD BE READY.
WE MUST MEET OUR OFTEN-STATED
PLEDGE TO THE FREE PEOPLES
OF WEST BERLIN AND MAINTAIN
OUR RIGHTS AND THEIR SAFETY
EVEN IN THE FACE OF FORCE
IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE
CONFIDENCE OF OTHER FREE PEOPLES
IN OUR WORD AND OUR RESOLVE.
THE MESSAGE SEEMED TO BE
HOW TOUGH HE WAS BEING WITH
THE SOVIET UNION,
HOW HE WAS STANDING UP TO THEM.
BUT FOR THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP
AND FOR KHRUSHCHEV,
BETWEEN THE LINES IS A VERY
CLEAR MESSAGE, WHICH IS:
WHAT I CARE ABOUT IS OUR TROOPS
IN WEST BERLIN AND OUR ACCESS
TO WEST BERLIN.
WHAT I DON'T CARE ABOUIS EAST BERLIN.
IN SHORT, WHILE WE ARE READY
TO DEFEND OUR INTEREST,
WE SHALL ALSO BE READY
TO SEARCH FOR PEACE:
IN QUIET EXPLORATORY TALKS,
IN FORMAL OR INFORMAL
MEETINGS.
WE DO NOT WANT MILITARY
CONSIDERATIONS TO DOMINATE
THE THINKING OF EITHER
EAST OR WEST.
ONE CAN UNDERSTAND KENNEDY'S
APPROACH TO BERLIN AT THAT TIME.
HE'S LESS CONCERNED ABOUBERLIN AND MORE CONCERNED
ABOUT THE DANGERS
OF NUCLEAR WAR.
HE THINKS THAT IF HE CAN HELP
KHRUSHCHEV SOLVE HIS PROBLEM
OF THE REFUGEE FLOOD FROM
BERLIN THAT HE MIGHT HAVE
A MORE AMICABLE, COOPERATIVE
NEGOTIATING PARTNER ON A
HOST OF OTHER ISSUES.
WITHIN DAYS OF
KENNEDY'S SPEECH,
KHRUSHCHEV APPROVED EASGERMAN PLANS TO SEAL THE
BORDER IN BERLIN.
ON AUGUST 13, 1961,
COMMUNIST FORCES ERECTED
BARRICADES AND STOOD GUARD ALONG
THE PERIMETER OF WEST BERLIN.
RESIDENTS OF EAST BERLIN SOON
FOUND THEMSELVES TRAPPED
BEHIND A BARRIER THAT WOULD
BECOME THE NOTORIOUS
BERLIN WALL.
WE THINK OF THE BERLIN WALL
AS BEING THIS TERRIBLE MOMENIN THE COLD WAR--
A SYMBOLIC MOMENT WHEN THE WALL
GOES UP BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.
ACTUALLY, IT WAS A RELIEF
TO KENNEDY BECAUSE IT WAS SUCH A
CRISIS FOR THE SOVIET UNION
TO HAVE THIS MASS MIGRATION,
PEOPLE JUST FLEEING EASTO WEST, THAT BY PUTTING
UP THE WALL IT STOPPED THAT,
AND IN A WAY, IT DIFFUSED
THAT CRISIS AND MADE BERLIN
LESS OF A CRISIS POINT.
SO IN THE LONG RUN, IT HELPED
THE WEST TO HAVE A BERLIN WALL.
I THINK THAT THERE'S NO DOUBTHAT THE PEOPLE WHO WERE
FINDING THEIR OWN POLICIES
WERE BEING FRUSTRATED
BY KENNEDY'S POLICIES,
WERE ANGRY, WERE FRUSTRATED.
THEY WERE TALKING AMONG
THEMSELVES, PUTTING HIM DOWN.
DEAN ACHESON HAD GROWN SO
FRUSTRATED THAT DURING A
SMALL WORKING GROUP MEETING
ON BERLIN HE SAID,
"GENTLEMAN YOU MIGHT AS WELL
FACE IT: THIS NATION IS
WITHOUT LEADERSHIP."
SOMEONE SERVING THE PRESIDENOF THE UNITED STATES,
SOMEONE TRYING TO FRAME
HIS MOST IMPORTANT POLICIES,
TALKING IN FRONT OF A GROUP
OF EXPERTS AND SAYING THIS
ABOUT THE PRESIDENT OF
THE UNITED STATES--
AND HE SAID IT IN EVEN HARSHER
TERMS IN A LETTER TO HIS
FORMER BOSS, HARRY TRUMAN
A FEW WEEKS LATER.
FOR A LOT OF AMERICANS,
KENNEDY'S EARLY FOREIGN POLICY
DAYS WERE AMATEUR HOUR,
AND IT WAS UNSETTLING.
THE COUNTRY WAS SCARED IN THE
SUMMER OF 1961 THAT THEIR LEADER
MAYBE DIDN'T KNOW WHAHE WAS DOING.
PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S HOPES
THAT BY ACQUIESCING TO THE
CONSTRUCTION OF THE BERLIN WALL
HE WOULD HAVE A MORE
CONCILIATORY NEGOTIATING PARTNER
IN THE SOVIET LEADER WERE
DASHED DAYS THEREAFTER,
WHEN KHRUSHCHEV RESUMES
ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TESTING.
KENNEDY IS TRYING
TO BE CONCILIATORY.
HE FINALLY HAS TO GIVE UP THACOURSE, AND HE HAS TO RESUME,
THOUGH HE WAS VERY RELUCTANTO DO SO, HIS OWN TESTING
PROGRAM.
KHRUSHCHEV SAID ONE PHRASE,
WHICH I DISTINCTLY REMEMBER.
HE SAID, "WELL, I PITY
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WHO HAVE
ELECTED SUCH A MAN
TO BE THEIR PRESIDENT."
KHRUSHCHEV PERCEIVED KENNEDY
AS BEING INDECISIVE AND WEAK
REGARDING BERLIN AND THE
BERLIN CRISIS.
AND BECAUSE OF THAT,
HE WAS WILLING TO ESCALATE
RHETORIC, NUCLEAR TESTING, ETC.
SO, BY ACQUIESCING TO THE
BERLIN WALL, HE'S FACING A
SOVIET LEADER THAT IS BECOMING
EVEN MORE TROUBLESOME
AND PROBLEMATIC.
IN THE FALL OF 1961,
KENNEDY WOULD FACE YET ANOTHER
GRAVE FOREIGN POLICY DECISION...
THIS TIME IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.
A COMMUNIST-BACKED INSURGENCY
WAS GAINING MOMENTUM IN
SOUTH VIETNAM, DESTABILIZING
THE REGIME OF NGO DINH DIEM.
U.S. MILITARY AND
INTELLIGENCE OFFICIALS BELIEVED
THE INSURGENCY COULD BE DEFEATED
AND LOBBIED FOR THE INTRODUCTION
OF U.S. COMBAT TROOPS.
BUT THOSE FAMILIAR WITH THE
FAILED FRENCH COLONIAL WAR
IN VIETNAM,
JUST A DECADE EARLIER,
HAD SERIOUS DOUBTS.
JFK UNDERSTOOD BECAUSE HE HAD
BEEN IN VIETNAM DURING THE
WANING YEARS OF THE FRENCH
COLONIAL PRESENCE THAIT WOULD BE VIRTUALLY
IMPOSSIBLE TO DEFEAT A
VIETNAMESE MOVEMENT, WHETHER IWAS COMMUNIST-LED OF NOT,
THAT HAD NATIONALISCREDENTIALS, THAT HAD--
THAT REPRESENTED VIETNAMESE
NATIONALISM.
THE REASON WHY THE WAR
IN INDOCHINA HAS NOT HAD
THE SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE
OF THAT AREA AND THE PEOPLE
OF ASIA HAS BEEN THAT THE FRENCH
HAVE MAINTAINED TOO GREAT A
DEGREE OF CONTROL OVER THE LIVES
OF THE PEOPLE.
AND THEREFORE,
THE COMMUNIST UNDER HOCHI MINH
ARE ABLE TO CLAIM THAT THEY ARE
FIGHTING FOR INDEPENDENCE,
AND THE FRENCH APPEAR TO BE
FIGHTING FOR A MAINTENANCE
OF COLONIAL RULE.
I, THEREFORE, BELIEVE THABEFORE THE UNITED STATES
MOVES IN, IN ANY DEGREE,
THAT INDEPENDENCE MUST BE
GRANTED TO THE PEOPLE;
THAT THE PEOPLE MUST SUPPORTHE STRUGGLE BECAUSE UNLESS,
AS I SAID, THAT SUPPORIS FORTHCOMING, ANY INTERVENTION
BY THE UNITED STATES
IS BOUND TO BE FUTILE.
JOHN KENNEDY UNDERSTOOD THATHE AGE OF COLONIALISM WAS OVER.
PRESIDENT KENNEDY WAS NOGOING TO INTRODUCE COMBAT TROOPS
INTO VIETNAM.
THE FIRST CHALLENGE TO JFK'S
FUNDAMENTAL POSITION OF TRYING
TO KEEP THE UNITED STATES OUOF WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
CAME IN 1961.
THE CONSENSUS VIEW IN THE
MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE
ESTABLISHMENT WAS THAT WE HAD
TO PROTECT SOUTH VIETNAM,
THAT THAT WAS OUR CLIENT,
OUR ALLY, THAT WE HAD A
MORAL OBLIGATION TO STAND
BY PRESIDENT DIEM,
AND TO PROTECT SOUTH VIETNAM
FROM NORTH VIETNAM.
THE MILITARY, THE JOINCHIEFS OF STAFF REALLY HAD
BOUGHT INTO THE IDEA THAT WE
COULD WIN IN SOUTH VIETNAM
MILITARILY.
THIS IS THE ISSUE THAT COMES
UP IN NOVEMBER OF 1961 WITH
THE TAYLOR-ROSTOW REPORT,
WHICH RECOMMENDS THE
INTRODUCTION OF COMBAT TROOPS.
THIS WAS SAYING WE WAN40,000 TROOPS TO GO
INTO SOUTH VIETNAM
AND DEFEAT THE VIETCONG.
AND THEN WE WANT TO HAVE
125 TO 130,000 TROOPS JUST IN
CASE NORTH VIETNAM AND CHINA
INTERVENE, JUST TO HANDLE
THAT POSSIBLE CONTINGENCY.
JFK TOLD HIS NATIONAL SECURITY
ADVISORS, "WE'RE NOT GOING
TO DO THIS, BASED ON
MY EXPERIENCE AND MY KNOWLEDGE,
MY PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE
OF VIETNAM.
THIS ISN'T GOING TO WORK, AND
THIS IS NOT AN INTEREST THADESERVES THE UNITED STATES
GOING TO WAR."
SO, IT WAS A VERY DECISIVE
MOMENT WHEN A U.S. PRESIDENREALLY RESPONDED TO A VERY
SERIOUS PROPOSAL FOR GOING
TO WAR WITH A VERY LOUD "NO".
HOWEVER, AS PART OF THE
POLITICAL POSITIONING THAHE FELT THAT HE HAD TO ASSUME,
HE THEN MADE A DEAL THAT HE
WOULD AGREE TO THEIR REQUESFOR THOUSANDS OF U.S. ADVISORS.
"ADVISORS" IS AN IMPORTANWORD; THEY WERE MILITARY
FOR THE MOST PART, A LOT OF THEM
WERE ECONOMIC AID PEOPLE, TOO.
BUT IT WAS PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S
INSISTENCE THAT IT NOT BE OUR
WAR THAT LIMITED OUR INVOLVEMENIN THAT KIND OF WAY.
WE WOULD DO EVERYTHING
WE COULD TO ADVISE AND TO TRAIN,
BUT KENNEDY WAS DETERMINED THAIT WOULDN'T BE US THAT WOULD
BE IN THE FRONT LINES.
IN 1962, KENNEDY'S SECOND
YEAR IN THE WHITE HOUSE,
MORE FORMIDABLE CHALLENGES WOULD
BESET THE YOUNG PRESIDENT...
SUBORDINATES WOULD QUESTION
HIS LEADERSHIP...
AND THE CALCULATIONS OF HIS
ADVERSARIES WOULD BRING
THE WORLD TO THE BRINK
OF NUCLEAR WAR.
AT THE BEGINNING OF '62,
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF,
PARTICULARLY LED BY
CURTIS LEMAY,
WHO WAS THE HEAD OF THE
AIR FORCE, WERE VERY SCATHING
ABOUT KENNEDY'S INABILITY
TO DEAL WITH THE CASTRO PROBLEM.
VIVA...
EL INTERNACIONALISMO
PROLETARIADO!
AND THEY FELT THAIN THE END, A INVASION
OF THE ISLAND WOULD BE NECESSARY
AND THEN MADE DETAILED PLANS
FOR AN INVASION OF CUBA
AND, IN FACT, MADE A FORMAL
RECOMMENDATION TO THE PRESIDENTHAT AN INVASION SHOULD
BE LAUNCHED.
AT THE SAME TIME,
KHRUSHCHEV HAD VERY REAL
CONCERNS ABOUT THE UNITED STATES
INVADING CUBA.
BOTH CASTRO AND KHRUSHCHEV WERE
CONVINCED THAT THE AMERICANS
WOULD TRY AGAIN.
KHRUSHCHEV WAS DETERMINED
TO SAVE CUBA ONE WAY
OR THE OTHER.
AND HE CAME UP WITH THIS
IDEA THAT NOBODY ELSE HAD
PREDICTED OF DEPLOYING
NUCLEAR MISSILES TO CUBA.
FIDEL CASTRO WANTED THE
SOVIET UNION TO OPENLY
SEND THESE MISSILES TO CUBA.
THERE WAS NO ILLEGALITY ABOUTHE SOVIET UNION POSITIONING
INTERMEDIATE RANGE BALLISTIC
MISSILES IN CUBA.
THE UNITED STATES,
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW,
HAD DEPLOYED SIMILAR MISSILES
IN TURKEY AND ITALY.
IT WAS THE POLITICS THAWORRIED NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV.
HE BELIEVED THAT IF HE TRIED
TO OPENLY DEPLOY THESE MISSILES
TO CUBA, THE UNITED STATES
WOULD OBJECT.
AND SO KHRUSHCHEV CAME UP WITH
THIS PLAN TO SURREPTITIOUSLY
TRANSPORT THE MISSILE PARTS AND
THE PERSONNEL IN A WAY THAWOULD KEEP THEM SECRET UNTIL
THEY WERE READY TO BE ANNOUNCED,
AND AT THAT POINT, KHRUSHCHEV
PLANNED TO GO TO CUBA
AND ANNOUNCE A FAIT ACCOMPLI
AND HAVE THOSE MISSILES THERE AS
A DETERRENAGAINST ANOTHER BAY OF PIGS.
HE WANT TO PREVENAMERICAN INVASION.
WE HAVE TO SEND VERY STRONG
SIGNAL THAT WE ARE SERIOUS.
AND THAT MEAN TO HIM WE WILL
SEND THESE MISSILES TO CUBA THAWILL CLEAR TO THE AMERICANS:
BE CAUTIOUS, DON'T DO THIS.
AS PLANS GOT UNDERWAY TO
BEGIN KHRUSHCHEV'S SECRETRANS-ATLANTIC DEPLOYMENOF SOVIET MISSILES TO CUBA...
ACROSS THE GLOBE IN
SOUTH VIETNAM, SOME OF
THE NEWLY ARRIVED U.S. ADVISERS
WERE DEFYING ORDERS AND ACTUALLY
ENGAGING IN COMBAT.
THE NORTH VIETNAMESE
LEADERSHIP,
THEY WERE VERY VULNERABLE,
VERY SUBJECT TO THE THREAOF INTERVENTION BY THE
UNITED STATES IN
SOUTH VIETNAM.
THEY WANTED TO DO EVERYTHING
POSSIBLE TO AVOID THAT.
AND SO THEY DID, IN FACT,
BEGIN TO TALK ABOUT THE
NECESSITY FOR SOME KIND
OF NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT,
SOME KIND OF NEGOTIATED
SETTLEMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM.
THAT INFORMATION REACHED
KENNEDY'S APPOINTED AMBASSADOR
TO INDIA,
JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH.
ONE OF THE REASONS THAPRESIDENT KENNEDY CHOSE MY
FATHER TO BE AMBASSADOR
TO INDIA RATHER THAN KEEPING
HIM IN WASHINGTON
WAS THAT THIS PERMITTED
KENNEDY TO CALL ON MY FATHER
AS A FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR.
HE HAD THE EXPERIENCE OF
WATCHING THE FRENCH DEFEAT IN
INDOCHINA IN 1954,
SO HE HAD
VIEWS ON THESE MATTERS, AND
THOSE VIEWS WERE CLOSE TO
KENNEDY'S OWN.
SO GALBRAITH SENT A LETTER
TO KENNEDY IN APRIL OF 1962.
WHAT GALBRAITH WAS SUGGESTING
WAS THAT THEY COULD GET THE
INDIAN GOVERNMENT TO HELP
ESTABLISH SOME KIND OF CONTACWITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE.
THERE COULD BE SOME TALK
ABOUT A DEAL UNDER WHICH,
IF THEY WOULD LOWER
THE LEVEL OF INSURGENCY,
WE WOULD THEN BEGIN TO
WITHDRAW TROOPS, WE COULD TALK
ABOUT SOME CORRESPONDING EFFORTS
OR MOVES TO REDUCE TENSIONS
AND REDUCE THE LEVEL OF WAR.
AND JFK DEFINITELY BOUGHINTO THAT.
BUT THE STATE DEPARTMENT WAS
FILLED UP WITH HOLDOVERS
FROM THE EISENHOWER
ADMINISTRATION:
PEOPLE WHO HAD THESE VERY
RIGHT-WING VIEWS ON
EAST ASIAN POLICY.
AND SO, JFK UNDERSTOOD THAT;
HE KNEW HE WAS GOING TO HAVE
TO WORK AROUND THE
STATE DEPARTMENT BUREAUCRACY
AND REALLY, HARRIMAN WAS
THE LOGICAL PERSON FOR HIM
TO TURN TO.
AVERELL HARRIMAN WAS A VERY
EXPERIENCED DIPLOMAT.
HE HAD BEEN AMBASSADOR TO THE
SOVIET UNION IN THE SECOND
WORLD WAR.
HE'D BEEN GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK.
HARRIMAN HAD CALLED FOR
AVOIDING SENDING TROOPS
TO VIETNAM IN NOVEMBER OF 1961,
BUT WHAT HAPPENED WAS THAHARRIMAN MIGRATED FROM JFK'S
SIDE OF THE LEDGER TO THE
COALITION OF MILITARY AND STATE
DEPARTMENT PEOPLE WHO WERE
CALLING FOR SENDING TROOPS
TO SOUTH VIETNAM.
AND I DON'T THINK JFK UNDERSTOOD
THE DEGREE TO WHICH HE HAD
REALLY TURNED TO THE OTHER SIDE
ON THAT QUESTION.
JFK ORDERED AVERELL HARRIMAN
TO SEND A CABLE THAT INSTRUCTED
GALBRAITH TO ESTABLISH
A NEGOTIATING CHANNEL WITH
NORTH VIETNAM.
WHAT IS SO INTERESTING ABOUTHE DOCUMENT IS THAT IMMEDIATELY
HARRIMAN, IN VERY HEAVY
PENCIL, CROSSES OUT THE PAROF THE DIRECTION FROM THE
PRESIDENT THAT CALLS
FOR MUTUAL DE-ESCALATION.
