Pearl Harbor: Through the Eyes of Japan (2025) Movie Script
1
- In the silence of a quiet Sunday morning
in December of 1941,
many young men on the island of Oahu
have just made it to church.
Others are waking up
and getting dressed for a
beautiful day in paradise,
and still others,
thousands of Navy sailors,
are still asleep in their bunks.
Unbeknown to them,
180 Japanese aircraft have
just arrived over the island
and are now approaching
the United States' naval base
of Pearl Harbor from multiple directions.
In just a few moments, the
opening shots of World War II
for both Japan and the United
States are about to be fired,
and the results would be catastrophic
for the American fleet at anchor.
This had been the result
of months of planning
by Japanese commanders,
and now, for the first time,
this iconic attack will be viewed
through the eyes of the aggressors,
the Japanese, who thrust the US
into the largest war in history.
From the perspective of
Imperial Japan's commanders,
admiral, and the pilots who flew it,
this is the attack on Pearl Harbor.
It is the fall of 1941,
four months before the
attack on Pearl Harbor.
Currently in Washington, D.C.,
Japanese representatives are
desperately trying to negotiate
some sort of peace deal
with the United States.
However, things are not going well.
The previous year, the United States,
along with other nations,
announced that they were
officially ceasing all sales
of iron ore, steel,
and most importantly, oil to Japan
in an effort to discourage their invasion
and occupation of China
and French Indochina.
This embargo, however, would
prove to be more devastating
to Japan than these nations
could've ever imagined.
Without these imports,
not only would Japan's
military come to a grinding halt,
but also her entire economy
in a span of just a few short years.
Appropriately, Japan tried
desperately to negotiate
with the United States,
specifically for oil sales,
but President Roosevelt
refused to give any ground.
In exchange for oil and
for the sanctions to be lifted,
he demanded that the Japanese pull out
of French Indochina and China.
In the Japanese military culture, however,
this was unthinkable.
They had just entered Indochina,
and the war was nearing an end in China.
To pull back now would make clear
that they had submitted
to the United States
and were running from battle,
an incredibly dishonorable outcome
for the forces of the Japanese Empire.
As the US made this
stance abundantly clear,
Japan saw where the situation was headed.
Representatives attempted
to continue peace talks in D.C.,
but as early as April of 1941,
the Imperial Japanese
Headquarters began preparing
for a potential war with
the Western powers.
Contrary to popular belief, however,
this was a war that many
in Japan did not want.
In Imperial Japan, there
were two main factions
of the military, the Army and the Navy,
and unlike many nations,
these two factions were fiercely divided
and always in competition with one another.
And in keeping with their
seemingly constant disagreements,
when the emperor and his
staff summoned both factions
to advise him on the potential
war outlook with America,
he received two very different answers.
The Army was led by
Prime Minister Hideki Tojo,
and was far more warmongering
than any other group.
The leaders within mostly
wanted a war with America,
and vastly overestimated
the capability of Imperial Japan
to wage war with the United States.
The Navy, however, was led
by much more restrained and logical minds.
The Minister of the Navy was a man
by the name of Koshiro Oikawa,
and he, unlike Tojo and
the war-hungry Army,
knew that Japan was not currently capable
of winning an all-out war with America,
and specifically, he was
well-aware of the fact
that the Japanese Navy
was not fully prepared
or armed enough to hold
off the American Pacific Fleet.
His restraint, however,
specifically in speaking his mind,
would prove to be costly.
As a man of traditional discipline,
he believed that it was not his position
as a military leader to decide when
and with whom to go to war.
That was instead the
job of the politicians,
and he was simply a military leader.
So unfortunately, one of
the only men whose insight
and opinion could have
indeed prevented the war
by stating the accurate outlook for Japan
and the unpreparedness
of her Navy was in fact silent
and reserved, as he
believed it was not his job
to speak on such matters.
Thus, the nation of Japan,
unless the peace talks
with the US were successful,
was well on her way to war,
and as such, a plan had to be made.
Despite its overconfident Army
and some leaders with
warmongering ambitions,
Japan and the rest of
the world was well-aware
that even in 1940
the United States of
America was a superpower.
Their economy was second to none,
and should they go to war
with their utmost strength
and on an even playing field,
they were nearly unbeatable.
We have thousands
- So it quickly became clear
that Japan would at all costs
try to ensure that this war was not fought
on an even playing field.
The best way to do this, without a doubt,
was a surprise attack, a
swift and unexpected blow
that would cripple the United States
while Japan immediately
engaged in an aggressive campaign
across the South Pacific to
take as many natural resources
as possible to fuel their
military and economy.
This would require a long and drawn-out war
by the United States to build back
and retake all of the territory.
This was not a war that
Imperial Japan believed
the American people
would be willing to wage.
But where and how
would this strike take place?
Perhaps a submarine strike
on the massive naval base
in San Francisco,
resulting in a crucial blow
at the mainland soil of the United States,
or perhaps Midway Island,
an Army invasion of a valuable airstrip
in the middle of the Pacific.
No, neither of these
would be the chosen target.
Instead, a man by the name of
Isoroku Yamamoto was already
well into the building of a plan
that would go down in history.
Yamamoto was currently
the most valuable man
in the entire Japanese Navy.
He had recently risen to prominence
for his keen strategic acumen
and his unwavering position against war.
In fact, he was one of the
last men that one would expect
to plan the ruthless surprise attack
against the United States,
as he had been firmly
against the invasion of China,
against the Tripartite
Pact with Nazi Germany
and Fascist Italy,
and was now also against
war with the United States.
If anyone would've had an
accurate grasp on the situation,
it should've been Yamamoto,
who, during his time in the United States,
had studied at Harvard and
had learned perfect English.
Due to these opinions,
Yamamoto had become a very
likely target for assassination
by the aggressive Japanese Army commanders,
who knew that he could try to prevent
the war that they wanted.
So Yamamoto was named Commander in Chief
of the Combined Naval
Fleet for the sole purpose
of protecting his life, as
naval commanders expected
that Yamamoto would
certainly be assassinated
had he remained on dry land.