HE ACTUALLY SAT ON THE
NEGOTIATING CABLE AND, IN FACT,
WHEN ONE OF HIS SUBORDINATES
TRIED TO WRITE A CABLE THAWAS HEADED IN THAT DIRECTION,
HE SAID, "NO, WE'RE NOT GOING
TO DO THAT."
AND THERE WAS NEVER
A CABLE SENT.
SO, IT WAS AN ASTONISHING CASE
OF A LEADING OFFICIAL
OF THE STATE DEPARTMENCOMPLETELY SUBVERTING
AN EXPLICIT ORDER FROM THE
PRESIDENT FOR TRYING TO CARRY
OUT A DIPLOMATIC POLICY.
WHAT HARRIMAN DID, I THINK,
WAS A REFLECTION OF A MUCH
BROADER PATTERN IN WHICH ALL
OF THESE ADVISORS WERE
ESSENTIALLY SUBVERTING WHAJFK WANTED TO DO.
THERE WAS A MINDSET THAT SAID
"NO NEGOTIATIONS FROM WEAKNESS"
AND WE'RE IN A WEAK POSITION
IN SOUTH VIETNAM, AND UNTIL THASITUATION TURNS ITSELF AROUND
AND WE CAN NEGOTIATE FROM
STRENGTH AND THE COMMUNISTS
UNDERSTAND THAT WE ARE WINNING
AND NOT LOSING, OF COURSE
WE ARE NOT GOING TO NEGOTIATE.
GALBRAITH WOULD LAUGH AT THAAND SAY,
"WEAKNESS, THE GREATEST COUNTRY
IN THE WORLD, THE STRONGESNATION IN THE WORLD,
CONTENDING WITH VIETNAM,
A COUNTRY OF 50 MILLION PEOPLE,
THAT HAS NO AIR-FORCE,
THAT HAS NO INDUSTRY, AND
THAT IS JUST EMERGING AS A
NATION, THE UNITED STATES
HAS TO BE AFRAID OF THAAND NOT SHOW WEAKNESS?"
AND IT'S NOT WEAKNESS,
WHICH THE PRESIDENT SAID
IN HIS INAUGURAL ADDRESS.
IT IS NOT WEAKNESS TO DISCUSS
OR TO NEGOTIATE FROM STRENGTH.
THE LACK OF FAITH IN
NEGOTIATIONS HELD BY MANY
U.S. OFFICIALS WENT MUCH
DEEPER THAN DISDAIN FOR
KENNEDY'S TRACK RECORD
IN FOREIGN POLICY.
FOR THOSE WHO FOUGHT AND WON
THE SECOND WORLD WAR,
ONE OF THE GREATEST ERRORS A
LEADER COULD MAKE WAS TO
TAKE AN ENEMY AT HIS WORD.
IN 1938, BRITISH PRIME MINISTER
NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN HAD BELIEVED
HE COULD NEGOTIATE PEACE
WITH ADOLF HITLER.
AS A RESULT, BRITISH WAR
PRODUCTION WAS DELAYED,
AND ENGLAND NEARLY LOST THE WAR.
"APPEASEMENT" WAS CONSIDERED
A DIRTY WORD BY A GENERATION OF
U.S. MILITARY LEADERS WHO KNEW
ALL TOO WELL THE HUMAN
PRICE OF NAVE LEADERSHIP.
AND DEVELOPMENTS IN CUBA
WERE ABOUT TO TEST THEM
TO THE LIMIT.
THE MISSILES THAT CAUSED THE
CRISIS WERE LARGE, MEDIUM RANGE
AND INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR
TIPPED BALLISTIC MISSILES.
THESE ARE MISSILES THAT CAN
FLY TO THE UNITED STATES,
HIT TEXAS AND NEW YORK CITY
AND A WIDE RANGE OF U.S.
TARGETS.
THE CIA DISCOVERED THE
MISSILES, AND PRESIDENT KENNEDY
WAS BRIEFED.
THE PRESIDENT ASKED BUNDY,
I'M TOLD, YOU KNOW,
"HOW MANY DAYS DO WE HAVE BEFORE
THIS BECOMES PUBLIC?"
AND BUNDY SAID,
"MAYBE A WEEK."
WE WERE RIGHT IN THE MIDDLE
OF POLITICAL ELECTION IN OCTOBER
OF '62, AND KENNEDY IS TORN
LOTS OF DIFFERENT WAYS.
HE ASSEMBLED, OF COURSE,
A SPECIAL GROUP THAT THEY CALLED
THE EXCOMM TO HELP HIM DEAL
WITH THIS.
ALL OF THE JOINT CHIEFS,
INCLUDING THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
JOINT CHIEFS, MAXWELL TAYLOR,
WHO WAS A FAVORITE OF KENNEDY'S,
FAVORED A MILITARY HIT ON THOSE
MISSILES FOLLOWED BY
AN INVASION.
GENERAL LEMAY'S ATTITUDE WAS,
"I'LL TAKE CARE OF THIS,
I'LL BOMB THE HELL OUT OF THEM."
AND THE PRESIDENT SAID, "NO."
AND THEN THE CHIEF OF STAFF
OF THE ARMY WANTED TO INVADE,
AND THE PRESIDENT SAID, "NO."
ON REFLECTION, AND HE HAD A
FEW DAYS TO REFLECT, HE THOUGHT,
"WELL, A WISER COURSE OF ACTION
WILL BE TO IMPOSE SOME KIND
OF NAVAL BLOCKADE ON CUBA
TO PREVENT MORE MISSILES FROM
REACHING THE ISLAND."
HE DECIDES TO FORGO VIOLENCE,
KNOWING THAT IF HE NEEDS TO
LATER ON, HE CAN INVADE CUBA,
AND ADOPT AN INTERIM STEP
OF QUARANTINE, WHICH BUYS TIME
FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH
THE SOVIET UNION.
WHEN CURTIS LEMAY HEARD THAKENNEDY WAS NOT GOING TO ATTACK
CUBA IMMEDIATELY,
HE WAS FURIOUS AND COMPARED THIS
TO CHAMBERLAIN'S APPEASEMENOF HITLER AT MUNICH.
AND LEMAY KNEW EXACTLY WHATHAT WAS ABOUT BECAUSE
JFK'S FATHER, OF COURSE,
WAS A GREAT SUPPORTER
OF NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN AND
BELIEVED IN TRYING TO
DEAL WITH HITLER.
CURTIS LEMAY,
THE CHIEF OF THE AIR FORCE
SAYS TO THE PRESIDENT,
"YOU'RE IN A BIG FIX,
MR. PRESIDENT," AND KENNEDY
IS TAKEN ABACK AND HE SAID,
"WHAT, WHAT DID YOU SAY?
AND LEMAY SAID,
"YOU'RE IN A BAD FIX!"
AND THE PRESIDENT SAID,
"AND YOU'RE RIGHT IN IWITH ME."
KENNEDY WENT ON TELEVISION
ON THE EVENING OF OCTOBER 22,
1962 AND GAVE WHAT IS CERTAINLY
THE MOST CHILLING, FRIGHTENING
OF PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESSES
TO THE NATION AND THE WORLD
THAT HAS EVER BEEN GIVEN.
WHEN HE CAME INTO THE ROOM,
HE WAS DELIBERATE, COOL.
I THOUGHT HE WAS NERVOUS.
BUT ONCE THE RED LIGHT WENT ON,
KENNEDY BRACED IN THAT SEAT,
LOOKED IN THE CAMERAS,
AND HE SAID "GOOD EVENING"
TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE,
AND TALKED ABOUT WHAT HE HAD TO
DO, BUT HE WAS A DIFFERENT GUY.
THIS GOVERNMENT, AS PROMISED,
HAS MAINTAINED THE CLOSESSURVEILLANCE OF THE SOVIEMILITARY BUILD UP ON THE ISLAND
OF CUBA.
WITHIN THE PAST WEEK,
UNMISTAKABLE EVIDENCE HAS
ESTABLISHED THE FACT THAT A
SERIES OF OFFENSIVE MISSILE
SITES IS NOW IN PREPARATION
ON THAT IMPRISONED ISLAND.
TO HALT THIS OFFENSIVE BUILD-UP,
A STRICT QUARANTINE ON ALL
OFFENSIVE MILITARY EQUIPMENUNDER SHIPMENT TO CUBA
IS BEING INITIATED.
ALL SHIPS OF ANY KIND BOUND
FOR CUBA FROM WHATEVER NATION OR
PORT, WERE THEY FOUND TO CONTAIN
CARGOS OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS,
BE TURNED BACK.
IT SHALL BE THE POLICY OF THIS
NATION TO REGARD ANY NUCLEAR
MISSILE LAUNCHED FROM CUBA
AGAINST ANY NATION IN THE
WESTERN HEMISPHERE AS AN ATTACK
BY THE SOVIET UNION ON
THE UNITED STATES REQUIRING A
FULL RETALIATORY RESPONSE
UPON THE SOVIET UNION.
WITH BOMBERS, JET FIGHTERS,
NAVY VESSELS AND OVER A HUNDRED
THOUSAND COMBAT PERSONNEL
ASSEMBLED IN THE GULF,
U.S. MILITARY OFFICIALS
PUSHED FOR AN INVASION.
THE INVASION WOULD HAVE BEEN
VERY SIMILAR IN SCALE TO THE
INVASION OF NORMANDY ON D-DAY
IN 1944.
BUT THEY DID NOT KNOW
THAT SOVIETS HAVE 94 TECHNICAL
NUCLEAR WEAPONS THERE.
THE SOVIETS SENT TACTICAL
BATTLEFIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS THATHE CIA NEVER REALLY UNDERSTOOD
WERE THERE.
THE SOVIETS HAD NUCLEAR
WEAPONS ON THE BEACH
WAITING FOR AN AMERICAN
INVASION FORCE, AND THAT COULD
HAVE BEEN EASILY THE BEGINNING
OF NUCLEAR WAR.
CASTRO SENT A MESSAGE TO
KHRUSHCHEV SAYING THAIF THE AMERICANS INVADE CUBA,
"YOU SHOULD ATTACK THE UNITED
STATES WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS."
THE TWO SUPER POWERS ARE
MARCHING ALMOST INEVITABLY
TOWARDS A NUCLEAR EXCHANGE.
THE U.S. MILITARY WAS NOONLY PRIMED TO ATTACK CUBA,
THE STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND WAS
PREPARED TO LAUNCH A NUCLEAR
STRIKE ON THE SOVIET UNION
ITSELF.
OVER 150 NUCLEAR MISSILES
AND TWELVE HUNDRED AIRPLANES
CARRYING NEARLY THREE
THOUSAND NUCLEAR WARHEADS
WERE ON STANDBY SHOULD
THE PRESIDENT GIVE THE ORDER.
WITH THE WORLD TEETERING
ON NUCLEAR DESTRUCTION,
BOTH KHRUSHCHEV AND KENNEDY
WERE DETERMINED TO FIND A
WAY OUT THAT WOULD NOT INVOLVE
ARMED CONFLICT.
WE KNOW TODAY THAT THE CRISIS
WAS OVERCOME THROUGH A SERIES
OF PERSONAL LETTERS EXCHANGED
BETWEEN NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV
AND JOHN KENNEDY.
KHRUSHCHEV'S OFFER TO KENNEDY
IS AN EXCHANGE OF SOVIEMISSILES IN CUBA FOR U.S.
MISSILES IN TURKEY AND ITALY.
THIS POSES A VERY DIFFICULPROBLEM FOR THE PRESIDENBECAUSE HE'S ALREADY BEEN
ACCUSED OF WEAKNESS BY THE JOINCHIEFS, BY HIS REPUBLICAN
OPPONENTS.
HE SECRETLY HAS HIS BROTHER
INFORM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR
THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL NOONLY PUBLICLY GUARANTEE THAWE WON'T BE INVADING CUBA IN THE
FUTURE, IF THE SOVIETS WITHDREW
THEIR MISSILES, BUT SECRETLY
THE UNITED STATES AND JOHN
KENNEDY PLEDGES TO START TO
DISMANTLE U.S. MISSILES
IN TURKEY SO THAT KHRUSHCHEV
CAN WALK AWAY FROM THIS
FEELING THAT HE GOSOMETHING HE NEEDED.
BOBBY KENNEDY TELLS DOBRYNIN
THAT TIME IS RUNNING OUT;
IT'S A MATTER OF HOURS BECAUSE
THE PRESIDENT IS COMING UNDER
PRESSURE FROM HIS SENIOR
MILITARY LEADERS TO DO
SOMETHING.
THE CUBAN MISSILES CRISIS
OFFICIALLY ENDED WITH A
BROADCAST ON SOVIET RADIO
OF NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV
AGREEING TO JOHN KENNEDY'S
PUBLIC PROPOSAL OF A
NON-INVASION PLEDGE OF CUBA,
THE MORNING OF OCTOBER 28, 1962.
The Soviet government has
ordered the dismantling of
weapons in Cuba, as well as
their crating and return
to the Soviet Union.
KHRUSHCHEV TOOK THE
INITIATIVE TO HAVE IT BROADCASAND IT WAS THE MESSAGE THAFINALLY BROKE THE CRISIS.
AFTER THE CUBAN MISSILE
CRISIS, WHEN THE SOVIETS
ANNOUNCED THAT THEY WERE
PULLING THEIR MISSILES OUT,
WHICH REALLY WAS A GREAVICTORY FOR THE WEST, KENNEDY
WISELY PUT THE WORD OUT,
"DO NOT GLOAT.
DO NOT BRAG ABOUT THIS.
DON'T TREAT THIS AS A VICTORY."
HE WAS VERY CAREFUL.
YOU NEVER RUB YOUR VICTORY
INTO YOUR OPPONENT'S FACE.
AT THE END OF THE MISSILE CRISIS
CURTIS LEMAY BELLOWED,
"WE LOST, WE SHOULD HAVE GONE IN
THERE AND CLEARED THEM OUWITH MISSILES AND BOMBS."
KENNEDY'S GREATNESS IN THE
MISSILE CRISIS WAS HE THOUGHIN TERMS OF AVOIDING THE
POINTLESS DEATHS OF MILLIONS OF
PEOPLE, WHETHER THEY WERE
AMERICANS OR RUSSIANS.
SO IN THAT SENSE, HE HAD
A KIND OF UNIVERSAL HUMANISM.
THERE'S A WEIRD SCENE AT THE
END OF THE MISSILE CRISIS
WHEN JACK AND BOBBY ARE TOGETHER
AND JACK KENNEDY, I GUESS
THINKING ABOUT LINCOLN
AFTER THE CIVIL WAR ON THE
NIGHT OF HIS ASSASSINATION,
LINCOLN WENT TO THE THEATER,
AND JACK KENNEDY SAYS TO
BOBBY, "THIS IS THE NIGHI SHOULD GO TO THE THEATRE."
AND BOBBY SAYS,
"IF YOU GO, I WILL GO, TOO."
I THINK ANY PRESIDENOF THE UNITED STATES
UNDERSTANDS THAT HIS LIFE
IS AT RISK.
AND I THINK JOHN KENNEDY,
WHO HAD HIS OWN VERY PERSONAL
SENSE OF MORTALITY THROUGH
THE DEATH OF HIS BROTHER,
THROUGH HIS OWN WOUNDING
IN THE WARS IN THE PACIFIC,
HAD A VERY REAL SENSE
OF THE POSSIBILITIES.
FOLLOWING THE CUBAN
MISSILE CRISIS,
KENNEDY HOPED TO FORGE A
NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH
NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV AND RESTARTALKS FOR A NUCLEAR TEST BAN.
INFORMED THAT NORMAN COUSINS,
EDITOR OF THE SATURDAY REVIEW
AND A NUCLEAR DISARMAMENACTIVIST, WAS HEADED
TO THE SOVIET UNION,
KENNEDY ASKED THAT HE CARRY
A PERSONAL MESSAGE
TO THE SOVIET LEADER.
KENNEDY DID WANT MY FATHER
TO TELL KHRUSHCHEV THAT THERE
WAS NO ONE IN THE UNITED STATES
MORE EAGER THAN HE
TO PUT ALL THESE
DIFFERENCES ASIDE.
KENNEDY FOUND OUT THACOUSINS WAS GOING TO BE IN
THE SOVIET UNION.
THIS WAS AN INSTANCE WHERE JFK
SAW AN INFLUENTIAL PRIVATE
CITIZEN WHO WAS ABLE TO BE A
GOOD BACK CHANNEL ENVOY,
AND JFK WAS INTERESTED IN
RESTARTING THE TEST BAN TREATY
TALKS WHICH HAD BROKEN DOWN
BECAUSE THERE WAS A
MISCOMMUNICATION ABOUT HOW
MANY ON-SITE TEST BAN VISITS
EACH SIDE WOULD GET EACH YEAR.
I REMEMBER MY FATHER TELLING
US THAT KENNEDY SAID HE WAS
VERY SCARED OF THE POWER OF THE
MILITARY IN THE UNITED STATES,
AND WHAT HE WAS SCARED OF IS
WHETHER THE MILITARY WOULD
SOMEHOW POSITION ITSELF AND
UNDERMINE HIS EXECUTIVE POWER.
ACCOMPANYING THEIR FATHER
TO SEE KHRUSHCHEV IN THE
SOVIET UNION WERE
ANDREA AND CANDICE COUSINS.
KHRUSHCHEV AT THAT POINT WAS
STAYING AT THIS LOVELY RETREAON THE EDGE OF THE BLACK SEA;
IT WAS SORT OF THE CAMP DAVID
OF THE SOVIET UNION.
WE CAME INTO THIS BEAUTIFUL
INDOOR/OUTDOOR ROOM WITH A
POOL, AND THERE WERE GLASS
PANELS, AND KHRUSHCHEV
PRESSED A BUTTON AND THE PANELS
FOLDED BACK.
AND THEN TO OUR SURPRISE,
HE SAYS TO MY SISTER ANDREA
AND TO ME,
"WHILE YOUR FATHER AND I
ARE TALKING,
WHY DON'T YOU TAKE A SWIM?"
WHILE WE WERE PADDLING AROUND
IN THE SWIMMING POOL,
MY FATHER AND KHRUSHCHEV
WERE OUT TALKING ABOUTHE FATE OF THE WORLD BASICALLY,
AND I DON'T KNOW,
I DON'T KNOW IF WE REALLY
UNDERSTOOD AT THAT TIME
HOW SERIOUS, HOW ENORMOUS
THESE QUESTIONS WERE,
AND HOW MUCH WAS AT STAKE.
WHAT KENNEDY WANTED FOR MY
FATHER TO CONVEY
TO KHRUSHCHEV WAS THAIT WAS TIME TO START AFRESH...
AND TO SEE IF THEY COULD GO
FORWARD WITH THEIR BASIC SHARED
INTENTION OF A TEST BAN TREATY.
AND KHRUSHCHEV SAID,
"WE'RE WILLING TO RESTART THESE
TALKS AND GET SOMETHING GOING,
BUT THE BALL'S IN JFK'S
COURT IN TERMS OF DOING IT."
EVENTUALLY, THEY CAME AND GOUS AND BROUGHT US BACK UP
TO KHRUSHCHEV'S STUDY, AND
KHRUSHCHEV TOOK OUT A GREABIG COAAND WAS FOOLING AROUND WITH
THE COAT, SORT OF PLAYING
HIDE AND SEEK, COVERING
HIMSELF UP WITH IT AND THROWING
IT OFF AND GROWLING, AND
THEN COVERING HIMSELF UP AGAIN.