During his time as commander
in chief of the naval fleet,
Isoroku Yamamoto had
innovated many important aspects
of the Imperial Navy,
but perhaps none so much as naval aviation.
Yamamoto was the greatest
advocate of naval air power
that Japan had ever seen.
Under his direction, the
Japanese naval aviation forces
had developed greatly in recent years,
and now, it was because of this
that a plan to strike Pearl
Harbor from the air was born.
The inspiration and
specific origins of the concept
for an attack on Hawaii
are actually unknown,
but what is apparent is that
Yamamoto was already planning
the concept out as early as January, 1941.
This sort of strike, however,
was completely revolutionary,
as naval aircraft had only
just recently reached a point
where they could legitimately
carry enough firepower
to execute an offensive strike
on an enemy fleet or base.
Thus, Yamamoto and the
Japanese Navy had to put together
a plan the likes of which had
never been before conceived.
Originally, when Yamamoto
assigned one of his staff members
to study an attack on Hawaii
and present him with the options,
there were three different attack concepts
that were considered.
The first was a strike utilizing
only Japanese dive bombers,
the most accurate and
most reliable for an attack
in a shallow water harbor such as this.
They would launch from
350 miles away at sea
and return back to the carriers.
This plan lacked fighter escort,
but was more of a hit-and-run concept,
targeting only the
American aircraft carriers
and then returning to the fleet.
The second idea was an interesting one,
as it also utilized only the
Japanese dive bombers,
but instead of launching at a
distance of 350 miles at sea,
the strike force would
be sent from farther out,
and immediately following their launch,
the Japanese carrier force
would turn back for Japan,
leaving the dive bombers
to land in the sea,
where they would later
be picked up by submarines.
This plan was essentially
the Japanese version
of the later to come Doolittle Raid,
a one-way strike from a carrier force
with the fleet immediately
turning away from the battle
to protect the carriers at all costs.
Then there was the third,
the most appealing, an all-out strike
utilizing dive bombers,
torpedo bombers, and fighters.
This plan had the most consensus
among naval staff members,
and if executed properly, would
ensure the most damage done
to the American fleet.
It was this plan that
they would build upon.
Meanwhile, Yamamoto
in Japan was still insisting
that the American economic
might would eventually win out
against the Imperial
Navy in a drawn-out war.
But nonetheless, if the
warmongering Army leaders insisted
on pushing his country into a war,
he felt that it was up to him to try
and give his empire the
best chance to succeed.
He wrote to a friend
expressing just this thought
right before the attack.
"A decision to go to war has been made
"that is diametrically
opposed to my attitude
"as an individual.
"There is no other choice
"but to pursue this course
with determination and energy.
"The current situation
is indeed strange for me.
"I suppose I should
regard it as my destiny."
As his destiny became clear,
training was now underway.
Yamamoto, who had threatened to resign
if the attack was not carried out
in the way that he demanded,
was now watching the
fighters practicing their strafing,
dive bombers striking targets at anchor,
and torpedo bombers attempting to hit ships
in a shallow harbor with
just 12 meters of depth.
This was thus far in naval
aviation an unheard of feat
in regards to an aerial torpedo.
It is because of this that the
US naval planners thought
that their fleet was safe
from aerial torpedo attack,
and thus did not utilize torpedo nets.
Fortunately for Yamamoto
and the Imperial Navy,
Japanese engineers had created a wooden fin
that allowed their torpedoes to not drop
to the normal depth
upon entry into the water.
But these fins are not
what you might think.
Looking at this new fin
as the Japanese train,
we can see the large
wooden fins on the back
of the Type 91 torpedo.
However, these are not the
special Pearl Harbor modification
as most people think.
These were added earlier
to ensure proper angle
upon entry into the water,
solving a separate problem
unrelated to that of Pearl Harbor.
These small little fins here
at the front of the tail cone
are actually the modification that was made
for the attack on Pearl Harbor,
and their impact is not made
after entry into the water,
but instead in the air.
These were gyroscopic anti-roll ailerons,
and their purpose was
to prevent the torpedo
from rolling in the air,
so that the horizontal
stabilizers on the back
could properly pitch the torpedo upwards
after entry into the water.
And tragically for the United States Navy,
this design worked flawlessly.
After rushing production,
these new torpedo
modifications would be delivered
to the carrier force
just a few days before
setting sail for Hawaii.
In Washington, D.C.,
peace talks had now
reached a breaking point.
Some historical perspectives
show the Japanese
as fully deceiving the United States
with false peace talks in
the lead-up to Pearl Harbor
or that the attack was a complete
and total surprise from a nation
that we were not in a
tense relationship with.
But these takes are not entirely true.
In reality, the Japanese envoy assigned
to reach an agreement was aggressively
still trying to negotiate peace,
and when they began to
fail, it was actually quite clear.
Here in "The New York Times,"
we can see a few articles from mid-November
that show the state of
the peace talks with the US
in the days leading up to
their deadline for a decision.
November 5th, "Japanese
Rushes Special Envoy to the U.S.
"with Last Proposals."
November 15th, "More
Japanese Representatives Arrive.
"Hoping for Peace."
And November 23rd, "US-Japan
Talks Now at Critical Point
"in Bids for Truce."
Now, remember, the decision point
for the Japanese attack
was in mid-November.
Thus, when a peace
agreement had not been reached
at this point, many of the moving parts
to the surprise attack
were already set into motion.
On November 26th, the
Japanese carrier fleet,
or Kido Butai, commanded
by Admiral Chuichi Nagumo,
set sail from Japan
and headed towards the
North Pacific on radio silence.
The force of six aircraft carriers
and more than 360
aircraft was fully prepped
and ready for war.
At the same time, we can
see things begin to unravel
as Japan accepts their fate.
US-Japanese peace talks have at this point
reached peak attention,
as they are continuously
making front page headlines.
November 27th, "US Gives
Terms to the Japanese,
"Plan Clings to Basic Principles,"
of pulling out of French
Indochina and China.
November 30th, things are now so serious
that the president ends his vacation early
to return to D.C. for final negotiations.
December 1st, less than
six days before the attack,
"Roosevelt Hurries Back in Crisis,"
sees Japanese envoy from Tokyo.