IT WAS REALLY DELIGHTFUL
THAT THIS MAN--
HE WAS UNDER SO MUCH PRESSURE,
AND YET, HE HAD THIS CAPACITY
TO PLAY AND TO BE SILLY.
IT WAS VERY HARD TO SQUARE
THIS PERSONAL VIEW OF HIM
WITH THE WAY HE WAS PICTURED
IN THE AMERICAN MEDIA,
YOU KNOW, POUNDING HIS SHOE
AT THE U.N.--
"WE'LL BURY YOU."
YOU KNOW, IT WAS REALLY
HARD TO SQUARE THOSE TWO THINGS.
SO, COUSINS COMES BACK
IN APRIL OF 1963,
VISITS THE WHITE HOUSE ON
APRIL 22 AND REPORTS TO KENNEDY
THAT KHRUSHCHEV IS INTERESTED,
BUT SOME OF THE HARDLINERS ARE
VERY SKEPTICAL AND READY
TO DENOUNCE THE U.S.
COUSINS FOLLOWS UP WITH A LETTER
TO JFK WHERE HE SUGGESTS A
SPEECH OF BREATHTAKING
IMPORTANCE EXPRESSING HIS
FRIENDSHIP FOR THE SOVIETS,
UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT THEY
WENT THROUGH IN THE WAR,
AND HE POINTS OUT THAT THE
SOVIET CENTRAL COMMITTEE IS
GOING TO MEET IN JUNE OF
THAT YEAR, AND SAYS THAWOULD BE A GOOD TIME TO DO IT.
AND, OF COURSE, JFK FORWARDS
THE LETTER ON TO TED SORENSON,
HIS CHIEF SPEECH WRITER,
AND THEY AGREE THAT SINCE JFK IS
GOING TO SPEAK AT AMERICAN
UNIVERSITY ON JUNE 10,
THAT WOULD BE THE TIME FOR SUCH
A SPEECH.
I HAVE THEREFORE CHOSEN THIS
TIME AND PLACE TO DISCUSS A
TOPIC ON WHICH IGNORANCE TOO
OFTEN ABOUNDS AND THE TRUTH TOO
RARELY PERCEIVED,
AND THAT IS THE MOST IMPORTANTOPIC ON EARTH, PEACE.
WHAT KIND OF A PEACE DO I MEAN
AND WHAT KIND OF A PEACE DO WE
SEEK?
NOT A "PAX AMERICANA,"
ENFORCED ON THE WORLD BY
AMERICAN WEAPONS OF WAR;
NOT THE PEACE OF THE GRAVE,
OR THE SECURITY OF THE SLAVE.
I AM TALKING ABOUT GENUINE
PEACE, THE KIND OF PEACE THAMAKES LIFE ON EARTH
WORTH LIVING.
CERTAINLY THE AMERICAN
UNIVERSITY SPEECH WAS A BREAK
WITH THE PREVAILING WISDOM
AND A BREAK WITH THE
ESTABLISHMENT, WHAT THE
ESTABLISHMENT VIEW OF
THE COLD WAR WAS AND WHETHER
OR NOT WE CAN SURVIVE AND
LIVE WITH THE SOVIETS.
EVERY THOUGHTFUL CITIZEN
WHO DESPAIRS OF WAR AND WISHES
TO BRING PEACE SHOULD BEGIN BY
LOOKING INWARD BY EXAMINING HIS
OWN ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE
POSSIBILITIES OF PEACE,
TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION,
TOWARDS THE COURSE
OF THE COLD WAR,
AND TOWARDS FREEDOM AND PEACE
HERE AT HOME.
FIRST, EXAMINE OUR ATTITUDE
TOWARDS PEACE ITSELF.
TOO MANY OF US
THINK IT IS IMPOSSIBLE.
TOO MANY THINK IT IS
UNREAL, BUT THAT IS A DANGEROUS,
DEFEATIST BELIEF.
IT LEADS TO THE CONCLUSION
THAT WAR IS INEVITABLE,
THAT MANKIND IS DOOMED,
THAT WE ARE GRIPPED BY FORCES
WE CANNOT CONTROL.
WE NEED NOT ACCEPT THAT VIEW.
OUR PROBLEMS ARE MAN-MADE,
THEREFORE THEY CAN BE SOLVED
BY MAN.
WHEN KENNEDY DELIVERED HIS
SPEECH AT AMERICAN UNIVERSITY,
IT PROVIDED A SIGNAL TO THE
SOVIET PEOPLE THAT THERE COULD
BE A NEW BEGINNING.
TO MAKE CLEAR OUR GOOD FAITH
AND SOLEMN CONVICTIONS
ON THIS MATTER,
I NOW DECLARE THATHE UNITED STATES DOES NOPROPOSE TO CONDUCT NUCLEAR
TESTS IN THE ATMOSPHERE,
SO LONG AS OTHER STATES
DO NOT DO SO.
WE WILL NOT...
WE WILL NOT BE THE FIRSTO RESUME.
SUCH A DECLARATION IS NO
SUBSTITUTE FOR A FORMAL, BINDING
TREATY, BUT I HOPE IT WILL
HELP US ACHIEVE ONE.
IN SHORT, KENNEDY MADE AN
ADVANCE TOWARDS KHRUSHCHEV,
TOWARDS THE NEED FOR MORE
DISCUSSIONS AND FOR A CLOSER
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO,
AND THAT DID NOT FALL ON DEAF
EARS, LET ME ASSURE YOU.
MY FATHER'S RESPECT TO THE
KENNEDY GREW THROUGH THESE
YEARS, ESPECIALLY THROUGH
THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS.
MY FATHER REPEATED THA"WE ARE VERY DIFFERENT,
WE DEFEND OUR SYSTEMS
ON THE BOTH SIDES,
THEY'RE DIFFERENT,
WE HAVE ONE IN COMMON:
WE WANT TO PREVENT THE WAR.
AND I CAN DEAL WITH THE
PRESIDENT KENNEDY."
I THINK THE AMERICAN
UNIVERSITY SPEECH
WAS A MILESTONE IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS--
NO QUESTION ABOUT IT.
WITH A LITTLE DIPLOMACY AND
KENNEDY'S STYLE,
HE BROUGHT KHRUSHCHEV
AROUND, AND WE HAVE A TESBAN TREATY TODAY.
MANY HAVE ARGUED THAT THE
LIMITED NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY
WAS KENNEDY'S GREATESACCOMPLISHMENT AS PRESIDENT.
HOW THIS ACHIEVEMENT WOULD RANK
HAD KENNEDY LIVED AND BEEN
PERMITTED TO FULFILL HIS OTHER
FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES
IS DIFFICULT TO MEASURE.
IN OCTOBER OF 1963,
PRESIDENT KENNEDY MADE A
DECISION TO BRING THE
THEN-EXISTING U.S. FORCES
IN VIETNAM OUT OVER
A CERTAIN TIMETABLE.
NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION
MEMORANDUM 263
WAS A DECISION DOCUMENTHAT BASICALLY
SUMMARIZED KENNEDY'S
APPROVAL TO BRING OUTHE 17,000 OR SO U.S. FORCES
THAT WERE IN VIETNAM
AT THAT TIME.
THE FIRST 1,000 WOULD BE
WITHDRAWN BY THE END OF
1963, THE REMAINDER WOULD
BE OUT BY THE END OF '65.
AND THAT WAS A FORMAL
PRESIDENTIAL DECISION.
IT WAS THE POLICY
OF THE UNITED STATES
ON THE DAY HE DIED.
THAT'S, IN FACT, NO LONGER,
I THINK,
HISTORICALLY CONTROVERSIAL.
THE MOST IMPORTANT INDICATION
OF THE THINKING OF JFK
ABOUT HIS POLICY TOWARD VIETNAM
WAS THAT THE DAY BEFORE HE WAS
SHOT DOWN, HE HAD A CONVERSATION
WITH HIS NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL STAFF MEMBER,
WHO WORKED ON SOUTHEAST ASIA,
MICHAEL FORRESTAL, IN WHICH
HE SAID THAT HE WANTED TO
INITIATE A COMPLETE, THOROUGH
REVIEW OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD
VIETNAM, AND THAT THE REVIEW
HAD TO INCLUDE OR INVOLVE THE
WHOLE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE
UNITED STATES SHOULD BE THERE
AT ALL.
PERHAPS EVEN MORE STARTLING
THAN KENNEDY'S PLAN TO WITHDRAW
PERSONNEL FROM VIETNAM
WAS HIS SECRET EFFORT TO ENGAGE
FIDEL CASTRO IN A DIALOGUE.
JOHN F. KENNEDY WAS
RESPONSIBLE FOR SOME OF THE
MOST INFAMOUS ACTS OF AGGRESSION
AGAINST CUBA AND YET,
SECRETLY HE WAS,
AT THE TIME OF HIS DEATH,
PURSUING AN ACCOMMODATION
WITH FIDEL CASTRO.
KENNEDY'S APPROACH TO CASTRO
WAS BURIED IN SECRET DOCUMENTS
THAT WERE IN A VAULT AT THE
KENNEDY LIBRARY UNTIL I ASKED
FOR THE ENTIRE FILE,
WHICH WAS TITLED,
"CONTACTS WITH CUBAN
LEADERS TO BE DECLASSIFIED
IN THE LATE 1990s."
COULD THE UNITED STATES
ACTUALLY NEGOTIATE DIRECTLY
WITH CASTRO?
TOP STATE DEPARTMENT AIDES
WERE SAYING, "THE UNITED STATES
WON'T TALK TO CUBA UNLESS CUBA
THROWS THE SOVIET UNION OUAND PROMISES, GUARANTEES
THAT IT WILL STOP SCREWING
AROUND IN THE REST OF LATIN
AMERICA AND PROMOTING REVOLUTION
AGAINST THE U.S. INTERESTS.
AND KENNEDY ACTUALLY TOOK A
VERY DIFFERENT POSITION.
HE TOLD MCGEORGE BUNDY,
HIS NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR,
"I DON'T THINK WE SHOULD BOX
FIDEL CASTRO INTO A CORNER.
I DON'T THINK WE SHOULD MAKE
PRE-CONDITIONAL DEMANDS
FOR TALKING TO HIM
THAT HE MAY NOT BE ABLE
TO MEET."
MY FATHER, HE REPEATEDLY TOLD
FIDEL CASTRO THAT,
"I TRUST KENNEDY.
I TRUST THAT HE WILL NOT INVADE
YOUR COUNTRY, AND WE HAVE
ANOTHER SIX YEARS BECAUSE
I BELIEVE THAT HE WILL
BE REELECTED."
WHILE U.S. EFFORTS TO
DESTABILIZE FIDEL CASTRO'S
GOVERNMENT CONTINUED,
KENNEDY WORKED THROUGH BACK
CHANNELS TO EXPLORE
THE POSSIBILITY OF TALKS.
IN NOVEMBER OF 1963,
A BREAKTHROUGH SEEMED NEAR,
AND KENNEDY SENT WORD TO CASTRO
THAT HE WAS OPEN TO NEGOTIATING
AN AGREEMENT.
HE SENT HIS OWN EMISSARY
TO TALK TO FIDEL CASTRO,
A FRENCH JOURNALISNAMED JEAN DANIEL WHO HAD
COME TO WASHINGTON IN OCTOBER,
MET WITH THE PRESIDENT,
AND WHEN THE PRESIDENFOUND OUT THAT HE WAS ON
HIS WAY TO CUBA, HE BASICALLY
SENT A MESSAGE TO FIDEL CASTRO
WITH JEAN DANIEL.
AND JEAN DANIEL WAS GIVING
THIS MESSAGE TO FIDEL CASTRO
ON NOVEMBER 22, 1963.
CASTRO HIMSELF WAS SAYING
THAT KENNEDY MIGHT BECOME
A HISTORIC PRESIDENT,
ONE OF THE FIRST PRESIDENTS
WHO UNDERSTOOD THAT THE WORLD
WAS A DIVERSE PLACE AND THATHE UNITED STATES COULD LIVE
WITH COMMUNIST REGIMES
PEACEFULLY.
AND SO THEY WERE TALKING
ABOUT THIS WHEN, DRAMATICALLY,
AN AIDE CAME IN AND SAID,
"THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES HAS BEEN SHOT."
CASTRO TURNED TO JEAN DANIEL
AND SAID,
"THERE GOES YOUR MISSION
OF PEACE."
MY FATHER WAS VERY NERVOUS
BECAUSE HE DIDN'T KNOW
WHO COULD DO IT.
AND THAT MEAN THAT SOME
HAWKISH AMERICANS
KILLED THE PRESIDENT WHO WANTO PRESERVE PEACE AND MAYBE
TOMORROW THEY WILL STARNUCLEAR WAR AGAINSTHE SOVIET UNION BECAUSE
KILLING AMERICAN PRESIDENT,
IT IS NOT A SMALL EVENT,
SO HE WAS VERY NERVOUS.
ONE OF THE SADNESSES OF MY
GROWING UP WAS THAT WHEN
I WAS A BOY AND KENNEDY CAME TO
OFFICE--I WAS 10 YEARS OLD
WHEN HE WAS ELECTED PRESIDENT--
THERE WAS THIS GREAT BELIEF IN
PUBLIC SERVICE, IN PUBLIC LIFE
AND BY THE TIME I WAS A YOUNG
MAN BECAUSE OF VIETNAM AND
WATERGATE, THAT HOPEFULNESS HAD
TURNED TO CYNICISM AND APATHY.
THAT'S A GREAT SADNESS TO ME,
AND WE'VE NEVER QUITE
OVERCOME IT.
THOSE WHO WERE LIVING ON THIS
PLANET AT THAT TIME HAD NEVER
EXPERIENCED A PRESIDENT BEING
ASSASSINATED, SO THIS WAS A
SHOCK BEYOND BELIEF.
IT WAS JUST...
STAGGERING, YEAH.
I THINK THE MOST IMPORTANTHINGS THAT KENNEDY DID FOR US
AND FOR THE SURVIVAL OF THE
PLANET WAS THAT HE WAS ABLE TO
GO AGAINST A GROUP THAT WAS
POWERFUL AND SPEAK UP IN SPITE
OF THE FACT THAT HE WAS ALONE.
I THINK THAT THAT'S A--
MAYBE THE HARDEST THING
FOR A PERSON TO DO.
KENNEDY SAID FAMOUSLY.
"ONE MAN CAN MAKE A DIFFERENCE,
AND EVERYONE SHOULD TRY."
THAT IS PROFOUNDLY TRUE.
AND IT'S NOT JUST TRUE OF
PRESIDENTS AND WITH PRESIDENTS.
IT'S TRUE OF ALL OF US,
WHEREVER WE MAY BE,
WHEREVER WE MAY BE IN LIFE.
THE NUCLEAR THREAT IS NOONLY STILL WITH US,
BUT IT'S GREATER THAN EVER.
AND IT IS POSSIBLE
TO TAKE A STAND AGAINST IT.
BUT TAKING A STAND AGAINST IT,
AS WE KNOW FROM KENNEDY,
IS NOT JUST A DIFFICULT THING,
BUT IT'S A DANGEROUS THING.
BUT IT MUST BE DONE ANYWAY.
male announcer: IN A 1964 COUP,
NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV WAS REMOVED
FROM POWER BY SOVIECONSPIRATORS WHO CLAIMED HIS
RESIGNATION WAS DUE TO
ADVANCED AGE AND POOR HEALTH.
SOURCES IN MOSCOW LATER REVEALED
THAT BEHIND KHRUSHCHEV'S
DISMISSAL WAS THE HUMILIATION
OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
AND DISSATISFACTION WITH HIS
LEADERSHIP.
FORCED FROM PUBLIC LIFE,
KHRUSHCHEV'S NAME WAS OMITTED
FROM RUSSIAN HISTORY BOOKS,
AND IN 1971, THE FORMER SOVIELEADER WAS DENIED
A STATE FUNERAL.
ACCORDING TO DECLASSIFIED
RECORDS, IN THE MONTH FOLLOWING
HIS BROTHER'S ASSASSINATION,
ATTORNEY GENERAL ROBERT F.
KENNEDY SENT A MEMO TO SECRETARY
OF STATE DEAN RUSK SEEKING AN
END TO THE U.S. TRAVEL BAN
TO CUBA, CALLING I"INCONSISTENT WITH TRADITIONAL
AMERICAN LIBERTIES."
TODAY AT THE UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL ASSEMBLY, A RESOLUTION
CALLING FOR AN END TO THE
ECONOMIC, COMMERCIAL, AND
FINANCIAL BLOCKADE IMPOSED BY
THE UNITED STATES ON CUBA
WAS ADOPTED BY A MARGIN OF
188 TO 3.
THIS MARKS THE 21st CONSECUTIVE
YEAR THE UNITED STATES HAS
IGNORED U.N. CONDEMNATION OVER
ITS CUBAN POLICIES.
PENTAGON PAPERS MADE PUBLIC
TODAY REVEALED NEW DETAILS
SURROUNDING THE EARLY DAYS
OF THE VIETNAM WAR.
ACCORDING TO THE PAPERS,
PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S PLAN FOR
DISENGAGEMENT OF ALL U.S.
MILITARY PERSONNEL IN SOUTH
VIETNAM BY 1965 WAS REVERSED
BY THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION
LESS THAN A YEAR AFTER KENNEDY'S
DEATH.
TENS OF THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE
HAVE TAKEN PART IN CELEBRATIONS
TO MARK 30 YEARS SINCE THE END
OF THE VIETNAM WAR TODAY.
BY THE TIME THE UNITED STATES
WITHDREW ITS FORCES IN 1975,
THE TRAGIC CONFLICT HAD CLAIMED
THE LIVES OF SOME 60,000
AMERICANS, 1 MILLION VIETNAMESE
SOLDIERS, AND NEARLY HALF A
MILLION VIETNAMESE CIVILIANS.
1960s, MANY AMERICANS FEARED
THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS
PLANNING A SURPRISE NUCLEAR
ATTACK ON THE UNITED STATES.
WHAT THEY DIDN'T KNOW WAS
THAT THEIR OWN GOVERNMENWAS CONSIDERING LAUNCHING
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINSTHE SOVIET UNION FIRST.
ON JULY 20, 1961,
HIGH-RANKING OFFICIALS INCLUDING
THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS
OF STAFF PRESENTED A PLAN
FOR A NUCLEAR FIRST STRIKE
TO PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY.
THE MEETING WAS TOP SECRET.
NO OFFICIAL RECORD
OF ITS CONTENT WAS FOUND
...UNTIL 1993.
THIS WAS A MEETING THAT WAS
HELD AT A TIME WHEN KENNEDY
WAS RECEIVING VERY BELLIGERENADVICE FROM SOME SENIOR
ADVISORS.
A MEMORANDUM WAS PREPARED
FOR VICE PRESIDENT JOHNSON
SUMMARIZING THE SEQUENCE OF
DISCUSSION AT THE MEETING
AND THAT MEMORANDUM WAS
DECLASSIFIED IN 1993.
UNTIL WE HAD THE BURRIS
MEMORANDUM, WE DIDN'T HAVE
A NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF
WHAT WAS SAID.
PRESIDENT KENNEDY WAS BEING
PRESENTED WITH A SCENARIO FOR
LAUNCHING A PRE-EMPTIVE SURPRISE
ATTACK BY THE UNITED STATES
ON THE SOVIET UNION.
THE SOVIETS WERE LAGGING
BEHIND IN THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE,
AND TOP U.S. MILITARY OFFICIALS
SUGGESTED A NUCLEAR FIRSSTRIKE MIGHT BE THE BEST OPTION
BEFORE THEY CAUGHT UP.