December 2nd, "Japan Renews Talks,
"But Capital is Skeptical,"
already showing the first signs
that they believe Japan is giving up.
And finally, on December 3rd,
we see that the US recognizes
troop buildups in key areas,
as the Japanese are
obviously planning to attack
various locations in the near future.
Now, Nagumo and the Kido Butai are
more than halfway across the Pacific,
nearing their launch point.
All the while, Japanese spies were sending
critical information back to Yamamoto
and his staff in Tokyo,
which as quickly as
possible was being relayed
to the admiral and his fleet.
In the days before the attack,
the Japanese spies reported
that there were no air balloons
preventing aerial attack,
as well as the fact that
eight or nine battleships were present
with a group in two
rows off of Ford Island.
This was key information,
because the Japanese
commanders were not positive
if the fleet would be
present in Pearl Harbor
or in another location that
had been used off of Maui.
While these reports did
provide priceless information,
they were not necessarily
the most accurate,
as they had to rely upon
minimally trained civilians
to identify US naval
vessels from long distances.
Thus, the reports also actually
incorrectly identified some ships.
For example, in the week
leading up to December 7th,
the number of aircraft carriers
reported in Pearl Harbor
were two by this spy,
but that was because he misidentified
the USS Utah as a carrier,
leaving only one, the USS
Lexington, still in the harbor
as the Japanese fleet approached.
But unfortunately, she would
also leave in the direction
of Midway to defend that crucial airfield
just before the attack,
similarly to the USS
Enterprise that had just left
to reinforce Wake Island a few days prior.
Thus, by December 7th,
there were no aircraft
carriers left in the harbor.
Unlike most portrayals,
while the Japanese did
hope to destroy three
or four carriers in the
original planning of the attack,
by the morning of the launch,
they knew that best case scenario,
there would only be one carrier present,
but even this was wishful thinking.
Regardless, the attack
still had to be carried out
to try and cripple the American Navy
before Japan went to war.
So as the Fleet of the
Rising Sun sailed towards
the rising sun on the
morning of December 7th,
one of the most important events
in history officially began.
The first event taking
place on the Kido Butai
in the early morning hours,
other than the launching of
the failed midget submarines
that made little impact on the attack,
would be the the sending
off of two seaplane scouts
to do reconnaissance over the harbor
and confirm that all
was clear for the strike.
These two seaplanes arrived
and confirmed the wind, cloud cover,
and location of the ships at Pearl.
Conditions were perfect,
and the order for the attack was given.
Despite the fact that their
suspicions were confirmed
and that no carriers were present,
a great deal of damage could still be done.
One seaplane returned back to the fleet,
and the other continued to
look for the missing carrier.
But the USS Enterprise,
currently on her way back from Wake Island,
would remain undiscovered.
In New York, thousands of miles away,
the Sunday morning paper
had already been delivered.
In it, there was no more front page mention
of the US and Japanese negotiations.
Ominously, far from the
headline at the bottom of page one,
would be a simple summary article titled,
"The International Situation."
The only mention of Japan
was President Roosevelt sending
one final message to Emperor Hirohito,
and that there have now
been suggestions from Tokyo
that Japan was on the verge of abandoning
diplomatic conversations
with the United States.
- This would be an understatement.
In reality, they were
on the verge of taking
more than 2,000 American
lives in a few short hours.
With the Kido Butai, the
first wave was now ready.
According to the attack
plans, the strike would consist
of three different attack waves.
The first, a group of 183 aircraft
were now being launched
from the six aircraft carriers.
Wave number one consisted
of 89 B5N Kate bombers,
40 fit with Type 91 torpedoes,
and 49 fit with 1,700-pound
armor-piercing bombs
for high-level bombing,
as well as 51 D3A Val dive bombers
with 550 pound bombs
for smaller targeted strikes,
as well as 43 A6M Zero fighters
for air control and strafing.
Still on radio silence, they
approached the Pacific Fleet
of the United States Navy
at anchor and mostly asleep.
Meanwhile, in Washington,
the Japanese peace talks'
representatives were attempting
to carry out their final assignment
just before the start of the attack.
In an effort to abide by the laws of war
in a symbolic and legalistic way,
the Japanese politicians
had decided to hand
the United States a declaration of war
just before the attack began.
This was despite the Imperial Army
and Navy not wanting to do so.
In fact, one of the only Navy
advocates that did demand
a declaration of war should
be given 30 minutes prior
was Admiral Yamamoto himself.
This, however, would fail to be executed.
The final message to the United States,
which was 5,000 words in length,
gave Japanese representatives
a hard time with decoding.
So its delivery was unintentionally delayed
until after the attack had already begun.
But it made little difference,
as American code breakers
had already intercepted
and decoded it long before the
Japanese representatives had.
So in some semblance,
the Japanese did attempt
to declare war just
before the attack began,
but it was a symbolic attempt,
and in the end would fail,
as the attack was already beginning.
At 7:40 a.m. Hawaii Time,
the massive flight of
Japanese aircraft finally began
to arrive at the island of Oahu.
In charge of the entire
aerial attack was a young man
by the name of Mitsuo Fuchida.
Fuchida had gained valuable experience
in the war against China,
and had now earned himself a
position as the man responsible
for overseeing and
directing the entire attack.
As he fired flares, a
fellow dive bomber group,
who was no doubt anxious,
actually began their attack runs
earlier than was planned.
But at this point, it
made little difference.
So Fuchida called out
over the radio, "To, To, To,"
the code words to command
the entire first wave to attack.
After shooting at a couple of
unsuspecting leisure aircraft
on an early Sunday morning flight,
most of which were civilian,
the flights began to head
to their respective targets.
For the 49 high-level B5N bombers,
they were assigned to go
around the northwest side of Oahu
and approach the harbor from the south.
This allowed them to line
up well with Battleship Row.
The 40 B5N bombers
carrying torpedoes would take
a similar attack, but at low altitude,
and would be split up as
they approached the harbor.
Some would strike the western side,
while others would turn
around after passing the harbor,
and get the ideal angle of attack
for Battleship Row from the east.
Meanwhile, the 51 D4A dive
bombers came in over Oahu
from the north, preparing to
strike the main US airfields,
joined by 43 Zero fighters.
At approximately 7:49 a.m.
on December 7th of 1941,
11 minutes ahead of schedule,
the first attack took place
as the torpedo bombers,
the most vulnerable,
but also perhaps the most
deadly, approached Ford Island
and Battleship Road to take advantage
of the initial moments of surprise.
Here, we can see one of
the most important maps
in the history of World War II,
a post-mission report map
drawn on December 8th of 1941
by Commander Fuchida himself
noting with absolute
pinpoint detail and accuracy
the results of the attack
right down to what sort
of bomb hit precisely where
on each American ship in the harbor.
In the title of the document,
we see, "Top Secret,
Estimated Damage Report.
"Against Surface Ships on
the Air Attack of Pearl Harbor,
"December 8th, 1941."
In this initial torpedo strike,
we see half of the northeast side squadron
led by Hirahita Matsumura,
who came upon the
retired battleship USS Utah
currently in use for training.
Here, Fuchida notes six torpedo strikes
coming in to sink the
ship, marking it with an X.
Matsumura himself, however,
recognized that this
was not a prime target,
and instead carried over
to the next available target
on the docks of the
southern side of the harbor.
Here, he saw ship
which he believed to
be the USS Pennsylvania,
as according to Japanese intelligence,
she was usually at anchor here.
In reality, however, she had recently left,
and instead this was a
mine layer and a light cruiser.
His flight dropped torpedoes,
and hit the USS Helena,
and damaged the mine layer USS Oglala,
which tried to pull away from the Helena,
so that the two did not sink each other.
At almost the same moment
as Fuchida watched from above
assigned as an air observer in his B5N
desperately taking notes,
the second line of torpedo
bombers began their attack,
coming into Battleship
Row from the southeast.
They would be led by ace
torpedo bomber Shigeharu Murata.
These came in and hit Battleship Row hard,
with the most damage being
done to the USS Oklahoma
and USS West Virginia,
which both took repeated blows
as they sat on the exposed
outer side of Battleship Row.
The Oklahoma would take the worst of it,
being hit by so many torpedoes
that she quickly capsized,
and would not even be
targeted in the following strikes.
Also now taking place was
the arrival of dive bombers
from the north, now striking Ford Island.
According to some sources,
this dive bomber flight
may have actually struck first
due to a miscommunication
earlier in the flares.
However, I don't think
that that is necessarily true,
as we can see in this famous photo taken
during the first wave.
Within it, we can see a
major spout from a torpedo
on what appears to be the opening attack
of the USS West Virginia,
and meanwhile, the airfield
appears to be mostly unscathed.
Also, noteworthy in this
photo is a clear indication
of the timeline of events.
Here, in a close-up, we
can see the USS Utah hit
in the first torpedo
attack from the north flight
already listing heavily,
and also here the fact that
the inner row of battleships
has no smoke or fire,
including the USS Arizona,
indicating that the high-level
bombers have not yet struck.
This puts the sequence
of events into perfect order.
So at almost the exact same moment,
perhaps a minute or two apart,
the Val dive bombers arrived
to strike the Ford Island airfield.
This flight were assigned
to take out the hangars
and aircraft at this air base,
and to render the runway useless.
Here, the famous hangar was hit by bombs
and machine gunfire,
which today still stands
and bears the scars from this attack.
One minute later, Zeros
and other Vals arrived
and opened up the attack
on the US Army aircraft
in the center of the island of Oahu.
Striking these smaller
airstrips was crucial
to prevent fighters from getting airborne
to hit the raiding bombers,
or worse, to potentially counter-attack
against the Japanese carrier fleet.
The Zeros would stray first,
hitting the grounded aircraft
that had been closely grouped
together to prevent sabotage.
Then the dive bombers came
in from above finishing the job
and striking hangars and
other important structures.
A similar method of attack
would follow at Wheeler Airfield,
Hickam Airfield, Ewa Mooring Mast Airfield,
as well as Kaneohe Bay Naval Air Station
on the northeast of the island.
Meanwhile, the second most effective attack
was now beginning,
a high-level bombing
attack on Battleship Row.
This would come from the dead south,
lining up with Battleship Row
to give them the highest chance of success.
Fuchida in his own high-level bomber
would help to lead this strike.
Here, on his map, we can see
the small red circles
indicating the reported hits
of the high-level bombers'
1,700-pound armor-piercing bombs.
We can see that hits were
landed on the USS Maryland
and the USS Tennessee,
both of which were protected
from the torpedo attacks
due to their location,
but would be heavily damaged
by these high-altitude bombers.
And then the final target in the crosshairs
of the high-altitude bombers
would be the USS Arizona.
According to Fuchida's post-mission report,
the Arizona would be hit by
four armor-piercing bombs,
the most of any battleship at Pearl.
One of these bombs would land a blow
that would take more life than perhaps
any other single moment of
the war for the American Navy
when it pierced the deck
of the mighty battleship
and ignited the forward magazine,
resulting in a cataclysmic
explosion that killed 1,177
of the 1,512 crewmen on board.
Fascinatingly, this would be
the most noteworthy mistake
on Fuchida's after-action map,
as the USS Arizona of all ships was listed
as only severely damaged, rather than sunk.
This would be because the black smoke
and fires from the Arizona were so thick
that it completely obscured
his view of the ship,
and he was not able to confirm her sinking.
As the remaining Japanese Zeros
and Vals attacked a few airfield targets
with their remaining ammunition,
the first wave strike came to a close,
and the attackers
returned to the carrier fleet.
The entire ordeal had taken a half hour,
but the morning was not yet over.
Approximately 20 minutes later,
the second wave consisting
of 171 aircraft arrived
at Pearl Harbor to continue the attack.
This second strike would include
no B5N bombers with torpedoes,
but instead a greater
number of high-level bombers,
as well as many more D4A Val dive bombers.
Accompanying them as
well would be 35 A6M Zeros
assigned to escort and
defend this second wave.
The target of this
second strike was primarily
the leftover hangars,
aircraft, and surviving ships,
and this time, the attackers would approach
from the eastern side of Oahu.