THE UNITED STATES HAD B-52s
CIRCLING THE SOVIET UNION
IN THE AIR ON A ROTATION BASIS.
EACH ONE OF THE BOMBS THAONE B-52 CARRIED HAD MANY
TIMES THE FIREPOWER
OF ONE HIROSHIMA.
YOU ALSO HAVE TO REMEMBER
THERE WERE FIXED MISSILES,
AND THERE WERE MISSILES
IN SUBMARINES.
THE PLAN SUGGESTED A SURPRISE
ATTACK IN LATE 1963.
THE COST WOULD BE CATASTROPHIC.
IN A FULL-SCALE NUCLEAR EXCHANGE
AN ESTIMATED 300 MILLION
PEOPLE WOULD DIE.
FACED WITH THE HORROR OF NUCLEAR
FALLOUT INCLUDING CANCER,
LEUKEMIA, AND BIRTH DEFECTS,
THE SURVIVORS WOULD ENVY
THE DEAD.
IT'S VERY HARD TO IMAGINE
THAT ANY SIGNIFICANORGANIZED HUMAN SOCIETY
WOULD HAVE SURVIVED.
THIS IS A QUESTION OF WHETHER
HUMAN LIFE, IN ANY CIVILIZED
FORM, IS GOING TO SURVIVE
AT ALL.
SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN RUSK
WROTE IN HIS MEMOIR THAAS THEY LEFT THE MEETING,
KENNEDY SAID TO HIM IN
DISPARAGING TONES,
"AND WE CALL OURSELVES
THE HUMAN RACE".
KENNEDY HAD AN ENTIRELY
DIFFERENT VIEW
ABOUT THE STRATEGIC FUTURE.
IT'S, I THINK, VERY CLEAR
THAT THIS MEETING INTENSIFIED
FOR HIM THE SENSE OF DANGER
THAT A WAR MIGHT BE UNLEASHED
IN CIRCUMSTANCES THAT HE
MIGHT NOT BE FULLY IN
CONTROL OF.
EVERY MAN, WOMAN, AND CHILD
LIVES UNDER A NUCLEAR SOROF DAMOCLES, HANGING BY THE
SLENDEREST OF THREADS,
CAPABLE OF BEING CUT AT ANY
MOMENT, BY ACTION,
OR MISCALCULATION,
OR BY MADNESS.
THE WEAPONS OF WAR MUST BE
ABOLISHED, BEFORE THEY
ABOLISH US.
IN 1961, THE UNITED STATES
WAS ENGAGED IN A PROTRACTED
COLD WAR WITH THE SOVIET UNION,
RED CHINA,
AND THE COMMUNIST BLOC.
THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF
PRESIDENTS HARRY TRUMAN
AND DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
HAD TRIED TO CONTAIN COMMUNISM
...THEN ROLL IT BACK.
BUT SOVIET PREMIERE
NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV
REMAINED DEFIANT.
WITH BOTH SIDES
ESCALATING THE PRODUCTION
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS,
CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE
SUPERPOWERS IN CUBA, BERLIN,
AND VIETNAM THREATENED
TO TURN THE COLD WAR HOT.
IT WAS INTO THESE CIRCUMSTANCES
THAT JOHN F. KENNEDY,
AT THE AGE OF 43,
WAS ELECTED THE 35TH PRESIDENOF THE UNITED STATES.
THE SCENE ON JANUARY 19, 1961
WAS A REMARKABLE ONE.
THERE WAS THE OLDEST PRESIDENIN THE HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES, AGE 70,
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER,
SITTING DOWN WITH THE
YOUNGEST PRESIDENT EVER
TO BE ELECTED, JOHN F. KENNEDY,
THE DAY BEFORE HIS INAUGURATION,
AND SHARING WITH HIM THE MOSINTIMATE CONVERSATION A
PRESIDENT THOSE DAYS COULD HAVE,
WHICH IS:
WHAT DO YOU DO IF IT COMES
TO MAKING A DECISION ABOUNUCLEAR USE?
HE OPENS UP THE SATCHEL
IN WHICH THE COMPUTER-LIKE
DEVICE IS IN THAT'S KNOWN
AS A "NUCLEAR FOOTBALL".
GENERAL POWER, THE HEAD OF THE
U.S. STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND,
HAS STARTED ROUND-THE-CLOCK
BOMBER PROTECTION OF THE
UNITED STATES AGAINSA POTENTIAL NUCLEAR ATTACK
BY THE SOVIETS.
EISENHOWER SAYS WHAT HE WANTS
KENNEDY TO KNOW ABOUKHRUSHCHEV IS,
"HE'S BRUTAL, INCALCULABLE;
HE'S GONNA RUN HOT AND COLD
ON YOU."
IT STRUCK KENNEDY THAEISENHOWER WAS REFERRING
TO THE SOVIETS MORE AS ANIMALS
TO BE TAMED RATHER THAN
NEGOTIATING PARTNERS.
I REMEMBER, YOU KNOW, BEING
THERE AT INAUGURATION DAY.
OH, BOY, IT WAS COLD.
I REMEMBER HE SAID, "WE MUSNEVER NEGOTIATE OUT OF FEAR."
LET US NEVER NEGOTIATE OUOF FEAR, BUT LET US NEVER
FEAR TO NEGOTIATE.
BUT THEN HE WENT ON TO SAY,
"BUT WE MUST NEVER FEAR
TO NEGOTIATE,"
AND I SAID, "UH OH.
THERE'S SOMETHING NEW.
WE'VE JUST TURNED,
TURNED THE PAGE."
KENNEDY, THE FIRST U.S.
PRESIDENT BORN IN THE 20th
CENTURY, INSPIRED A YOUTHFUL
GENERATION EAGER FOR
FRESH LEADERSHIP.
THERE WAS A FEELING AT THE
BEGINNING OF THE KENNEDY
ADMINISTRATION THAT A NEW ERA
HAD BEGUN.
JOHN F. KENNEDY CAME
PROMISING A NEW FRONTIER.
IT WAS GOING TO BE A TIME
OF ENDLESS OPPORTUNITY.
AND TO BE PART OF THAT ERA
WAS ONE OF THE GREAT HONORS
OF ONE'S LIFE.
I'LL NEVER FORGET THE FIRSTIME I WALKED INTO THE
WHITE HOUSE TO SEE MY OLD
FRIEND KEN O'DONNELL,
WHO WAS PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S
APPOINTMENT SECRETARY.
WE JUST LOOKED AT EACH OTHER
AND BURST OUT LAUGHING.
YOU KNOW, WHAT ARE PEOPLE LIKE
US DOING IN A PLACE LIKE THIS?
I WAS THE YOUNGEST MEMBER
OF THE KENNEDY WHITE HOUSE.
I HAD GRADUATED FROM COLLEGE...
LAST.
EVERYBODY WAS VERY EXCITED.
WE KNEW WE WERE MAKING HISTORY.
WE WERE READY TO GO.
I TRAVELED EVERYWHERE
WITH HIM.
HE WAS SUCH AN EXCITING MAN,
BUT ALSO ONE OF GREAT PRINCIPLE.
WE WERE CALLED SPECIAL
COUNCIL, AND I WAS ASSISTANSPECIAL COUNCIL.
IT WAS JUST PERFECTLY OBVIOUS
THE GUY HAD A FIRST-RATE MIND,
AND HE KNEW HOW TO USE IT.
FOR EXAMPLE TAKING
ARTHUR SCHLESINGER,
THE MOST RENOWNED
HISTORIAN IN THE COUNTRY
AND MAKING HIM A SPECIAL
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENIN THE WHITE HOUSE SO THATHE PRESIDENT HAD REFERENCE
TO A HISTORIAN WHO COULD PUEVENTS IN PERSPECTIVE.
JFK PULLED DAD ASIDE
AND SAID, "BOBBY TELLS ME THAYOU'RE GONNA COME WORK
IN THE WHITE HOUSE."
AND DAD SAID, "WELL, OBVIOUSLY
AS A HISTORIAN IT'S A GREAOPPORTUNITY, I'M VERY EXCITED
ABOUT IT, BUT I REALLY DON'KNOW WHAT I'LL BE DOING."
AND KENNEDY SAID, "WELL, I DON'KNOW WHAT I WILL BE DOING
EITHER, BUT I'M SURE THERE
WILL BE PLENTY OF WORK
FOR BOTH OF US."
DURING THE KENNEDY YEARS,
I WAS A CORRESPONDENT ASSIGNED
TO JOHN KENNEDY FOR THE
1960 CAMPAIGN.
I WENT WITH HIM INTO THE
WHITE HOUSE BECAUSE I HAD
ALREADY BEEN COVERING
EISENHOWER AT THE WHITE HOUSE.
KENNEDY WAS A FORCE
IN THIS TOWN--
WELL-VERSED ON FOREIGN POLICY
AND VERY ARTICULATE.
FROM THE OUTSET OF HIS
PRESIDENCY, KENNEDY KNEW
IT WAS IMPORTANT TO FULLY
ASSESS HIS COLD WAR ADVERSARY,
NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV.
ADVISERS HAD WARNED HIM THAT THE
HOT-TEMPERED SOVIET LEADER
WOULD USE THREATS AND
INTIMIDATION TO IMPOSE HIS WILL.
CAREFULLY WEIGHING
KHRUSHCHEV'S WORDS AND ACTIONS,
KENNEDY HOPED TO GAIN A TRUE
MEASURE OF THE MAN.
PRESIDENT KENNEDY WASN'T EVEN
HOME FROM HIS INAUGURAL DAY
PARTIES WHEN KHRUSHCHEV DECIDED
TO SHOWER HIM WITH CONCILIATION.
FIRST AND FOREMOST,
HE DECIDED TO PUBLISH
THE ENTIRE INAUGURAL SPEECH.
THEN HE WAS READY TO RELEASE
TWO CAPTURED AIRMEN FROM THE
RECONNAISSANCE PLANE THAT HAD
BEEN SHOT DOWN THE PREVIOUS
AUGUST.
HE'D BEEN HOLDING THESE AIRMEN
SO AS NOT TO HELP VICE PRESIDENNIXON IN HIS CAMPAIGN AGAINSKENNEDY.
AND THIS WAS NOW GOING TO BE
HIS INAUGURAL GIFT.
THEREAFTER, HE ALSO MADE KNOWN
THAT 500 ELDERLY SOVIETS
WOULD BE ABLE TO REUNITE WITH
THEIR FAMILIES IN THE U.S.
KHRUSHCHEV IS
ESSENTIALLY SAYING,
"WE WANT A NEW START.
WE HAVE GREAT HOPES IN
THIS RELATIONSHIP.
WE REALLY ARE GOING TO WORK
VERY EARLY IN YOUR
ADMINISTRATION FOR SOME
BREAKTHROUGHS."
NIKITA IST IN DIE
WELTGESCHICHTE MIT SEINEM
SCHUH EINGEGANGEN.
MY FATHER WANTED TO
IMPROVE RELATIONS
WITH UNITED STATES.
FIRST OF ALL,
HE WAS A REFORMER BECAUSE
HE REALLY STARTED REFORMATION
OF RUSSIA WHEN HE CAME TO
THE POWER AFTER THE STALIN DAYS.
AND SECONDLY,
MY FATHER WAS IN TWO WARS,
AND HE EVEN COULD NOT WATCH
MOVIE ABOUT THE WAR BECAUSE
IT CAME BACK IN HIS MEMORY
WHAT REALLY HAPPENED,
AND HE COULD NOT SLEEP AFTER
THIS, SO HE WANT TO SHOW
TO THE NEW PRESIDENHIS POSITIVE FEELINGS
TOWARD THE UNITED STATES.
WHILE KHRUSHCHEV'S GOODWILL
GESTURES APPEARED TO SIGNAL
A DESIRE FOR A NEW BEGINNING,
KENNEDY PLACED GREATER EMPHASIS
ON AN INFLAMMATORY SPEECH
THE SOVIET LEADER HAD GIVEN
ONLY A FEW WEEKS EARLIER.
IN IT, KHRUSHCHEV HAD SAID
HE INTENDED TO BEATHE UNITED STATES WITH
"SMALL WARS OF LIBERATION"
ALL OVER THE WORLD.
CHAIRMAN KHRUSHCHEV THREW
DOWN THE GAUNTLET IN THE THIRD
WORLD BY ESSENTIALLY ARGUING
THAT THE SOVIET UNION'S FOREIGN
POLICY NOW INCREASINGLY
WOULD BE TO SUPPORT NATIONAL
INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENTS WHERE
THE SUPER POWERS BOTH
ESSENTIALLY TRIED TO GAIN
INFLUENCE.
KENNEDY WAS REALLY QUITE UPSEABOUT THIS SPEECH, AND HE GAVE
THE TEXT OF THIS SPEECH TO ALL
OF HIS ADVISORS AND SAID,
"YOU NEED TO READ THIS."
KENNEDY ENDS UP CARRYING THIS
SPEECH AROUND IN HIS POCKET,
AND HE PULLS IT OUT WITH EXPERTS
IN HIS NEW ADMINISTRATION, AND
HE READS FROM THE SPEECH
HE'S SO OBSESSED WITH THE
MESSAGE THAT KHRUSHCHEV IS
TRYING TO SEND HIM.
IN A DRAMATIC SHIFT IN TONE,
KENNEDY USED TOUGH LANGUAGE
TO CONFRONT THE SOVIET THREAT,
AND AT HIS FIRSSTATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS,
HE ANNOUNCED HIS INTENTION
TO ACCELERATE U.S. MISSILE
AND SUBMARINE PRODUCTION.
EACH DAY, WE DRAW NEARER
THE HOUR OF MAXIMUM DANGER
AS WEAPONS SPREAD AND
HOSTILE FORCES GROW STRONGER.
I FEEL I MUST INFORM THE
CONGRESS THAT OUR ANALYSIS
OVER THE LAST TEN DAYS
MAKE IT CLEAR THAT IN EACH
OF THE PRINCIPLE AREAS
OF CRISIS, THE TIDE OF EVENTS
HAS BEEN RUNNING OUT, AND TIME
HAS NOT BEEN OUR FRIEND.
THE LANGUAGE OF THE STATE
OF THE UNION WAS ALMOSAPOCALYPTIC IN NATURE AND
SUCH A SHIFT FROM CONCILIATION
TO CONFRONTATION.
AND HE IGNORES THE CONCILIATORY
GESTURES AND NEVER REALLY
ADEQUATELY TESTS THEM--
MAYBE THEY WOULD HAVE AMOUNTED
TO NOTHING, BUT WE'LL NEVER
KNOW BECAUSE HE NEVER REALLY
TESTED THEM.
KENNEDY'S STRUGGLE
TO UNDERSTAND HOW BEST TO DEAL
WITH THE SOVIETS
WAS ONLY JUST BEGINNING.
KENNEDY'S PRESIDENCY WAS VERY
SUBSTANTIALLY ABSORBED BY
THE CHALLENGE OF THE COLD WAR,
WHICH PLAYED ITSELF OUT ON
STAGES ALL OVER THE WORLD:
BERLIN, CUBA, VIETNAM.
AND HE'S OBLIGED TO KEEP TABS
ON THESE MATTERS CONTINUALLY.
BERLIN...
NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV CALLED I"THE MOST DANGEROUS PLACE
ON EARTH."
SINCE THE END OF THE SECOND
WORLD WAR, SOVIET, BRITISH,
FRENCH AND AMERICAN FORCES
HAD STOOD FACE-TO-FACE IN THE
STREETS OF THE OCCUPIED CITY.
AND THE SITUATION WAS
GROWING TENSER BY THE DAY.
ONE THING KENNEDY BROUGHWITH HIM INTO THE ADMINISTRATION
WAS AN AWARENESS OF THE
VULNERABILITY OF BERLIN AND
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE AMERICAN
COMMITMENT IN BERLIN.
IN 1961,
BERLIN IS AN ISLAND INSIDE
OF EAST GERMANY WITH AN
OPEN BORDER.
BERLIN WAS DIVIDED INTO
4 SECTORS,
THE SOVIET SECTOR HOUSING
THE COMMUNIST GOVERNMENOF EAST GERMANY.
BUT THE OTHER SECTORS WERE
IN THE OCCUPATION OF THE
UNITED STATES, BRITAIN,
AND FRANCE.
AND KHRUSHCHEV WANTED TO
END THAT SITUATION.
BERLIN WAS ALWAYS A SYMBOL
TO THE SOVIET UNION
OF COMMUNIST FAILURES.
THE SOVIETS WERE BEING
EMBARRASSED BY THE NUMBERS
OF PEOPLE TRYING TO GET OUFROM COMMUNIST CONTROL.
THEY WERE LOSING SOME HUNDRED
THOUSAND PEOPLE EVERY YEAR--
MORE THAN 10,000 EVERY MONTH.
IT'S THE BEST DOCTORS,
IT'S THE BEST FARMERS,
IT'S THE BEST TEACHERS,
SO THE FRONT LINE OF THE
SOVIET EMPIRE IS BEING DRAINED
OF ITS INTELLECTUAL AND
PROFESSIONAL LIFE BLOOD,
THEREFORE THREATENING THE
ENTIRE SOVIET CONSTRUCT.
IF KHRUSHCHEV WERE TO USE
MILITARY FORCE IN BERLIN,
KENNEDY AND HIS WESTERN ALLIES
HAD FEW OPTIONS.
IF THEY MARCH ON BERLIN,
WE DON'T HAVE THE TROOPS
TO FEND THEM OFF.
WHAT ARE WE GOING TO HAVE TO DO?
WE'RE GONNA HAVE TO USE
NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
AND WHAT DOES THAT DO?
KENNEDY WAS LOOKING FOR
A CAPABLE ADVISOR WHO COULD
PROVIDE A COHERENT POLICY
FOR DEALING WITH BERLIN.
PRESIDENT KENNEDY BRINGS
DEAN ACHESON BACK INTO SERVICE,
THE LEGENDARY SECRETARY OF STATE
OF HARRY TRUMAN,
A HAWK'S HAWK WHEN IT COMES TO
DEALING WITH THE SOVIET UNION.
ACHESON WAS A TOUGH OLD HAWK
WHO BELIEVED THAT YOU DIDN'NEGOTIATE WITH THE SOVIETS,
THAT THEY ONLY UNDERSTOOD POWER.
YOU HAD TO BE WILLING TO FIGHT,
TO GO TO THE BRINK,
TO SHOW THEM THAT YOU HAVE
THE MILITARY CAPACITY
AND THE WILLINGNESS TO USE IT.
ACHESON PRODUCES A MEMO
THAT'S TOUGH--
ESSENTIALLY SAYS YOU CAN'T GIVE
AN INCH TO THE SOVIET UNION
IN BERLIN BECAUSE THIS IS
ABOUT THE GLOBE.
IF YOU START IN BERLIN,
AND YOU GIVE GROUND IN BERLIN,
ITALY'S NEXT, FRANCE,
THE REST OF GERMANY,
WHO KNOWS WHERE ELSE.
OF COURSE,
WITHIN WEEKS
WE HAD THE BAY OF PIGS.
IN THE YEARS PRECEDING 1961,
A REVOLUTION ON THE CARIBBEAN
ISLAND OF CUBA,
LED BY FIDEL CASTRO,
OUSTED THE COUNTRY'S REPRESSIVE
DICTATORSHIP AND SEIZED
ALL FOREIGN-OWNED PROPERTY.
THE UNITED STATES IMPOSED
AN EMBARGO ON CASTRO'S REGIME,
FREEZING CUBAN ASSETS AND
SEVERING DIPLOMATIC TIES
WITH HAVANA.