Here, we can see one of the photos
from the high-level bombers on this raid
to get a good picture of what exactly
the harbor looked like at
the start of the second wave.
Due to the fact that
no carriers were present
and many of the battleships
had already taken heavy damage,
some of the primary targets of this attack
would be the ships at the docks
on the east side of the harbor.
These hits can be seen on Fuchida's map,
as he remained behind after
the first wave left to watch
and report the success of the second wave.
Here, we can see multiple
destroyers that were hit hard,
including the USS Shaw,
which famously exploded in dry docks
creating this iconic image.
- Also, the USS Nevada
became a notable target,
as she had tried to get
underway and exit the harbor.
She, however, became a
prime target for the dive bombers
of the second wave,
and was hit by what
Fuchida lists as eight bombs
shortly before she was run aground.
We also see that some of
the other Vals did indeed
try to finish off the battleships
that appeared to still be afloat.
This included the California
and the USS Maryland,
who each took multiple direct hits
from the second wave dive bombers.
The Zeros would also have
their work cut out for them
in the second wave,
as a handful of American
fighters did get into the air,
and there were still aircraft left
for strafing on the ground.
But for the most part,
the second wave was
less eventful than the first,
and American antiaircraft
crews were more alert
for the second attack,
resulting in a few more Japanese losses.
At 10:00 a.m. Hawaii Time,
the second wave was gone,
headed back to the carriers.
In the first two waves,
they had lost 29 aircraft,
no doubt good results
for the high-risk attack.
The third wave of the attack,
which was ready and willing,
was withdrawn at the
order of Admiral Nagumo,
who thought that the risk
of a third strike outweighed the return.
It appeared that the American
fleet was already crippled,
and his fleet was now surely within range
of American land-based bombers.
Thus, to protect the fleet, he withdrew,
and brought the attack to an end.
In addition, the carriers were not present,
and their location was unknown.
Should the American carriers
locate the Japanese fleet
while the third wave was still underway,
it could have disastrous
results for the Kido Butai.
Furthermore, if the
Japanese were to take off now
and strike Pearl with the third wave,
they would not return until
the darkness of evening,
and nighttime carrier
landings were not yet a tactic
that the Imperial Navy had mastered.
Thus, Nagumo believed
the right decision was
to withdraw the third strike.
Originally, Admiral Yamamoto
supported this decision,
but later stated that he regretted it,
and that a third wave
could've potentially done
substantially more damage
to the American fleet,
and specifically the oil reserves.
Miraculously, Mitsuo Fuchida,
the lead pilot for the
attack on Pearl Harbor,
and the author of the famous
Japanese damage report map
would survive not only the attack,
but also the remainder of the war.
In the Battle of Midway,
while on board the Akagi,
he was injured during the morning attacks
by American aircraft.
He would receive two broken ankles,
and was removed from
his duties as a combat pilot.
He would spend the rest of the war
as a staff officer in the Imperial Navy,
and was actually in Hiroshima at the time
of the atomic bombing in 1945.
Yet he would once again survive,
even though many of
his party traveling with him
at that moment would later
die of radiation poisoning.
He would eventually go on
to become a devout Christian,
and spent many of his
later years traveling the world
and spreading the gospel.
For the Japanese fleet, however,
despite the withdrawal of the third wave
and the missing American carriers,
the attack was indeed a success.
It accomplished the crippling
of the American Pacific Fleet
and sunk four American battleships,
giving the Japanese a crucial headstart
and an advantage on their
campaign in the South Pacific.
Unfortunately, it would have the opposite
of its intended effect,
with the attack widely considered dastardly
and underhanded by most Americans,
as no declaration of war
had yet been declared.
Instead of the American
public becoming sick of the war
and not wanting to
wage a drawn-out conflict,
it instead rallied the
American people together
in a quest for revenge.
And as Yamamoto had feared,
it would create an enemy
for Japan that would outlast
and outproduce them
in a long and brutal war.
As always, I'm TJ.
Thanks for watching,
and I'll see you next time.
- In the silence of a quiet Sunday morning
in December of 1941,
many young men on the island of Oahu
have just made it to church.
Others are waking up
and getting dressed for a
beautiful day in paradise,
and still others,
thousands of Navy sailors,
are still asleep in their bunks.
Unbeknown to them,
180 Japanese aircraft have
just arrived over the island
and are now approaching
the United States' naval base
of Pearl Harbor from multiple directions.
In just a few moments, the
opening shots of World War II
for both Japan and the United
States are about to be fired,
and the results would be catastrophic
for the American fleet at anchor.
This had been the result
of months of planning
by Japanese commanders,
and now, for the first time,
this iconic attack will be viewed
through the eyes of the aggressors,
the Japanese, who thrust the US
into the largest war in history.
From the perspective of
Imperial Japan's commanders,
admiral, and the pilots who flew it,
this is the attack on Pearl Harbor.
It is the fall of 1941,
four months before the
attack on Pearl Harbor.
Currently in Washington, D.C.,
Japanese representatives are
desperately trying to negotiate
some sort of peace deal
with the United States.
However, things are not going well.
The previous year, the United States,
along with other nations,
announced that they were
officially ceasing all sales
of iron ore, steel,
and most importantly, oil to Japan
in an effort to discourage their invasion
and occupation of China
and French Indochina.
This embargo, however, would
prove to be more devastating
to Japan than these nations
could've ever imagined.
Without these imports,
not only would Japan's
military come to a grinding halt,
but also her entire economy
in a span of just a few short years.
Appropriately, Japan tried
desperately to negotiate
with the United States,
specifically for oil sales,
but President Roosevelt
refused to give any ground.
In exchange for oil and
for the sanctions to be lifted,
he demanded that the Japanese pull out
of French Indochina and China.
In the Japanese military culture, however,
this was unthinkable.
They had just entered Indochina,
and the war was nearing an end in China.
To pull back now would make clear
that they had submitted
to the United States
and were running from battle,
an incredibly dishonorable outcome
for the forces of the Japanese Empire.
As the US made this
stance abundantly clear,
Japan saw where the situation was headed.
Representatives attempted
to continue peace talks in D.C.,
but as early as April of 1941,
the Imperial Japanese
Headquarters began preparing
for a potential war with
the Western powers.
Contrary to popular belief, however,
this was a war that many
in Japan did not want.
In Imperial Japan, there
were two main factions
of the military, the Army and the Navy,
and unlike many nations,
these two factions were fiercely divided
and always in competition with one another.
And in keeping with their
seemingly constant disagreements,
when the emperor and his
staff summoned both factions
to advise him on the potential
war outlook with America,
he received two very different answers.
The Army was led by
Prime Minister Hideki Tojo,
and was far more warmongering
than any other group.
The leaders within mostly
wanted a war with America,
and vastly overestimated
the capability of Imperial Japan
to wage war with the United States.
The Navy, however, was led
by much more restrained and logical minds.
The Minister of the Navy was a man
by the name of Koshiro Oikawa,
and he, unlike Tojo and
the war-hungry Army,
knew that Japan was not currently capable
of winning an all-out war with America,
and specifically, he was
well-aware of the fact
that the Japanese Navy
was not fully prepared
or armed enough to hold
off the American Pacific Fleet.
His restraint, however,
specifically in speaking his mind,
would prove to be costly.
As a man of traditional discipline,
he believed that it was not his position
as a military leader to decide when
and with whom to go to war.
That was instead the
job of the politicians,
and he was simply a military leader.
So unfortunately, one of
the only men whose insight
and opinion could have
indeed prevented the war
by stating the accurate outlook for Japan
and the unpreparedness
of her Navy was in fact silent
and reserved, as he
believed it was not his job
to speak on such matters.
Thus, the nation of Japan,
unless the peace talks
with the US were successful,
was well on her way to war,
and as such, a plan had to be made.
Despite its overconfident Army
and some leaders with
warmongering ambitions,
Japan and the rest of
the world was well-aware
that even in 1940
the United States of
America was a superpower.
Their economy was second to none,
and should they go to war
with their utmost strength
and on an even playing field,
they were nearly unbeatable.
We have thousands
- So it quickly became clear
that Japan would at all costs
try to ensure that this war was not fought
on an even playing field.
The best way to do this, without a doubt,
was a surprise attack, a
swift and unexpected blow
that would cripple the United States
while Japan immediately
engaged in an aggressive campaign
across the South Pacific to
take as many natural resources
as possible to fuel their
military and economy.
This would require a long and drawn-out war
by the United States to build back
and retake all of the territory.
This was not a war that
Imperial Japan believed
the American people
would be willing to wage.
But where and how
would this strike take place?
Perhaps a submarine strike
on the massive naval base
in San Francisco,
resulting in a crucial blow
at the mainland soil of the United States,
or perhaps Midway Island,
an Army invasion of a valuable airstrip
in the middle of the Pacific.
No, neither of these
would be the chosen target.
Instead, a man by the name of
Isoroku Yamamoto was already
well into the building of a plan
that would go down in history.
Yamamoto was currently
the most valuable man
in the entire Japanese Navy.
He had recently risen to prominence
for his keen strategic acumen
and his unwavering position against war.
In fact, he was one of the
last men that one would expect
to plan the ruthless surprise attack
against the United States,
as he had been firmly
against the invasion of China,
against the Tripartite
Pact with Nazi Germany
and Fascist Italy,
and was now also against
war with the United States.
If anyone would've had an
accurate grasp on the situation,
it should've been Yamamoto,
who, during his time in the United States,
had studied at Harvard and
had learned perfect English.
Due to these opinions,
Yamamoto had become a very
likely target for assassination
by the aggressive Japanese Army commanders,
who knew that he could try to prevent
the war that they wanted.
So Yamamoto was named Commander in Chief
of the Combined Naval
Fleet for the sole purpose
of protecting his life, as
naval commanders expected
that Yamamoto would
certainly be assassinated
had he remained on dry land.
During his time as commander
in chief of the naval fleet,
Isoroku Yamamoto had
innovated many important aspects
of the Imperial Navy,
but perhaps none so much as naval aviation.
Yamamoto was the greatest
advocate of naval air power
that Japan had ever seen.
Under his direction, the
Japanese naval aviation forces
had developed greatly in recent years,
and now, it was because of this
that a plan to strike Pearl
Harbor from the air was born.
The inspiration and
specific origins of the concept
for an attack on Hawaii
are actually unknown,
but what is apparent is that
Yamamoto was already planning
the concept out as early as January, 1941.
This sort of strike, however,
was completely revolutionary,
as naval aircraft had only
just recently reached a point
where they could legitimately
carry enough firepower
to execute an offensive strike
on an enemy fleet or base.
Thus, Yamamoto and the
Japanese Navy had to put together
a plan the likes of which had
never been before conceived.
Originally, when Yamamoto
assigned one of his staff members
to study an attack on Hawaii
and present him with the options,
there were three different attack concepts
that were considered.
The first was a strike utilizing
only Japanese dive bombers,
the most accurate and
most reliable for an attack
in a shallow water harbor such as this.
They would launch from
350 miles away at sea
and return back to the carriers.
This plan lacked fighter escort,
but was more of a hit-and-run concept,
targeting only the
American aircraft carriers
and then returning to the fleet.
The second idea was an interesting one,
as it also utilized only the
Japanese dive bombers,
but instead of launching at a
distance of 350 miles at sea,
the strike force would
be sent from farther out,
and immediately following their launch,
the Japanese carrier force
would turn back for Japan,
leaving the dive bombers
to land in the sea,
where they would later
be picked up by submarines.
This plan was essentially
the Japanese version
of the later to come Doolittle Raid,
a one-way strike from a carrier force
with the fleet immediately
turning away from the battle
to protect the carriers at all costs.
Then there was the third,
the most appealing, an all-out strike
utilizing dive bombers,
torpedo bombers, and fighters.
This plan had the most consensus
among naval staff members,
and if executed properly, would
ensure the most damage done
to the American fleet.
It was this plan that
they would build upon.
Meanwhile, Yamamoto
in Japan was still insisting
that the American economic
might would eventually win out
against the Imperial
Navy in a drawn-out war.
But nonetheless, if the
warmongering Army leaders insisted
on pushing his country into a war,
he felt that it was up to him to try
and give his empire the
best chance to succeed.