THE CUBANS TURNED TO THE
SOVIET UNION FOR SUPPORT.
ON CUBA, WE KNOW FOR A FACTHAT KENNEDY ACTUALLY VIEWED
FIDEL CASTRO, IN 1960,
AS SOMEBODY WHOSE REVOLUTION
REALLY REPRESENTED THE
ASPIRATIONS, BROADLY SPEAKING,
OF THE VAST MAJORITY
OF THE CUBAN PEOPLE.
HE HAD NO DOUBT ABOUT THAT.
AND, AND HE BELIEVED THAT IF
THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENHAD HANDLED CASTRO RIGHT THAHE WOULDN'T HAVE TURNED TO THE
SOVIET UNION, AND OF COURSE
THERE'S PLENTY OF EVIDENCE
TO SUPPORT THAT POINT OF VIEW,
BUT VERY EARLY ON HE REALIZED
THAT POLITICALLY HE COULDN'TAKE THAT POSITION PUBLICLY.
ONLY MONTHS INTO
HIS ADMINISTRATION,
KENNEDY WOULD DISCOVER
THAT THE CUBAN PROBLEM
MIGHT LEAD TO HIS UNDOING.
AS SOON AS THE KENNEDYS GOINTO OFFICE THEY HAD TO WORRY
ABOUT CUBA.
THE CIA HAD COOKED UP A PLAN
TO INVADE CUBA WITH A FORCE
OF EXILES, AND THE CIA
WAS ITCHING TO USE THIS FORCE
AND OVERTHROW FIDEL CASTRO.
HE HAD INHERITED THE WHOLE
THING FROM THE EISENHOWER
ADMINISTRATION.
HE HAD BEEN TOLD THIS PLAN
FOR LANDING AT THE BAY OF PIGS
WAS GOING TO BE SUCCESSFUL.
THERE WAS NO NEED FOR HIM TO
CONSIDER THE NECESSITY FOR
USE OF MILITARY FORCE
BY THE UNITED STATES,
WE DIDN'T HAVE TO BE DIRECTLY
INVOLVED, THAT WAS THE PREMISE.
BUT PRESIDENT KENNEDY
WAS MISLED.
HIS LEADING ADVISORS,
PARTICULARLY HIS MILITARY
ADVISORS, HAD NOT GIVEN HIM
THE TRUTH--
SAME THING WAS TRUE FOR THE CIA,
BY THE WAY.
THE BASIC ISSUE IN CUBA
IS NOT ONE BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA.
IT IS BETWEEN THE CUBANS
THEMSELVES.
AND I INTEND TO SEE THAT WE
ADHERE TO THAT PRINCIPLE,
AND AS I UNDERSTAND IT,
THIS ADMINISTRATION'S ATTITUDE
IS SO UNDERSTOOD AND SHARED
BY THE ANTI-CASTRO EXILES
FROM CUBA IN THIS COUNTRY.
THE PLANNING HAD BEEN THAT IF
THE INVASION DIDN'T SUCCEED,
THE UNITED STATES WOULD
INTRODUCE ITS OWN FORCES.
BUT THE CIA NEVER CLEARLY
COMMUNICATED THIS RATHER
ESSENTIAL FACT TO THE PRESIDENT.
PERSUADED BY CIA OFFICIALS
WHO WERE WITHHOLDING VITAL
INFORMATION AND CONCERNED
ABOUT THE POLITICAL FALL-OUOF APPEARING WEAK ON COMMUNISM,
THE PRESIDENT AUTHORIZED THE
CIA PLAN FOR AN INVASION
OF ARMED CUBAN EX-PATRIOTS
AT THE BAY OF PIGS.
THE CUBAN EXILES LANDED
AT THE BAY OF PIGS.
IT WAS A DISASTER FROM
THE GET-GO.
A THOUSAND OF THEM WERE
BASICALLY DRIVEN INTO THE SEA
OR CAPTURED.
MOST IMPORTANTLY,
THERE WAS NO AIR COVER.
MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE
OFFICIALS REPEATEDLY PRESSURED
THE PRESIDENT TO AUTHORIZE
U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTION.
KENNEDY REFUSED.
HIS ARGUMENT AT THE TIME
IS, IF THE U.S. GETS DIRECTLY
INVOLVED, IF AMERICAN
FINGERPRINTS ARE TOO CLEARLY
ON THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION,
THAT KHRUSHCHEV WILL USE THAAS AN EXCUSE TO ACT ON BERLIN.
KENNEDY WAS WORRIED BECAUSE
HE WAS COMING UP TO A SUMMIMEETING, HE HOPED, WITH
KHRUSHCHEV, AND HE DIDN'WANT TO DISTRACT FROM THASUMMIT MEETING BY HAVING
TOO MUCH ATTENTION BE PAID
TO CUBA.
WHAT THIS BAY OF PIGS QUICKLY
SHOWED WAS THAT THE
DOMINANT FORCES IN THE
ADMINISTRATION WERE PEOPLE
THAT KENNEDY HAD NEVER APPOINTED
THAT HE HAD INHERITED FROM
HIS PREDECESSORS IN THE CIA
AND THE MILITARY,
AND THEY BASICALLY WERE
ASSUMING THAT THEY COULD
PUSH KENNEDY AROUND.
THERE WAS A KIND OF ENTRAPMENBUILT INTO THE WHOLE SCENARIO,
AND KENNEDY REALIZED THAT, TOO,
AND WAS NOT ABOUT TO BECOME
A PRESIDENT THAT WAS ENTRAPPED.
JOHN F. KENNEDY CLEARLY FELTHAT HE HAD BEEN MISLEAD,
THAT HIS LEADING ADVISORS
HAD NOT GIVEN HIM THE TRUTH
AND THAT HE HAD TO BE VERY
CAUTIOUS IN THE FUTURE
ABOUT ACCEPTING ANYTHING
THAT THEY SAID.
THE CIA WAS VERY UNHAPPY
BECAUSE THEY HAD CONFIDENTLY
ASSUMED THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD
APPROVE OF AIR STRIKES AGAINSCASTRO'S FORCES IF THE BRIGADE
GOT IN TROUBLE ON THE BEACH.
THE BAY OF PIGS WAS A MAJOR
DISASTER FOR THE UNITED STATES,
NOT NECESSARILY BECAUSE WE
HAD BEEN DEFEATED,
BUT BECAUSE IT SHOWED THE
WORLD OUR BALD AGGRESSION
AGAINST CUBA.
AND IT GAVE CUBA A VICTORY
OVER THE GOLIATH OF THE NORTH.
KENNEDY TOOK THAT DISASTER
VERY, VERY PERSONALLY
BECAUSE HE SAW IT AS
A PERSONAL FAILURE.
YOU KNOW, YOU DO THE BEST YOU
CAN AND THINGS DON'T WORK OUSOMETIMES, WELL, OKAY.
BUT THAT WASN'T THE CASE HERE.
AND HE BLAMED HIMSELF,
HE BLAMED HIMSELF FOR
NOT ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS.
NOBODY LIKES TO TAKE A HIT,
ESPECIALLY WHEN YOU'RE SO
PUBLICLY EXPOSED.
BUT YEAH, I THINK HE LEARNED,
AND WHAT HE LEARNED IS...
KNOW WHOSE ADVICE TO RELY ON.
KENNEDY RALLIED IN A
NUMBER OF WAYS.
FOR ONE THING, HE TOLD THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE THAT IT WAS
HIS RESPONSIBILITY.
HE USED A FAMOUS PHRASE,
THAT A "VICTORY HAS A THOUSAND
FATHERS BUT DEFEAT IS AN
ORPHAN."
BUT HE TOOK RESPONSIBILITY
FOR IT, AND INTERESTINGLY,
HIS POLL RATINGS SHOT UP
TO ABOUT 90%.
AMERICANS LIKE IT WHEN
POLITICIANS TAKE RESPONSIBILITY.
THE FAILED BAY OF PIGS
OPERATION HAD ENORMOUS INFLUENCE
ON KENNEDY'S IMAGE AS A
FOREIGN POLICY MAKER.
THE JOINT CHIEFS FELT THAHE WAS SOFT, HE SHOWED THAHE WAS SOFT ON COMMUNISM.
HE DID NOT HAVE THE CREDENTIALS,
FROM THEIR POINT OF VIEW,
TO BE ABLE TO STAND UP.
THERE WAS AMBIVALENCE
ABOUT JFK.
HE WAS A WHIPPERSNAPPER.
HE WAS GREEN.
HE'D BEEN A LT. J.G.
IN WORLD WAR II.
HE SAID, "I WAS A LIEUTENANJUNIOR GRADE, AND THOSE GUYS
WERE RUNNING THE WAR.
AND I JUST DIDN'ASK THE QUESTIONS THAI HAD ON MY MIND.
JOHN F. KENNEDY EMERGED
FROM THAT CATASTROPHIC FOREIGN
POLICY FAILURE
CHASTENED IN TERMS OF THE
PITFALLS OF THE USE OF FORCE
AND WITH A DEGREE OF WISDOM
ABOUT LISTENING TO THE
ADVICE OF HIS TOP GENERALS,
HIS TOP CIA OFFICIALS,
AND OTHER ADVISORS RATHER
THAN LISTENING TO HIS GUT.
AFTER THE BAY OF PIGS,
JACK KENNEDY SAID HE WANTED
TO BREAK THE CIA INTO A
THOUSAND PIECES HE WAS SO MAD
AT THEM,
AND HE ALMOST DID.
HE GOT RID OF ALLEN DULLES,
THE DIRECTOR OF THE CIA,
AND RICHARD BISSELL,
THE COVERT OPERATIONS CHIEF.
FOLLOWING THE BAY OF PIGS
FIASCO, KENNEDY SENT SIGNALS
THAT HE WAS INTERESTED IN
HOLDING A SUMMIT MEETING WITH
NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV.
FRUSTRATED BY THE SLOW PACE
OF BUREAUCRACY AT THE
STATE DEPARTMENT,
THE PRESIDENT DECIDED TO REACH
OUT TO THE SOVIET LEADER
THROUGH UNOFFICIAL CHANNELS.
KENNEDY WAS DETERMINED TO
ESTABLISH A DIALOGUE WITH
THE SOVIET UNION
AND TO SEE IF THERE WERE
ISSUES THAT COULD BE RESOLVED
AND RECONCILED WITHOUCONSTANT MILITARY CONFRONTATION.
THE KENNEDYS OPERATED ON MANY
LEVELS, AND THEY LIKED BACK
CHANNELS AS A WAY OF DOING
BUSINESS.
AND THEY FOUND ONE ALMOSBY ACCIDENT.
IT WAS ONE OF THE MOSUNUSUAL BACK CHANNELS AMONG
MAJOR LEADERS IN HISTORY,
OF HIS BROTHER THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
BOBBY KENNEDY, WHO KNOWS
ALL OF JOHN F. KENNEDY'S
MOST INTIMATE THOUGHTS
AND A SOVIET MILITARY SPY,
GEORGI BOLSHAKOV, BASED IN
WASHINGTON, WHO REALLY CAN'KNOW ANYTHING VERY INTIMATELY
ABOUT KHRUSHCHEV.
ROBERT KENNEDY, WHEN HE MEWITH BOLSHAKOV, WANTED TO
COMMUNICATE A COUPLE OF THINGS:
ONE, THAT CUBA WAS A MISTAKE,
BUT ALSO THAT HE WANTED
TO HAVE A SUMMIT.
THE PRESIDENT WANTED TO MEEKHRUSHCHEV AT THE SUMMITHAT JUNE, AND THAT SET IN
MOTION THE SUMMIT MEETING.
THE KENNEDYS ARRIVED FROM
PARIS ON SATURDAY THE 3rd OF
JUNE AND WENT DIRECTLY TO THE
RESIDENCE OF THE U.S. AMBASSADOR
IN HIETZING, WHICH IS A
BEAUTIFUL AREA,
VERY POSH AREA IN VIENNA.
KENNEDY HAD THE SEVERE BACK
PROBLEMS IN VIENNA,
WHICH IS SOMETHING THAT THE
PUBLIC DIDN'T KNOW AT ALL.
HIS DOCTORS RECOMMENDED HIM
TO USE CRUTCHES, BUT KENNEDY,
OF COURSE, DID NOT TAKE CRUTCHES
ON TO VIENNA.
IF YOU ASK ME WHAT THE
MYSTERIOUS TERM "CHARISMA" IS,
I WOULD SAY THAT'S KENNEDY.
VICTOR SUKHODREV WAS
WITH KENNEDY AND KHRUSHCHEV
DURING ALL THESE CONVERSATIONS.
HE WAS YOUNG, ENERGETIC,
YET HUMAN...
AND COULD BE FRAIL,
AS ALL HUMANS ARE AT SOME POINT.
MY AMERICAN COUNTERPART WAS
ALEXANDER AKALOVSKY
ON THE AMERICAN SIDE.
I HAD MET KHRUSHCHEV ON A
NUMBER OF OCCASIONS BEFORE,
SO I KNEW HOW HE BEHAVES.
HE WAS A VERY VOLATILE PERSON.
HE COULD, YOU KNOW, BE ENRAGED
THEN CALM DOWN RIGHT AWAY,
AND SAY, "LET'S MAKE PEACE,"
AND THINGS LIKE THAT.
DURING THEIR OPENING REMARKS,
KHRUSHCHEV LOOKED INTENTLY
AT THE PRESIDENT AND THEN ASKED,
"MR. PRESIDENT,
HOW OLD ARE YOU?"
AND KENNEDY SAID,
"WELL, I'M FORTY-FOUR."
THERE CAME INTO KHRUSHCHEV'S
EYES A VERY WISTFUL LOOK
AND HE SAID, "YES, FORTY-FOUR.
WELL, YOU KNOW, MY SON
WOULD HAVE BEEN THAT AGE,
BUT HE WAS KILLED IN THE WAR."
IN THE FIRST MEETING OF HIS
CONVERSATIONS WITH KHRUSHCHEV,
KENNEDY GOT OFF ON THE WRONG
FOOT BECAUSE THEY ENGAGED
IN A PRETTY INTENSE
IDEOLOGICAL DEBATE.
PEOPLE LIKE KHRUSHCHEV,
THEY KNOW MARXIST IDEOLOGY
VERY WELL.
YOU CAN'T REALLY HOLD YOUR
OWN AGAINST THEM
IN SUCH A DISCUSSION.
KENNEDY,
HE BEGAN TO FIDGET IN HIS CHAIR;
I LATER LEARNED THAT THAT WAS
BECAUSE HIS BACK WAS HURTING.
AFTER THE FIRST ROUND OF
TALKS, AS A FORM OF RELAXATION
THEY WENT OUT INTO THE GARDEN
AT THE AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE.
THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION
ABOUT MISCALCULATION.
THE PRESIDENT USED THAA NUMBER OF TIMES--
THAT TERM "MISCALCULATION."
AND KHRUSHCHEV SAID HE COULDN'REALLY UNDERSTAND WHATHAT MEANT.
AND AT THAT POINT HE SAID,
"WELL, YOU KNOW, FOR EXAMPLE,
I MADE A MISJUDGMENT IN CUBA."
HE SAID "WHAT HAPPENED IN
CUBA, THE BAY OF PIGS."
THE INFERENCE WAS THAT HE HAD
INHERITED THAT PROBLEM FROM THE
PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION.
IT WAS NOT REALLY OF HIS DOING.
INHERITED OR NOT,
KHRUSHCHEV SUGGESTED THAT A GAP
EXISTED BETWEEN AMERICAN IDEALS
AND AMERICAN SELF-INTEREST.
WITH LITTLE ACCOMPLISHED,
THE TWO LEADERS RESOLVED
TO RESUME THEIR TALKS
THE FOLLOWING DAY.
ON THE 2ND DAY TAKING PLACE
AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY,
ALL THE TALK WAS ABOUT BERLIN.
KHRUSHCHEV WENT INTO THIS
TIRADE ABOUT BERLIN.
HE KEPT REITERATING THABY THAT VERY WINTER
THE SOVIET UNION WOULD
BLOCK OFF WEST BERLIN,
WHILE EAST BERLIN WOULD BECOME
THE OFFICIAL SEAT OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF EAST GERMANY.
KHRUSHCHEV KEPT SAYING THATHE DECISION TO CONCLUDE
A PEACE TREATY WITH EAST GERMANY
WAS IRREVOCABLE;
IT WILL HAPPEN,
NOBODY COULD STOP HIM--
NOBODY IN THE WORLD.
THAT'S HIS WORDS.
AND KENNEDY WAS UNPREPARED
FOR THIS AND WAS SHOCKED
AT THE IDEA THAT HIS LEADING
COUNTERPART IN THE COLD WAR
WAS SEEMINGLY SO IRRATIONAL.
KHRUSHCHEV AT ONE POINT SAID,
"YOU KNOW, BERLIN IS LIKE
THE SCROTUM IN OUR HANDS,
WHICH WE CAN SQUEEZE AT ANY
TIME WE WANT."
HOW THE PRESIDENT TOOK IT:
HE TURNED TO ME AND HE ASKED,
"ALEX, IS HE ALWAYS LIKE THAT?"
KHRUSHCHEV RESORTED TO
WARNINGS THAT HE ISSUED ABOUPOTENTIAL WAR.
KHRUSHCHEV LOOKED KENNEDY
IN THE EYE AND SAID,
"IF IT'S GOT TO BE WAR,
IT MIGHT AS WELL BE NOW."
KENNEDY, WITH HIS HANDS
IN HIS COAT POCKETS
IN A TYPICALLY KENNEDY-ESQUE
GESTURE REMARKED,
"WELL, IT'S GONNA BE
A COLD WINTER."
JOHN F. KENNEDY WAS A VERY
CONFIDENT MAN IN SO MANY WAYS,
EVEN COCKY, BUT HE WAS HUMBLED
BY HIS EARLY FOREIGN POLICY
EXPERIENCES.
TO HAVE THE FIASCO
OF THE BAY OF PIGS AND THEN
GET BULLIED BY KHRUSHCHEV
AT VIENNA WAS A PRETTY TOUGH
ONE-TWO PUNCH THAT MADE HIM FEAR
FOR THE SAFETY OF THE WORLD.
YOU REALLY SEE A PRESIDENON EMOTIONAL EDGE FEELING
THAT HE'S FAILED IN THE MOSIMPORTANT MOMENT OF HIS
PRESIDENCY AND BELIEVING
THE STAKES ARE NUCLEAR.
WHEN THE PRESIDENT RETURNED
FROM VIENNA, HIS BROTHER,
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,
FOUND HIM AT THE WHITE HOUSE,
AND PRESIDENT KENNEDY WAS
IN TEARS.
AND HE SAID, "YOU KNOW, BOBBY,
YOU AND ARE ADULTS,
WE'VE HAD A GOOD LIFE.
BUT I JUST--
OUR CHILDREN, I JUST CAN'STOMACH THE IDEA OF OUR
CHILDREN NOT HAVING A CHANCE.
THE SUMMER OF 1961 WAS A TIME
FRAUGHT WITH GREAT DANGER.
PRESIDENT KENNEDY GOT HIS
ADVISORS TOGETHER.
THERE WERE A SERIES OF
MEETINGS ABOUT WHAT TO DO
ABOUT BERLIN.
ON THE ONE HAND, YOU HAVE
THE HARDLINERS ON BERLIN,
LED BY DEAN ACHESON.