He wrote to a friend
expressing just this thought
right before the attack.
"A decision to go to war has been made
"that is diametrically
opposed to my attitude
"as an individual.
"There is no other choice
"but to pursue this course
with determination and energy.
"The current situation
is indeed strange for me.
"I suppose I should
regard it as my destiny."
As his destiny became clear,
training was now underway.
Yamamoto, who had threatened to resign
if the attack was not carried out
in the way that he demanded,
was now watching the
fighters practicing their strafing,
dive bombers striking targets at anchor,
and torpedo bombers attempting to hit ships
in a shallow harbor with
just 12 meters of depth.
This was thus far in naval
aviation an unheard of feat
in regards to an aerial torpedo.
It is because of this that the
US naval planners thought
that their fleet was safe
from aerial torpedo attack,
and thus did not utilize torpedo nets.
Fortunately for Yamamoto
and the Imperial Navy,
Japanese engineers had created a wooden fin
that allowed their torpedoes to not drop
to the normal depth
upon entry into the water.
But these fins are not
what you might think.
Looking at this new fin
as the Japanese train,
we can see the large
wooden fins on the back
of the Type 91 torpedo.
However, these are not the
special Pearl Harbor modification
as most people think.
These were added earlier
to ensure proper angle
upon entry into the water,
solving a separate problem
unrelated to that of Pearl Harbor.
These small little fins here
at the front of the tail cone
are actually the modification that was made
for the attack on Pearl Harbor,
and their impact is not made
after entry into the water,
but instead in the air.
These were gyroscopic anti-roll ailerons,
and their purpose was
to prevent the torpedo
from rolling in the air,
so that the horizontal
stabilizers on the back
could properly pitch the torpedo upwards
after entry into the water.
And tragically for the United States Navy,
this design worked flawlessly.
After rushing production,
these new torpedo
modifications would be delivered
to the carrier force
just a few days before
setting sail for Hawaii.
In Washington, D.C.,
peace talks had now
reached a breaking point.
Some historical perspectives
show the Japanese
as fully deceiving the United States
with false peace talks in
the lead-up to Pearl Harbor
or that the attack was a complete
and total surprise from a nation
that we were not in a
tense relationship with.
But these takes are not entirely true.
In reality, the Japanese envoy assigned
to reach an agreement was aggressively
still trying to negotiate peace,
and when they began to
fail, it was actually quite clear.
Here in "The New York Times,"
we can see a few articles from mid-November
that show the state of
the peace talks with the US
in the days leading up to
their deadline for a decision.
November 5th, "Japanese
Rushes Special Envoy to the U.S.
"with Last Proposals."
November 15th, "More
Japanese Representatives Arrive.
"Hoping for Peace."
And November 23rd, "US-Japan
Talks Now at Critical Point
"in Bids for Truce."
Now, remember, the decision point
for the Japanese attack
was in mid-November.
Thus, when a peace
agreement had not been reached
at this point, many of the moving parts
to the surprise attack
were already set into motion.
On November 26th, the
Japanese carrier fleet,
or Kido Butai, commanded
by Admiral Chuichi Nagumo,
set sail from Japan
and headed towards the
North Pacific on radio silence.
The force of six aircraft carriers
and more than 360
aircraft was fully prepped
and ready for war.
At the same time, we can
see things begin to unravel
as Japan accepts their fate.
US-Japanese peace talks have at this point
reached peak attention,
as they are continuously
making front page headlines.
November 27th, "US Gives
Terms to the Japanese,
"Plan Clings to Basic Principles,"
of pulling out of French
Indochina and China.
November 30th, things are now so serious
that the president ends his vacation early
to return to D.C. for final negotiations.
December 1st, less than
six days before the attack,
"Roosevelt Hurries Back in Crisis,"
sees Japanese envoy from Tokyo.
December 2nd, "Japan Renews Talks,
"But Capital is Skeptical,"
already showing the first signs
that they believe Japan is giving up.
And finally, on December 3rd,
we see that the US recognizes
troop buildups in key areas,
as the Japanese are
obviously planning to attack
various locations in the near future.
Now, Nagumo and the Kido Butai are
more than halfway across the Pacific,
nearing their launch point.
All the while, Japanese spies were sending
critical information back to Yamamoto
and his staff in Tokyo,
which as quickly as
possible was being relayed
to the admiral and his fleet.
In the days before the attack,
the Japanese spies reported
that there were no air balloons
preventing aerial attack,
as well as the fact that
eight or nine battleships were present
with a group in two
rows off of Ford Island.
This was key information,
because the Japanese
commanders were not positive
if the fleet would be
present in Pearl Harbor
or in another location that
had been used off of Maui.
While these reports did
provide priceless information,
they were not necessarily
the most accurate,
as they had to rely upon
minimally trained civilians
to identify US naval
vessels from long distances.
Thus, the reports also actually
incorrectly identified some ships.
For example, in the week
leading up to December 7th,
the number of aircraft carriers
reported in Pearl Harbor
were two by this spy,
but that was because he misidentified
the USS Utah as a carrier,
leaving only one, the USS
Lexington, still in the harbor
as the Japanese fleet approached.
But unfortunately, she would
also leave in the direction
of Midway to defend that crucial airfield
just before the attack,
similarly to the USS
Enterprise that had just left
to reinforce Wake Island a few days prior.
Thus, by December 7th,
there were no aircraft
carriers left in the harbor.
Unlike most portrayals,
while the Japanese did
hope to destroy three
or four carriers in the
original planning of the attack,
by the morning of the launch,
they knew that best case scenario,
there would only be one carrier present,
but even this was wishful thinking.
Regardless, the attack
still had to be carried out
to try and cripple the American Navy
before Japan went to war.
So as the Fleet of the
Rising Sun sailed towards
the rising sun on the
morning of December 7th,
one of the most important events
in history officially began.
The first event taking
place on the Kido Butai
in the early morning hours,
other than the launching of
the failed midget submarines
that made little impact on the attack,
would be the the sending
off of two seaplane scouts
to do reconnaissance over the harbor
and confirm that all
was clear for the strike.