AND THEN YOU HAVE THE
SOFTLINERS ON BERLIN,
LED BY ARTHUR SCHLESINGER.
BUT ACHESON WAS THE ONLY
ONE WITH A PLAN.
AND IT'S A TOUGH ONE.
ACHESON WANTED THE PRESIDENOF THE UNITED STATES TO DECLARE
A NATIONAL EMERGENCY,
RAISE TAXES, FULLY MOBILIZE THE
MILITARY, INCREASE THE DEFENSE
SPENDING BY FIVE BILLION
DOLLARS, GO EVERYTHING
RIGHT UP TO THE EDGE OF WAR.
WHAT IS KENNEDY DOING
IN THIS THING?
AGAIN, HE'S ASKING QUESTIONS,
CONSTANTLY ASKING QUESTIONS.
AND THE QUESTION HE'S CONSTANTLY
COMING BACK TO IS:
WHAT DOES THE OTHER GUY DO
IF WE DO THIS?
THE WORLD IS NOT DECEIVED
BY THE COMMUNIST ATTEMPTO LABEL BERLIN AS A HOT BED
OF WAR.
THERE IS PEACE IN BERLIN TODAY.
THE SOURCE OF WORLD TROUBLE
AND TENSION IS MOSCOW,
NOT BERLIN.
AND IF WAR BEGINS,
IT WILL HAVE BEGUN IN MOSCOW
AND NOT BERLIN.
I THINK KHRUSHCHEV
MISCALCULATED WITH JOHN KENNEDY.
HE WAS A LOT TOUGHER THAN
KHRUSHCHEV THOUGHT HE WAS.
KENNEDY CLEARLY WANTED
TO SEND A SIGNAL
TO KHRUSHCHEV.
HE WAS READY TO CONFRONT HIM
MILITARILY IF THAT IS WHAT HE
CHOSE; IF HE WANTED WAR,
THE UNITED STATES
WOULD BE READY.
WE MUST MEET OUR OFTEN-STATED
PLEDGE TO THE FREE PEOPLES
OF WEST BERLIN AND MAINTAIN
OUR RIGHTS AND THEIR SAFETY
EVEN IN THE FACE OF FORCE
IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE
CONFIDENCE OF OTHER FREE PEOPLES
IN OUR WORD AND OUR RESOLVE.
THE MESSAGE SEEMED TO BE
HOW TOUGH HE WAS BEING WITH
THE SOVIET UNION,
HOW HE WAS STANDING UP TO THEM.
BUT FOR THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP
AND FOR KHRUSHCHEV,
BETWEEN THE LINES IS A VERY
CLEAR MESSAGE, WHICH IS:
WHAT I CARE ABOUT IS OUR TROOPS
IN WEST BERLIN AND OUR ACCESS
TO WEST BERLIN.
WHAT I DON'T CARE ABOUIS EAST BERLIN.
IN SHORT, WHILE WE ARE READY
TO DEFEND OUR INTEREST,
WE SHALL ALSO BE READY
TO SEARCH FOR PEACE:
IN QUIET EXPLORATORY TALKS,
IN FORMAL OR INFORMAL
MEETINGS.
WE DO NOT WANT MILITARY
CONSIDERATIONS TO DOMINATE
THE THINKING OF EITHER
EAST OR WEST.
ONE CAN UNDERSTAND KENNEDY'S
APPROACH TO BERLIN AT THAT TIME.
HE'S LESS CONCERNED ABOUBERLIN AND MORE CONCERNED
ABOUT THE DANGERS
OF NUCLEAR WAR.
HE THINKS THAT IF HE CAN HELP
KHRUSHCHEV SOLVE HIS PROBLEM
OF THE REFUGEE FLOOD FROM
BERLIN THAT HE MIGHT HAVE
A MORE AMICABLE, COOPERATIVE
NEGOTIATING PARTNER ON A
HOST OF OTHER ISSUES.
WITHIN DAYS OF
KENNEDY'S SPEECH,
KHRUSHCHEV APPROVED EASGERMAN PLANS TO SEAL THE
BORDER IN BERLIN.
ON AUGUST 13, 1961,
COMMUNIST FORCES ERECTED
BARRICADES AND STOOD GUARD ALONG
THE PERIMETER OF WEST BERLIN.
RESIDENTS OF EAST BERLIN SOON
FOUND THEMSELVES TRAPPED
BEHIND A BARRIER THAT WOULD
BECOME THE NOTORIOUS
BERLIN WALL.
WE THINK OF THE BERLIN WALL
AS BEING THIS TERRIBLE MOMENIN THE COLD WAR--
A SYMBOLIC MOMENT WHEN THE WALL
GOES UP BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.
ACTUALLY, IT WAS A RELIEF
TO KENNEDY BECAUSE IT WAS SUCH A
CRISIS FOR THE SOVIET UNION
TO HAVE THIS MASS MIGRATION,
PEOPLE JUST FLEEING EASTO WEST, THAT BY PUTTING
UP THE WALL IT STOPPED THAT,
AND IN A WAY, IT DIFFUSED
THAT CRISIS AND MADE BERLIN
LESS OF A CRISIS POINT.
SO IN THE LONG RUN, IT HELPED
THE WEST TO HAVE A BERLIN WALL.
I THINK THAT THERE'S NO DOUBTHAT THE PEOPLE WHO WERE
FINDING THEIR OWN POLICIES
WERE BEING FRUSTRATED
BY KENNEDY'S POLICIES,
WERE ANGRY, WERE FRUSTRATED.
THEY WERE TALKING AMONG
THEMSELVES, PUTTING HIM DOWN.
DEAN ACHESON HAD GROWN SO
FRUSTRATED THAT DURING A
SMALL WORKING GROUP MEETING
ON BERLIN HE SAID,
"GENTLEMAN YOU MIGHT AS WELL
FACE IT: THIS NATION IS
WITHOUT LEADERSHIP."
SOMEONE SERVING THE PRESIDENOF THE UNITED STATES,
SOMEONE TRYING TO FRAME
HIS MOST IMPORTANT POLICIES,
TALKING IN FRONT OF A GROUP
OF EXPERTS AND SAYING THIS
ABOUT THE PRESIDENT OF
THE UNITED STATES--
AND HE SAID IT IN EVEN HARSHER
TERMS IN A LETTER TO HIS
FORMER BOSS, HARRY TRUMAN
A FEW WEEKS LATER.
FOR A LOT OF AMERICANS,
KENNEDY'S EARLY FOREIGN POLICY
DAYS WERE AMATEUR HOUR,
AND IT WAS UNSETTLING.
THE COUNTRY WAS SCARED IN THE
SUMMER OF 1961 THAT THEIR LEADER
MAYBE DIDN'T KNOW WHAHE WAS DOING.
PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S HOPES
THAT BY ACQUIESCING TO THE
CONSTRUCTION OF THE BERLIN WALL
HE WOULD HAVE A MORE
CONCILIATORY NEGOTIATING PARTNER
IN THE SOVIET LEADER WERE
DASHED DAYS THEREAFTER,
WHEN KHRUSHCHEV RESUMES
ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TESTING.
KENNEDY IS TRYING
TO BE CONCILIATORY.
HE FINALLY HAS TO GIVE UP THACOURSE, AND HE HAS TO RESUME,
THOUGH HE WAS VERY RELUCTANTO DO SO, HIS OWN TESTING
PROGRAM.
KHRUSHCHEV SAID ONE PHRASE,
WHICH I DISTINCTLY REMEMBER.
HE SAID, "WELL, I PITY
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WHO HAVE
ELECTED SUCH A MAN
TO BE THEIR PRESIDENT."
KHRUSHCHEV PERCEIVED KENNEDY
AS BEING INDECISIVE AND WEAK
REGARDING BERLIN AND THE
BERLIN CRISIS.
AND BECAUSE OF THAT,
HE WAS WILLING TO ESCALATE
RHETORIC, NUCLEAR TESTING, ETC.
SO, BY ACQUIESCING TO THE
BERLIN WALL, HE'S FACING A
SOVIET LEADER THAT IS BECOMING
EVEN MORE TROUBLESOME
AND PROBLEMATIC.
IN THE FALL OF 1961,
KENNEDY WOULD FACE YET ANOTHER
GRAVE FOREIGN POLICY DECISION...
THIS TIME IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.
A COMMUNIST-BACKED INSURGENCY
WAS GAINING MOMENTUM IN
SOUTH VIETNAM, DESTABILIZING
THE REGIME OF NGO DINH DIEM.
U.S. MILITARY AND
INTELLIGENCE OFFICIALS BELIEVED
THE INSURGENCY COULD BE DEFEATED
AND LOBBIED FOR THE INTRODUCTION
OF U.S. COMBAT TROOPS.
BUT THOSE FAMILIAR WITH THE
FAILED FRENCH COLONIAL WAR
IN VIETNAM,
JUST A DECADE EARLIER,
HAD SERIOUS DOUBTS.
JFK UNDERSTOOD BECAUSE HE HAD
BEEN IN VIETNAM DURING THE
WANING YEARS OF THE FRENCH
COLONIAL PRESENCE THAIT WOULD BE VIRTUALLY
IMPOSSIBLE TO DEFEAT A
VIETNAMESE MOVEMENT, WHETHER IWAS COMMUNIST-LED OF NOT,
THAT HAD NATIONALISCREDENTIALS, THAT HAD--
THAT REPRESENTED VIETNAMESE
NATIONALISM.
THE REASON WHY THE WAR
IN INDOCHINA HAS NOT HAD
THE SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE
OF THAT AREA AND THE PEOPLE
OF ASIA HAS BEEN THAT THE FRENCH
HAVE MAINTAINED TOO GREAT A
DEGREE OF CONTROL OVER THE LIVES
OF THE PEOPLE.
AND THEREFORE,
THE COMMUNIST UNDER HOCHI MINH
ARE ABLE TO CLAIM THAT THEY ARE
FIGHTING FOR INDEPENDENCE,
AND THE FRENCH APPEAR TO BE
FIGHTING FOR A MAINTENANCE
OF COLONIAL RULE.
I, THEREFORE, BELIEVE THABEFORE THE UNITED STATES
MOVES IN, IN ANY DEGREE,
THAT INDEPENDENCE MUST BE
GRANTED TO THE PEOPLE;
THAT THE PEOPLE MUST SUPPORTHE STRUGGLE BECAUSE UNLESS,
AS I SAID, THAT SUPPORIS FORTHCOMING, ANY INTERVENTION
BY THE UNITED STATES
IS BOUND TO BE FUTILE.
JOHN KENNEDY UNDERSTOOD THATHE AGE OF COLONIALISM WAS OVER.
PRESIDENT KENNEDY WAS NOGOING TO INTRODUCE COMBAT TROOPS
INTO VIETNAM.
THE FIRST CHALLENGE TO JFK'S
FUNDAMENTAL POSITION OF TRYING
TO KEEP THE UNITED STATES OUOF WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
CAME IN 1961.
THE CONSENSUS VIEW IN THE
MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE
ESTABLISHMENT WAS THAT WE HAD
TO PROTECT SOUTH VIETNAM,
THAT THAT WAS OUR CLIENT,
OUR ALLY, THAT WE HAD A
MORAL OBLIGATION TO STAND
BY PRESIDENT DIEM,
AND TO PROTECT SOUTH VIETNAM
FROM NORTH VIETNAM.
THE MILITARY, THE JOINCHIEFS OF STAFF REALLY HAD
BOUGHT INTO THE IDEA THAT WE
COULD WIN IN SOUTH VIETNAM
MILITARILY.
THIS IS THE ISSUE THAT COMES
UP IN NOVEMBER OF 1961 WITH
THE TAYLOR-ROSTOW REPORT,
WHICH RECOMMENDS THE
INTRODUCTION OF COMBAT TROOPS.
THIS WAS SAYING WE WAN40,000 TROOPS TO GO
INTO SOUTH VIETNAM
AND DEFEAT THE VIETCONG.
AND THEN WE WANT TO HAVE
125 TO 130,000 TROOPS JUST IN
CASE NORTH VIETNAM AND CHINA
INTERVENE, JUST TO HANDLE
THAT POSSIBLE CONTINGENCY.
JFK TOLD HIS NATIONAL SECURITY
ADVISORS, "WE'RE NOT GOING
TO DO THIS, BASED ON
MY EXPERIENCE AND MY KNOWLEDGE,
MY PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE
OF VIETNAM.
THIS ISN'T GOING TO WORK, AND
THIS IS NOT AN INTEREST THADESERVES THE UNITED STATES
GOING TO WAR."
SO, IT WAS A VERY DECISIVE
MOMENT WHEN A U.S. PRESIDENREALLY RESPONDED TO A VERY
SERIOUS PROPOSAL FOR GOING
TO WAR WITH A VERY LOUD "NO".
HOWEVER, AS PART OF THE
POLITICAL POSITIONING THAHE FELT THAT HE HAD TO ASSUME,
HE THEN MADE A DEAL THAT HE
WOULD AGREE TO THEIR REQUESFOR THOUSANDS OF U.S. ADVISORS.
"ADVISORS" IS AN IMPORTANWORD; THEY WERE MILITARY
FOR THE MOST PART, A LOT OF THEM
WERE ECONOMIC AID PEOPLE, TOO.
BUT IT WAS PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S
INSISTENCE THAT IT NOT BE OUR
WAR THAT LIMITED OUR INVOLVEMENIN THAT KIND OF WAY.
WE WOULD DO EVERYTHING
WE COULD TO ADVISE AND TO TRAIN,
BUT KENNEDY WAS DETERMINED THAIT WOULDN'T BE US THAT WOULD
BE IN THE FRONT LINES.
IN 1962, KENNEDY'S SECOND
YEAR IN THE WHITE HOUSE,
MORE FORMIDABLE CHALLENGES WOULD
BESET THE YOUNG PRESIDENT...
SUBORDINATES WOULD QUESTION
HIS LEADERSHIP...
AND THE CALCULATIONS OF HIS
ADVERSARIES WOULD BRING
THE WORLD TO THE BRINK
OF NUCLEAR WAR.
AT THE BEGINNING OF '62,
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF,
PARTICULARLY LED BY
CURTIS LEMAY,
WHO WAS THE HEAD OF THE
AIR FORCE, WERE VERY SCATHING
ABOUT KENNEDY'S INABILITY
TO DEAL WITH THE CASTRO PROBLEM.
VIVA...
EL INTERNACIONALISMO
PROLETARIADO!
AND THEY FELT THAIN THE END, A INVASION
OF THE ISLAND WOULD BE NECESSARY
AND THEN MADE DETAILED PLANS
FOR AN INVASION OF CUBA
AND, IN FACT, MADE A FORMAL
RECOMMENDATION TO THE PRESIDENTHAT AN INVASION SHOULD
BE LAUNCHED.
AT THE SAME TIME,
KHRUSHCHEV HAD VERY REAL
CONCERNS ABOUT THE UNITED STATES
INVADING CUBA.
BOTH CASTRO AND KHRUSHCHEV WERE
CONVINCED THAT THE AMERICANS
WOULD TRY AGAIN.
KHRUSHCHEV WAS DETERMINED
TO SAVE CUBA ONE WAY
OR THE OTHER.
AND HE CAME UP WITH THIS
IDEA THAT NOBODY ELSE HAD
PREDICTED OF DEPLOYING
NUCLEAR MISSILES TO CUBA.
FIDEL CASTRO WANTED THE
SOVIET UNION TO OPENLY
SEND THESE MISSILES TO CUBA.
THERE WAS NO ILLEGALITY ABOUTHE SOVIET UNION POSITIONING
INTERMEDIATE RANGE BALLISTIC
MISSILES IN CUBA.
THE UNITED STATES,
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW,
HAD DEPLOYED SIMILAR MISSILES
IN TURKEY AND ITALY.
IT WAS THE POLITICS THAWORRIED NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV.
HE BELIEVED THAT IF HE TRIED
TO OPENLY DEPLOY THESE MISSILES
TO CUBA, THE UNITED STATES
WOULD OBJECT.
AND SO KHRUSHCHEV CAME UP WITH
THIS PLAN TO SURREPTITIOUSLY
TRANSPORT THE MISSILE PARTS AND
THE PERSONNEL IN A WAY THAWOULD KEEP THEM SECRET UNTIL
THEY WERE READY TO BE ANNOUNCED,
AND AT THAT POINT, KHRUSHCHEV
PLANNED TO GO TO CUBA
AND ANNOUNCE A FAIT ACCOMPLI
AND HAVE THOSE MISSILES THERE AS
A DETERRENAGAINST ANOTHER BAY OF PIGS.
HE WANT TO PREVENAMERICAN INVASION.
WE HAVE TO SEND VERY STRONG
SIGNAL THAT WE ARE SERIOUS.
AND THAT MEAN TO HIM WE WILL
SEND THESE MISSILES TO CUBA THAWILL CLEAR TO THE AMERICANS:
BE CAUTIOUS, DON'T DO THIS.
AS PLANS GOT UNDERWAY TO
BEGIN KHRUSHCHEV'S SECRETRANS-ATLANTIC DEPLOYMENOF SOVIET MISSILES TO CUBA...
ACROSS THE GLOBE IN
SOUTH VIETNAM, SOME OF
THE NEWLY ARRIVED U.S. ADVISERS
WERE DEFYING ORDERS AND ACTUALLY
ENGAGING IN COMBAT.
THE NORTH VIETNAMESE
LEADERSHIP,
THEY WERE VERY VULNERABLE,
VERY SUBJECT TO THE THREAOF INTERVENTION BY THE
UNITED STATES IN
SOUTH VIETNAM.
THEY WANTED TO DO EVERYTHING
POSSIBLE TO AVOID THAT.
AND SO THEY DID, IN FACT,
BEGIN TO TALK ABOUT THE
NECESSITY FOR SOME KIND
OF NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT,
SOME KIND OF NEGOTIATED
SETTLEMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM.
THAT INFORMATION REACHED
KENNEDY'S APPOINTED AMBASSADOR
TO INDIA,
JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH.
ONE OF THE REASONS THAPRESIDENT KENNEDY CHOSE MY
FATHER TO BE AMBASSADOR
TO INDIA RATHER THAN KEEPING
HIM IN WASHINGTON
WAS THAT THIS PERMITTED
KENNEDY TO CALL ON MY FATHER
AS A FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR.
HE HAD THE EXPERIENCE OF
WATCHING THE FRENCH DEFEAT IN
INDOCHINA IN 1954,
SO HE HAD
VIEWS ON THESE MATTERS, AND
THOSE VIEWS WERE CLOSE TO
KENNEDY'S OWN.
SO GALBRAITH SENT A LETTER
TO KENNEDY IN APRIL OF 1962.
WHAT GALBRAITH WAS SUGGESTING
WAS THAT THEY COULD GET THE
INDIAN GOVERNMENT TO HELP
ESTABLISH SOME KIND OF CONTACWITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE.
THERE COULD BE SOME TALK
ABOUT A DEAL UNDER WHICH,
IF THEY WOULD LOWER
THE LEVEL OF INSURGENCY,
WE WOULD THEN BEGIN TO
WITHDRAW TROOPS, WE COULD TALK
ABOUT SOME CORRESPONDING EFFORTS
OR MOVES TO REDUCE TENSIONS
AND REDUCE THE LEVEL OF WAR.
AND JFK DEFINITELY BOUGHINTO THAT.
BUT THE STATE DEPARTMENT WAS
FILLED UP WITH HOLDOVERS
FROM THE EISENHOWER
ADMINISTRATION:
PEOPLE WHO HAD THESE VERY
RIGHT-WING VIEWS ON
EAST ASIAN POLICY.
AND SO, JFK UNDERSTOOD THAT;
HE KNEW HE WAS GOING TO HAVE
TO WORK AROUND THE
STATE DEPARTMENT BUREAUCRACY
AND REALLY, HARRIMAN WAS
THE LOGICAL PERSON FOR HIM
TO TURN TO.
AVERELL HARRIMAN WAS A VERY
EXPERIENCED DIPLOMAT.
HE HAD BEEN AMBASSADOR TO THE
SOVIET UNION IN THE SECOND
WORLD WAR.
HE'D BEEN GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK.
HARRIMAN HAD CALLED FOR
AVOIDING SENDING TROOPS
TO VIETNAM IN NOVEMBER OF 1961,
BUT WHAT HAPPENED WAS THAHARRIMAN MIGRATED FROM JFK'S
SIDE OF THE LEDGER TO THE
COALITION OF MILITARY AND STATE
DEPARTMENT PEOPLE WHO WERE
CALLING FOR SENDING TROOPS
TO SOUTH VIETNAM.
AND I DON'T THINK JFK UNDERSTOOD
THE DEGREE TO WHICH HE HAD
REALLY TURNED TO THE OTHER SIDE
ON THAT QUESTION.
JFK ORDERED AVERELL HARRIMAN
TO SEND A CABLE THAT INSTRUCTED
GALBRAITH TO ESTABLISH
A NEGOTIATING CHANNEL WITH
NORTH VIETNAM.
WHAT IS SO INTERESTING ABOUTHE DOCUMENT IS THAT IMMEDIATELY
HARRIMAN, IN VERY HEAVY
PENCIL, CROSSES OUT THE PAROF THE DIRECTION FROM THE
PRESIDENT THAT CALLS
FOR MUTUAL DE-ESCALATION.
HE ACTUALLY SAT ON THE
NEGOTIATING CABLE AND, IN FACT,
WHEN ONE OF HIS SUBORDINATES
TRIED TO WRITE A CABLE THAWAS HEADED IN THAT DIRECTION,
HE SAID, "NO, WE'RE NOT GOING
TO DO THAT."
AND THERE WAS NEVER
A CABLE SENT.
SO, IT WAS AN ASTONISHING CASE
OF A LEADING OFFICIAL
OF THE STATE DEPARTMENCOMPLETELY SUBVERTING
AN EXPLICIT ORDER FROM THE
PRESIDENT FOR TRYING TO CARRY
OUT A DIPLOMATIC POLICY.
WHAT HARRIMAN DID, I THINK,
WAS A REFLECTION OF A MUCH
BROADER PATTERN IN WHICH ALL
OF THESE ADVISORS WERE
ESSENTIALLY SUBVERTING WHAJFK WANTED TO DO.
THERE WAS A MINDSET THAT SAID
"NO NEGOTIATIONS FROM WEAKNESS"
AND WE'RE IN A WEAK POSITION
IN SOUTH VIETNAM, AND UNTIL THASITUATION TURNS ITSELF AROUND
AND WE CAN NEGOTIATE FROM
STRENGTH AND THE COMMUNISTS
UNDERSTAND THAT WE ARE WINNING
AND NOT LOSING, OF COURSE
WE ARE NOT GOING TO NEGOTIATE.
GALBRAITH WOULD LAUGH AT THAAND SAY,
"WEAKNESS, THE GREATEST COUNTRY
IN THE WORLD, THE STRONGESNATION IN THE WORLD,
CONTENDING WITH VIETNAM,
A COUNTRY OF 50 MILLION PEOPLE,
THAT HAS NO AIR-FORCE,
THAT HAS NO INDUSTRY, AND
THAT IS JUST EMERGING AS A
NATION, THE UNITED STATES
HAS TO BE AFRAID OF THAAND NOT SHOW WEAKNESS?"
AND IT'S NOT WEAKNESS,
WHICH THE PRESIDENT SAID
IN HIS INAUGURAL ADDRESS.
IT IS NOT WEAKNESS TO DISCUSS
OR TO NEGOTIATE FROM STRENGTH.
THE LACK OF FAITH IN
NEGOTIATIONS HELD BY MANY
U.S. OFFICIALS WENT MUCH
DEEPER THAN DISDAIN FOR
KENNEDY'S TRACK RECORD
IN FOREIGN POLICY.
FOR THOSE WHO FOUGHT AND WON
THE SECOND WORLD WAR,
ONE OF THE GREATEST ERRORS A
LEADER COULD MAKE WAS TO
TAKE AN ENEMY AT HIS WORD.
IN 1938, BRITISH PRIME MINISTER
NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN HAD BELIEVED
HE COULD NEGOTIATE PEACE
WITH ADOLF HITLER.
AS A RESULT, BRITISH WAR
PRODUCTION WAS DELAYED,
AND ENGLAND NEARLY LOST THE WAR.
"APPEASEMENT" WAS CONSIDERED
A DIRTY WORD BY A GENERATION OF
U.S. MILITARY LEADERS WHO KNEW
ALL TOO WELL THE HUMAN
PRICE OF NAVE LEADERSHIP.
AND DEVELOPMENTS IN CUBA
WERE ABOUT TO TEST THEM
TO THE LIMIT.
THE MISSILES THAT CAUSED THE
CRISIS WERE LARGE, MEDIUM RANGE
AND INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR
TIPPED BALLISTIC MISSILES.
THESE ARE MISSILES THAT CAN
FLY TO THE UNITED STATES,
HIT TEXAS AND NEW YORK CITY
AND A WIDE RANGE OF U.S.
TARGETS.
THE CIA DISCOVERED THE
MISSILES, AND PRESIDENT KENNEDY
WAS BRIEFED.
THE PRESIDENT ASKED BUNDY,
I'M TOLD, YOU KNOW,
"HOW MANY DAYS DO WE HAVE BEFORE
THIS BECOMES PUBLIC?"
AND BUNDY SAID,
"MAYBE A WEEK."
WE WERE RIGHT IN THE MIDDLE
OF POLITICAL ELECTION IN OCTOBER
OF '62, AND KENNEDY IS TORN
LOTS OF DIFFERENT WAYS.
HE ASSEMBLED, OF COURSE,
A SPECIAL GROUP THAT THEY CALLED
THE EXCOMM TO HELP HIM DEAL
WITH THIS.
ALL OF THE JOINT CHIEFS,
INCLUDING THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
JOINT CHIEFS, MAXWELL TAYLOR,
WHO WAS A FAVORITE OF KENNEDY'S,
FAVORED A MILITARY HIT ON THOSE
MISSILES FOLLOWED BY
AN INVASION.
GENERAL LEMAY'S ATTITUDE WAS,
"I'LL TAKE CARE OF THIS,
I'LL BOMB THE HELL OUT OF THEM."
AND THE PRESIDENT SAID, "NO."
AND THEN THE CHIEF OF STAFF
OF THE ARMY WANTED TO INVADE,
AND THE PRESIDENT SAID, "NO."
ON REFLECTION, AND HE HAD A
FEW DAYS TO REFLECT, HE THOUGHT,
"WELL, A WISER COURSE OF ACTION
WILL BE TO IMPOSE SOME KIND
OF NAVAL BLOCKADE ON CUBA
TO PREVENT MORE MISSILES FROM
REACHING THE ISLAND."
HE DECIDES TO FORGO VIOLENCE,
KNOWING THAT IF HE NEEDS TO
LATER ON, HE CAN INVADE CUBA,
AND ADOPT AN INTERIM STEP
OF QUARANTINE, WHICH BUYS TIME
FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH
THE SOVIET UNION.
WHEN CURTIS LEMAY HEARD THAKENNEDY WAS NOT GOING TO ATTACK
CUBA IMMEDIATELY,
HE WAS FURIOUS AND COMPARED THIS
TO CHAMBERLAIN'S APPEASEMENOF HITLER AT MUNICH.
AND LEMAY KNEW EXACTLY WHATHAT WAS ABOUT BECAUSE
JFK'S FATHER, OF COURSE,
WAS A GREAT SUPPORTER
OF NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN AND
BELIEVED IN TRYING TO
DEAL WITH HITLER.
CURTIS LEMAY,
THE CHIEF OF THE AIR FORCE
SAYS TO THE PRESIDENT,
"YOU'RE IN A BIG FIX,
MR. PRESIDENT," AND KENNEDY
IS TAKEN ABACK AND HE SAID,
"WHAT, WHAT DID YOU SAY?
AND LEMAY SAID,
"YOU'RE IN A BAD FIX!"
AND THE PRESIDENT SAID,
"AND YOU'RE RIGHT IN IWITH ME."
KENNEDY WENT ON TELEVISION
ON THE EVENING OF OCTOBER 22,
1962 AND GAVE WHAT IS CERTAINLY
THE MOST CHILLING, FRIGHTENING
OF PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESSES
TO THE NATION AND THE WORLD
THAT HAS EVER BEEN GIVEN.
WHEN HE CAME INTO THE ROOM,
HE WAS DELIBERATE, COOL.
I THOUGHT HE WAS NERVOUS.
BUT ONCE THE RED LIGHT WENT ON,
KENNEDY BRACED IN THAT SEAT,
LOOKED IN THE CAMERAS,
AND HE SAID "GOOD EVENING"
TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE,
AND TALKED ABOUT WHAT HE HAD TO
DO, BUT HE WAS A DIFFERENT GUY.
THIS GOVERNMENT, AS PROMISED,
HAS MAINTAINED THE CLOSESSURVEILLANCE OF THE SOVIEMILITARY BUILD UP ON THE ISLAND
OF CUBA.
WITHIN THE PAST WEEK,
UNMISTAKABLE EVIDENCE HAS
ESTABLISHED THE FACT THAT A
SERIES OF OFFENSIVE MISSILE
SITES IS NOW IN PREPARATION
ON THAT IMPRISONED ISLAND.
TO HALT THIS OFFENSIVE BUILD-UP,
A STRICT QUARANTINE ON ALL
OFFENSIVE MILITARY EQUIPMENUNDER SHIPMENT TO CUBA
IS BEING INITIATED.
ALL SHIPS OF ANY KIND BOUND
FOR CUBA FROM WHATEVER NATION OR
PORT, WERE THEY FOUND TO CONTAIN
CARGOS OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS,
BE TURNED BACK.
IT SHALL BE THE POLICY OF THIS
NATION TO REGARD ANY NUCLEAR
MISSILE LAUNCHED FROM CUBA
AGAINST ANY NATION IN THE
WESTERN HEMISPHERE AS AN ATTACK
BY THE SOVIET UNION ON
THE UNITED STATES REQUIRING A
FULL RETALIATORY RESPONSE
UPON THE SOVIET UNION.
WITH BOMBERS, JET FIGHTERS,
NAVY VESSELS AND OVER A HUNDRED
THOUSAND COMBAT PERSONNEL
ASSEMBLED IN THE GULF,
U.S. MILITARY OFFICIALS
PUSHED FOR AN INVASION.
THE INVASION WOULD HAVE BEEN
VERY SIMILAR IN SCALE TO THE
INVASION OF NORMANDY ON D-DAY
IN 1944.
BUT THEY DID NOT KNOW
THAT SOVIETS HAVE 94 TECHNICAL
NUCLEAR WEAPONS THERE.
THE SOVIETS SENT TACTICAL
BATTLEFIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS THATHE CIA NEVER REALLY UNDERSTOOD
WERE THERE.
THE SOVIETS HAD NUCLEAR
WEAPONS ON THE BEACH
WAITING FOR AN AMERICAN
INVASION FORCE, AND THAT COULD
HAVE BEEN EASILY THE BEGINNING
OF NUCLEAR WAR.
CASTRO SENT A MESSAGE TO
KHRUSHCHEV SAYING THAIF THE AMERICANS INVADE CUBA,
"YOU SHOULD ATTACK THE UNITED
STATES WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS."
THE TWO SUPER POWERS ARE
MARCHING ALMOST INEVITABLY
TOWARDS A NUCLEAR EXCHANGE.
THE U.S. MILITARY WAS NOONLY PRIMED TO ATTACK CUBA,
THE STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND WAS
PREPARED TO LAUNCH A NUCLEAR
STRIKE ON THE SOVIET UNION
ITSELF.
OVER 150 NUCLEAR MISSILES
AND TWELVE HUNDRED AIRPLANES
CARRYING NEARLY THREE
THOUSAND NUCLEAR WARHEADS
WERE ON STANDBY SHOULD
THE PRESIDENT GIVE THE ORDER.
WITH THE WORLD TEETERING
ON NUCLEAR DESTRUCTION,
BOTH KHRUSHCHEV AND KENNEDY
WERE DETERMINED TO FIND A
WAY OUT THAT WOULD NOT INVOLVE
ARMED CONFLICT.
WE KNOW TODAY THAT THE CRISIS
WAS OVERCOME THROUGH A SERIES
OF PERSONAL LETTERS EXCHANGED
BETWEEN NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV
AND JOHN KENNEDY.
KHRUSHCHEV'S OFFER TO KENNEDY
IS AN EXCHANGE OF SOVIEMISSILES IN CUBA FOR U.S.
MISSILES IN TURKEY AND ITALY.
THIS POSES A VERY DIFFICULPROBLEM FOR THE PRESIDENBECAUSE HE'S ALREADY BEEN
ACCUSED OF WEAKNESS BY THE JOINCHIEFS, BY HIS REPUBLICAN
OPPONENTS.
HE SECRETLY HAS HIS BROTHER
INFORM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR
THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL NOONLY PUBLICLY GUARANTEE THAWE WON'T BE INVADING CUBA IN THE
FUTURE, IF THE SOVIETS WITHDREW
THEIR MISSILES, BUT SECRETLY
THE UNITED STATES AND JOHN
KENNEDY PLEDGES TO START TO
DISMANTLE U.S. MISSILES
IN TURKEY SO THAT KHRUSHCHEV
CAN WALK AWAY FROM THIS
FEELING THAT HE GOSOMETHING HE NEEDED.
BOBBY KENNEDY TELLS DOBRYNIN
THAT TIME IS RUNNING OUT;
IT'S A MATTER OF HOURS BECAUSE
THE PRESIDENT IS COMING UNDER
PRESSURE FROM HIS SENIOR
MILITARY LEADERS TO DO
SOMETHING.
THE CUBAN MISSILES CRISIS
OFFICIALLY ENDED WITH A
BROADCAST ON SOVIET RADIO
OF NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV
AGREEING TO JOHN KENNEDY'S
PUBLIC PROPOSAL OF A
NON-INVASION PLEDGE OF CUBA,
THE MORNING OF OCTOBER 28, 1962.
The Soviet government has
ordered the dismantling of
weapons in Cuba, as well as
their crating and return
to the Soviet Union.
KHRUSHCHEV TOOK THE
INITIATIVE TO HAVE IT BROADCASAND IT WAS THE MESSAGE THAFINALLY BROKE THE CRISIS.
AFTER THE CUBAN MISSILE
CRISIS, WHEN THE SOVIETS
ANNOUNCED THAT THEY WERE
PULLING THEIR MISSILES OUT,
WHICH REALLY WAS A GREAVICTORY FOR THE WEST, KENNEDY
WISELY PUT THE WORD OUT,
"DO NOT GLOAT.
DO NOT BRAG ABOUT THIS.
DON'T TREAT THIS AS A VICTORY."
HE WAS VERY CAREFUL.
YOU NEVER RUB YOUR VICTORY
INTO YOUR OPPONENT'S FACE.
AT THE END OF THE MISSILE CRISIS
CURTIS LEMAY BELLOWED,
"WE LOST, WE SHOULD HAVE GONE IN
THERE AND CLEARED THEM OUWITH MISSILES AND BOMBS."
KENNEDY'S GREATNESS IN THE
MISSILE CRISIS WAS HE THOUGHIN TERMS OF AVOIDING THE
POINTLESS DEATHS OF MILLIONS OF
PEOPLE, WHETHER THEY WERE
AMERICANS OR RUSSIANS.
SO IN THAT SENSE, HE HAD
A KIND OF UNIVERSAL HUMANISM.
THERE'S A WEIRD SCENE AT THE
END OF THE MISSILE CRISIS
WHEN JACK AND BOBBY ARE TOGETHER
AND JACK KENNEDY, I GUESS
THINKING ABOUT LINCOLN
AFTER THE CIVIL WAR ON THE
NIGHT OF HIS ASSASSINATION,
LINCOLN WENT TO THE THEATER,
AND JACK KENNEDY SAYS TO
BOBBY, "THIS IS THE NIGHI SHOULD GO TO THE THEATRE."
AND BOBBY SAYS,
"IF YOU GO, I WILL GO, TOO."
I THINK ANY PRESIDENOF THE UNITED STATES
UNDERSTANDS THAT HIS LIFE
IS AT RISK.
AND I THINK JOHN KENNEDY,
WHO HAD HIS OWN VERY PERSONAL
SENSE OF MORTALITY THROUGH
THE DEATH OF HIS BROTHER,
THROUGH HIS OWN WOUNDING
IN THE WARS IN THE PACIFIC,
HAD A VERY REAL SENSE
OF THE POSSIBILITIES.
FOLLOWING THE CUBAN
MISSILE CRISIS,
KENNEDY HOPED TO FORGE A
NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH
NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV AND RESTARTALKS FOR A NUCLEAR TEST BAN.
INFORMED THAT NORMAN COUSINS,
EDITOR OF THE SATURDAY REVIEW
AND A NUCLEAR DISARMAMENACTIVIST, WAS HEADED
TO THE SOVIET UNION,
KENNEDY ASKED THAT HE CARRY
A PERSONAL MESSAGE
TO THE SOVIET LEADER.
KENNEDY DID WANT MY FATHER
TO TELL KHRUSHCHEV THAT THERE
WAS NO ONE IN THE UNITED STATES
MORE EAGER THAN HE
TO PUT ALL THESE
DIFFERENCES ASIDE.
KENNEDY FOUND OUT THACOUSINS WAS GOING TO BE IN
THE SOVIET UNION.
THIS WAS AN INSTANCE WHERE JFK
SAW AN INFLUENTIAL PRIVATE
CITIZEN WHO WAS ABLE TO BE A
GOOD BACK CHANNEL ENVOY,
AND JFK WAS INTERESTED IN
RESTARTING THE TEST BAN TREATY
TALKS WHICH HAD BROKEN DOWN
BECAUSE THERE WAS A
MISCOMMUNICATION ABOUT HOW
MANY ON-SITE TEST BAN VISITS
EACH SIDE WOULD GET EACH YEAR.
I REMEMBER MY FATHER TELLING
US THAT KENNEDY SAID HE WAS
VERY SCARED OF THE POWER OF THE
MILITARY IN THE UNITED STATES,
AND WHAT HE WAS SCARED OF IS
WHETHER THE MILITARY WOULD
SOMEHOW POSITION ITSELF AND
UNDERMINE HIS EXECUTIVE POWER.
ACCOMPANYING THEIR FATHER
TO SEE KHRUSHCHEV IN THE
SOVIET UNION WERE
ANDREA AND CANDICE COUSINS.
KHRUSHCHEV AT THAT POINT WAS
STAYING AT THIS LOVELY RETREAON THE EDGE OF THE BLACK SEA;
IT WAS SORT OF THE CAMP DAVID
OF THE SOVIET UNION.
WE CAME INTO THIS BEAUTIFUL
INDOOR/OUTDOOR ROOM WITH A
POOL, AND THERE WERE GLASS
PANELS, AND KHRUSHCHEV
PRESSED A BUTTON AND THE PANELS
FOLDED BACK.
AND THEN TO OUR SURPRISE,
HE SAYS TO MY SISTER ANDREA
AND TO ME,
"WHILE YOUR FATHER AND I
ARE TALKING,
WHY DON'T YOU TAKE A SWIM?"
WHILE WE WERE PADDLING AROUND
IN THE SWIMMING POOL,
MY FATHER AND KHRUSHCHEV
WERE OUT TALKING ABOUTHE FATE OF THE WORLD BASICALLY,
AND I DON'T KNOW,
I DON'T KNOW IF WE REALLY
UNDERSTOOD AT THAT TIME
HOW SERIOUS, HOW ENORMOUS
THESE QUESTIONS WERE,
AND HOW MUCH WAS AT STAKE.
WHAT KENNEDY WANTED FOR MY
FATHER TO CONVEY
TO KHRUSHCHEV WAS THAIT WAS TIME TO START AFRESH...
AND TO SEE IF THEY COULD GO
FORWARD WITH THEIR BASIC SHARED
INTENTION OF A TEST BAN TREATY.
AND KHRUSHCHEV SAID,
"WE'RE WILLING TO RESTART THESE
TALKS AND GET SOMETHING GOING,
BUT THE BALL'S IN JFK'S
COURT IN TERMS OF DOING IT."
EVENTUALLY, THEY CAME AND GOUS AND BROUGHT US BACK UP
TO KHRUSHCHEV'S STUDY, AND
KHRUSHCHEV TOOK OUT A GREABIG COAAND WAS FOOLING AROUND WITH
THE COAT, SORT OF PLAYING
HIDE AND SEEK, COVERING
HIMSELF UP WITH IT AND THROWING
IT OFF AND GROWLING, AND
THEN COVERING HIMSELF UP AGAIN.
IT WAS REALLY DELIGHTFUL
THAT THIS MAN--
HE WAS UNDER SO MUCH PRESSURE,
AND YET, HE HAD THIS CAPACITY
TO PLAY AND TO BE SILLY.
IT WAS VERY HARD TO SQUARE
THIS PERSONAL VIEW OF HIM
WITH THE WAY HE WAS PICTURED
IN THE AMERICAN MEDIA,
YOU KNOW, POUNDING HIS SHOE
AT THE U.N.--
"WE'LL BURY YOU."
YOU KNOW, IT WAS REALLY
HARD TO SQUARE THOSE TWO THINGS.
SO, COUSINS COMES BACK
IN APRIL OF 1963,
VISITS THE WHITE HOUSE ON
APRIL 22 AND REPORTS TO KENNEDY
THAT KHRUSHCHEV IS INTERESTED,
BUT SOME OF THE HARDLINERS ARE
VERY SKEPTICAL AND READY
TO DENOUNCE THE U.S.
COUSINS FOLLOWS UP WITH A LETTER
TO JFK WHERE HE SUGGESTS A
SPEECH OF BREATHTAKING
IMPORTANCE EXPRESSING HIS
FRIENDSHIP FOR THE SOVIETS,
UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT THEY
WENT THROUGH IN THE WAR,
AND HE POINTS OUT THAT THE
SOVIET CENTRAL COMMITTEE IS
GOING TO MEET IN JUNE OF
THAT YEAR, AND SAYS THAWOULD BE A GOOD TIME TO DO IT.
AND, OF COURSE, JFK FORWARDS
THE LETTER ON TO TED SORENSON,
HIS CHIEF SPEECH WRITER,
AND THEY AGREE THAT SINCE JFK IS
GOING TO SPEAK AT AMERICAN
UNIVERSITY ON JUNE 10,
THAT WOULD BE THE TIME FOR SUCH
A SPEECH.
I HAVE THEREFORE CHOSEN THIS
TIME AND PLACE TO DISCUSS A
TOPIC ON WHICH IGNORANCE TOO
OFTEN ABOUNDS AND THE TRUTH TOO
RARELY PERCEIVED,
AND THAT IS THE MOST IMPORTANTOPIC ON EARTH, PEACE.
WHAT KIND OF A PEACE DO I MEAN
AND WHAT KIND OF A PEACE DO WE
SEEK?
NOT A "PAX AMERICANA,"
ENFORCED ON THE WORLD BY
AMERICAN WEAPONS OF WAR;
NOT THE PEACE OF THE GRAVE,
OR THE SECURITY OF THE SLAVE.
I AM TALKING ABOUT GENUINE
PEACE, THE KIND OF PEACE THAMAKES LIFE ON EARTH
WORTH LIVING.
CERTAINLY THE AMERICAN
UNIVERSITY SPEECH WAS A BREAK
WITH THE PREVAILING WISDOM
AND A BREAK WITH THE
ESTABLISHMENT, WHAT THE
ESTABLISHMENT VIEW OF
THE COLD WAR WAS AND WHETHER
OR NOT WE CAN SURVIVE AND
LIVE WITH THE SOVIETS.
EVERY THOUGHTFUL CITIZEN
WHO DESPAIRS OF WAR AND WISHES
TO BRING PEACE SHOULD BEGIN BY
LOOKING INWARD BY EXAMINING HIS
OWN ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE
POSSIBILITIES OF PEACE,
TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION,
TOWARDS THE COURSE
OF THE COLD WAR,
AND TOWARDS FREEDOM AND PEACE
HERE AT HOME.
FIRST, EXAMINE OUR ATTITUDE
TOWARDS PEACE ITSELF.
TOO MANY OF US
THINK IT IS IMPOSSIBLE.
TOO MANY THINK IT IS
UNREAL, BUT THAT IS A DANGEROUS,
DEFEATIST BELIEF.
IT LEADS TO THE CONCLUSION
THAT WAR IS INEVITABLE,
THAT MANKIND IS DOOMED,
THAT WE ARE GRIPPED BY FORCES
WE CANNOT CONTROL.
WE NEED NOT ACCEPT THAT VIEW.
OUR PROBLEMS ARE MAN-MADE,
THEREFORE THEY CAN BE SOLVED
BY MAN.
WHEN KENNEDY DELIVERED HIS
SPEECH AT AMERICAN UNIVERSITY,
IT PROVIDED A SIGNAL TO THE
SOVIET PEOPLE THAT THERE COULD
BE A NEW BEGINNING.
TO MAKE CLEAR OUR GOOD FAITH
AND SOLEMN CONVICTIONS
ON THIS MATTER,
I NOW DECLARE THATHE UNITED STATES DOES NOPROPOSE TO CONDUCT NUCLEAR
TESTS IN THE ATMOSPHERE,
SO LONG AS OTHER STATES
DO NOT DO SO.
WE WILL NOT...
WE WILL NOT BE THE FIRSTO RESUME.
SUCH A DECLARATION IS NO
SUBSTITUTE FOR A FORMAL, BINDING
TREATY, BUT I HOPE IT WILL
HELP US ACHIEVE ONE.
IN SHORT, KENNEDY MADE AN
ADVANCE TOWARDS KHRUSHCHEV,
TOWARDS THE NEED FOR MORE
DISCUSSIONS AND FOR A CLOSER
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO,
AND THAT DID NOT FALL ON DEAF
EARS, LET ME ASSURE YOU.
MY FATHER'S RESPECT TO THE
KENNEDY GREW THROUGH THESE
YEARS, ESPECIALLY THROUGH
THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS.
MY FATHER REPEATED THA"WE ARE VERY DIFFERENT,
WE DEFEND OUR SYSTEMS
ON THE BOTH SIDES,
THEY'RE DIFFERENT,
WE HAVE ONE IN COMMON:
WE WANT TO PREVENT THE WAR.
AND I CAN DEAL WITH THE
PRESIDENT KENNEDY."
I THINK THE AMERICAN
UNIVERSITY SPEECH
WAS A MILESTONE IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS--
NO QUESTION ABOUT IT.
WITH A LITTLE DIPLOMACY AND
KENNEDY'S STYLE,
HE BROUGHT KHRUSHCHEV
AROUND, AND WE HAVE A TESBAN TREATY TODAY.
MANY HAVE ARGUED THAT THE
LIMITED NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY
WAS KENNEDY'S GREATESACCOMPLISHMENT AS PRESIDENT.
HOW THIS ACHIEVEMENT WOULD RANK
HAD KENNEDY LIVED AND BEEN
PERMITTED TO FULFILL HIS OTHER
FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES
IS DIFFICULT TO MEASURE.
IN OCTOBER OF 1963,
PRESIDENT KENNEDY MADE A
DECISION TO BRING THE
THEN-EXISTING U.S. FORCES
IN VIETNAM OUT OVER
A CERTAIN TIMETABLE.
NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION
MEMORANDUM 263
WAS A DECISION DOCUMENTHAT BASICALLY
SUMMARIZED KENNEDY'S
APPROVAL TO BRING OUTHE 17,000 OR SO U.S. FORCES
THAT WERE IN VIETNAM
AT THAT TIME.
THE FIRST 1,000 WOULD BE
WITHDRAWN BY THE END OF
1963, THE REMAINDER WOULD
BE OUT BY THE END OF '65.
AND THAT WAS A FORMAL
PRESIDENTIAL DECISION.
IT WAS THE POLICY
OF THE UNITED STATES
ON THE DAY HE DIED.
THAT'S, IN FACT, NO LONGER,
I THINK,
HISTORICALLY CONTROVERSIAL.
THE MOST IMPORTANT INDICATION
OF THE THINKING OF JFK
ABOUT HIS POLICY TOWARD VIETNAM
WAS THAT THE DAY BEFORE HE WAS
SHOT DOWN, HE HAD A CONVERSATION
WITH HIS NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL STAFF MEMBER,
WHO WORKED ON SOUTHEAST ASIA,
MICHAEL FORRESTAL, IN WHICH
HE SAID THAT HE WANTED TO
INITIATE A COMPLETE, THOROUGH
REVIEW OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD
VIETNAM, AND THAT THE REVIEW
HAD TO INCLUDE OR INVOLVE THE
WHOLE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE
UNITED STATES SHOULD BE THERE
AT ALL.
PERHAPS EVEN MORE STARTLING
THAN KENNEDY'S PLAN TO WITHDRAW
PERSONNEL FROM VIETNAM
WAS HIS SECRET EFFORT TO ENGAGE
FIDEL CASTRO IN A DIALOGUE.
JOHN F. KENNEDY WAS
RESPONSIBLE FOR SOME OF THE
MOST INFAMOUS ACTS OF AGGRESSION
AGAINST CUBA AND YET,
SECRETLY HE WAS,
AT THE TIME OF HIS DEATH,
PURSUING AN ACCOMMODATION
WITH FIDEL CASTRO.
KENNEDY'S APPROACH TO CASTRO
WAS BURIED IN SECRET DOCUMENTS
THAT WERE IN A VAULT AT THE
KENNEDY LIBRARY UNTIL I ASKED
FOR THE ENTIRE FILE,
WHICH WAS TITLED,
"CONTACTS WITH CUBAN
LEADERS TO BE DECLASSIFIED
IN THE LATE 1990s."
COULD THE UNITED STATES
ACTUALLY NEGOTIATE DIRECTLY
WITH CASTRO?
TOP STATE DEPARTMENT AIDES
WERE SAYING, "THE UNITED STATES
WON'T TALK TO CUBA UNLESS CUBA
THROWS THE SOVIET UNION OUAND PROMISES, GUARANTEES
THAT IT WILL STOP SCREWING
AROUND IN THE REST OF LATIN
AMERICA AND PROMOTING REVOLUTION
AGAINST THE U.S. INTERESTS.
AND KENNEDY ACTUALLY TOOK A
VERY DIFFERENT POSITION.
HE TOLD MCGEORGE BUNDY,
HIS NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR,
"I DON'T THINK WE SHOULD BOX
FIDEL CASTRO INTO A CORNER.
I DON'T THINK WE SHOULD MAKE
PRE-CONDITIONAL DEMANDS
FOR TALKING TO HIM
THAT HE MAY NOT BE ABLE
TO MEET."
MY FATHER, HE REPEATEDLY TOLD
FIDEL CASTRO THAT,
"I TRUST KENNEDY.
I TRUST THAT HE WILL NOT INVADE
YOUR COUNTRY, AND WE HAVE
ANOTHER SIX YEARS BECAUSE
I BELIEVE THAT HE WILL
BE REELECTED."
WHILE U.S. EFFORTS TO
DESTABILIZE FIDEL CASTRO'S
GOVERNMENT CONTINUED,
KENNEDY WORKED THROUGH BACK
CHANNELS TO EXPLORE
THE POSSIBILITY OF TALKS.
IN NOVEMBER OF 1963,
A BREAKTHROUGH SEEMED NEAR,
AND KENNEDY SENT WORD TO CASTRO
THAT HE WAS OPEN TO NEGOTIATING
AN AGREEMENT.
HE SENT HIS OWN EMISSARY
TO TALK TO FIDEL CASTRO,
A FRENCH JOURNALISNAMED JEAN DANIEL WHO HAD
COME TO WASHINGTON IN OCTOBER,
MET WITH THE PRESIDENT,
AND WHEN THE PRESIDENFOUND OUT THAT HE WAS ON
HIS WAY TO CUBA, HE BASICALLY
SENT A MESSAGE TO FIDEL CASTRO
WITH JEAN DANIEL.
AND JEAN DANIEL WAS GIVING
THIS MESSAGE TO FIDEL CASTRO
ON NOVEMBER 22, 1963.
CASTRO HIMSELF WAS SAYING
THAT KENNEDY MIGHT BECOME
A HISTORIC PRESIDENT,
ONE OF THE FIRST PRESIDENTS
WHO UNDERSTOOD THAT THE WORLD
WAS A DIVERSE PLACE AND THATHE UNITED STATES COULD LIVE
WITH COMMUNIST REGIMES
PEACEFULLY.
AND SO THEY WERE TALKING
ABOUT THIS WHEN, DRAMATICALLY,
AN AIDE CAME IN AND SAID,
"THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES HAS BEEN SHOT."
CASTRO TURNED TO JEAN DANIEL
AND SAID,
"THERE GOES YOUR MISSION
OF PEACE."
MY FATHER WAS VERY NERVOUS
BECAUSE HE DIDN'T KNOW
WHO COULD DO IT.
AND THAT MEAN THAT SOME
HAWKISH AMERICANS
KILLED THE PRESIDENT WHO WANTO PRESERVE PEACE AND MAYBE
TOMORROW THEY WILL STARNUCLEAR WAR AGAINSTHE SOVIET UNION BECAUSE
KILLING AMERICAN PRESIDENT,
IT IS NOT A SMALL EVENT,
SO HE WAS VERY NERVOUS.
ONE OF THE SADNESSES OF MY
GROWING UP WAS THAT WHEN
I WAS A BOY AND KENNEDY CAME TO
OFFICE--I WAS 10 YEARS OLD
WHEN HE WAS ELECTED PRESIDENT--
THERE WAS THIS GREAT BELIEF IN
PUBLIC SERVICE, IN PUBLIC LIFE
AND BY THE TIME I WAS A YOUNG
MAN BECAUSE OF VIETNAM AND
WATERGATE, THAT HOPEFULNESS HAD
TURNED TO CYNICISM AND APATHY.
THAT'S A GREAT SADNESS TO ME,
AND WE'VE NEVER QUITE
OVERCOME IT.
THOSE WHO WERE LIVING ON THIS
PLANET AT THAT TIME HAD NEVER
EXPERIENCED A PRESIDENT BEING
ASSASSINATED, SO THIS WAS A
SHOCK BEYOND BELIEF.
IT WAS JUST...
STAGGERING, YEAH.
I THINK THE MOST IMPORTANTHINGS THAT KENNEDY DID FOR US
AND FOR THE SURVIVAL OF THE
PLANET WAS THAT HE WAS ABLE TO
GO AGAINST A GROUP THAT WAS
POWERFUL AND SPEAK UP IN SPITE
OF THE FACT THAT HE WAS ALONE.
I THINK THAT THAT'S A--
MAYBE THE HARDEST THING
FOR A PERSON TO DO.
KENNEDY SAID FAMOUSLY.
"ONE MAN CAN MAKE A DIFFERENCE,
AND EVERYONE SHOULD TRY."
THAT IS PROFOUNDLY TRUE.
AND IT'S NOT JUST TRUE OF
PRESIDENTS AND WITH PRESIDENTS.
IT'S TRUE OF ALL OF US,
WHEREVER WE MAY BE,
WHEREVER WE MAY BE IN LIFE.
THE NUCLEAR THREAT IS NOONLY STILL WITH US,
BUT IT'S GREATER THAN EVER.
AND IT IS POSSIBLE
TO TAKE A STAND AGAINST IT.
BUT TAKING A STAND AGAINST IT,
AS WE KNOW FROM KENNEDY,
IS NOT JUST A DIFFICULT THING,
BUT IT'S A DANGEROUS THING.
BUT IT MUST BE DONE ANYWAY.
male announcer: IN A 1964 COUP,
NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV WAS REMOVED
FROM POWER BY SOVIECONSPIRATORS WHO CLAIMED HIS
RESIGNATION WAS DUE TO
ADVANCED AGE AND POOR HEALTH.
SOURCES IN MOSCOW LATER REVEALED
THAT BEHIND KHRUSHCHEV'S
DISMISSAL WAS THE HUMILIATION
OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
AND DISSATISFACTION WITH HIS
LEADERSHIP.
FORCED FROM PUBLIC LIFE,
KHRUSHCHEV'S NAME WAS OMITTED
FROM RUSSIAN HISTORY BOOKS,
AND IN 1971, THE FORMER SOVIELEADER WAS DENIED
A STATE FUNERAL.
ACCORDING TO DECLASSIFIED
RECORDS, IN THE MONTH FOLLOWING
HIS BROTHER'S ASSASSINATION,
ATTORNEY GENERAL ROBERT F.
KENNEDY SENT A MEMO TO SECRETARY
OF STATE DEAN RUSK SEEKING AN
END TO THE U.S. TRAVEL BAN
TO CUBA, CALLING I"INCONSISTENT WITH TRADITIONAL
AMERICAN LIBERTIES."
TODAY AT THE UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL ASSEMBLY, A RESOLUTION
CALLING FOR AN END TO THE
ECONOMIC, COMMERCIAL, AND
FINANCIAL BLOCKADE IMPOSED BY
THE UNITED STATES ON CUBA
WAS ADOPTED BY A MARGIN OF
188 TO 3.
THIS MARKS THE 21st CONSECUTIVE
YEAR THE UNITED STATES HAS
IGNORED U.N. CONDEMNATION OVER
ITS CUBAN POLICIES.
PENTAGON PAPERS MADE PUBLIC
TODAY REVEALED NEW DETAILS
SURROUNDING THE EARLY DAYS
OF THE VIETNAM WAR.
ACCORDING TO THE PAPERS,
PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S PLAN FOR
DISENGAGEMENT OF ALL U.S.
MILITARY PERSONNEL IN SOUTH
VIETNAM BY 1965 WAS REVERSED
BY THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION
LESS THAN A YEAR AFTER KENNEDY'S
DEATH.
TENS OF THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE
HAVE TAKEN PART IN CELEBRATIONS
TO MARK 30 YEARS SINCE THE END
OF THE VIETNAM WAR TODAY.
BY THE TIME THE UNITED STATES
WITHDREW ITS FORCES IN 1975,
THE TRAGIC CONFLICT HAD CLAIMED
THE LIVES OF SOME 60,000
AMERICANS, 1 MILLION VIETNAMESE
SOLDIERS, AND NEARLY HALF A
MILLION VIETNAMESE CIVILIANS.