These two seaplanes arrived
and confirmed the wind, cloud cover,
and location of the ships at Pearl.
Conditions were perfect,
and the order for the attack was given.
Despite the fact that their
suspicions were confirmed
and that no carriers were present,
a great deal of damage could still be done.
One seaplane returned back to the fleet,
and the other continued to
look for the missing carrier.
But the USS Enterprise,
currently on her way back from Wake Island,
would remain undiscovered.
In New York, thousands of miles away,
the Sunday morning paper
had already been delivered.
In it, there was no more front page mention
of the US and Japanese negotiations.
Ominously, far from the
headline at the bottom of page one,
would be a simple summary article titled,
"The International Situation."
The only mention of Japan
was President Roosevelt sending
one final message to Emperor Hirohito,
and that there have now
been suggestions from Tokyo
that Japan was on the verge of abandoning
diplomatic conversations
with the United States.
- This would be an understatement.
In reality, they were
on the verge of taking
more than 2,000 American
lives in a few short hours.
With the Kido Butai, the
first wave was now ready.
According to the attack
plans, the strike would consist
of three different attack waves.
The first, a group of 183 aircraft
were now being launched
from the six aircraft carriers.
Wave number one consisted
of 89 B5N Kate bombers,
40 fit with Type 91 torpedoes,
and 49 fit with 1,700-pound
armor-piercing bombs
for high-level bombing,
as well as 51 D3A Val dive bombers
with 550 pound bombs
for smaller targeted strikes,
as well as 43 A6M Zero fighters
for air control and strafing.
Still on radio silence, they
approached the Pacific Fleet
of the United States Navy
at anchor and mostly asleep.
Meanwhile, in Washington,
the Japanese peace talks'
representatives were attempting
to carry out their final assignment
just before the start of the attack.
In an effort to abide by the laws of war
in a symbolic and legalistic way,
the Japanese politicians
had decided to hand
the United States a declaration of war
just before the attack began.
This was despite the Imperial Army
and Navy not wanting to do so.
In fact, one of the only Navy
advocates that did demand
a declaration of war should
be given 30 minutes prior
was Admiral Yamamoto himself.
This, however, would fail to be executed.
The final message to the United States,
which was 5,000 words in length,
gave Japanese representatives
a hard time with decoding.
So its delivery was unintentionally delayed
until after the attack had already begun.
But it made little difference,
as American code breakers
had already intercepted
and decoded it long before the
Japanese representatives had.
So in some semblance,
the Japanese did attempt
to declare war just
before the attack began,
but it was a symbolic attempt,
and in the end would fail,
as the attack was already beginning.
At 7:40 a.m. Hawaii Time,
the massive flight of
Japanese aircraft finally began
to arrive at the island of Oahu.
In charge of the entire
aerial attack was a young man
by the name of Mitsuo Fuchida.
Fuchida had gained valuable experience
in the war against China,
and had now earned himself a
position as the man responsible
for overseeing and
directing the entire attack.
As he fired flares, a
fellow dive bomber group,
who was no doubt anxious,
actually began their attack runs
earlier than was planned.
But at this point, it
made little difference.
So Fuchida called out
over the radio, "To, To, To,"
the code words to command
the entire first wave to attack.
After shooting at a couple of
unsuspecting leisure aircraft
on an early Sunday morning flight,
most of which were civilian,
the flights began to head
to their respective targets.
For the 49 high-level B5N bombers,
they were assigned to go
around the northwest side of Oahu
and approach the harbor from the south.
This allowed them to line
up well with Battleship Row.
The 40 B5N bombers
carrying torpedoes would take
a similar attack, but at low altitude,
and would be split up as
they approached the harbor.
Some would strike the western side,
while others would turn
around after passing the harbor,
and get the ideal angle of attack
for Battleship Row from the east.
Meanwhile, the 51 D4A dive
bombers came in over Oahu
from the north, preparing to
strike the main US airfields,
joined by 43 Zero fighters.
At approximately 7:49 a.m.
on December 7th of 1941,
11 minutes ahead of schedule,
the first attack took place
as the torpedo bombers,
the most vulnerable,
but also perhaps the most
deadly, approached Ford Island
and Battleship Road to take advantage
of the initial moments of surprise.
Here, we can see one of
the most important maps
in the history of World War II,
a post-mission report map
drawn on December 8th of 1941
by Commander Fuchida himself
noting with absolute
pinpoint detail and accuracy
the results of the attack
right down to what sort
of bomb hit precisely where
on each American ship in the harbor.
In the title of the document,
we see, "Top Secret,
Estimated Damage Report.
"Against Surface Ships on
the Air Attack of Pearl Harbor,
"December 8th, 1941."
In this initial torpedo strike,
we see half of the northeast side squadron
led by Hirahita Matsumura,
who came upon the
retired battleship USS Utah
currently in use for training.
Here, Fuchida notes six torpedo strikes
coming in to sink the
ship, marking it with an X.
Matsumura himself, however,
recognized that this
was not a prime target,
and instead carried over
to the next available target
on the docks of the
southern side of the harbor.
Here, he saw ship
which he believed to
be the USS Pennsylvania,
as according to Japanese intelligence,
she was usually at anchor here.
In reality, however, she had recently left,
and instead this was a
mine layer and a light cruiser.
His flight dropped torpedoes,
and hit the USS Helena,
and damaged the mine layer USS Oglala,
which tried to pull away from the Helena,
so that the two did not sink each other.
At almost the same moment
as Fuchida watched from above
assigned as an air observer in his B5N
desperately taking notes,
the second line of torpedo
bombers began their attack,
coming into Battleship
Row from the southeast.
They would be led by ace
torpedo bomber Shigeharu Murata.
These came in and hit Battleship Row hard,
with the most damage being
done to the USS Oklahoma
and USS West Virginia,
which both took repeated blows
as they sat on the exposed
outer side of Battleship Row.
The Oklahoma would take the worst of it,
being hit by so many torpedoes
that she quickly capsized,
and would not even be
targeted in the following strikes.
Also now taking place was
the arrival of dive bombers
from the north, now striking Ford Island.
According to some sources,
this dive bomber flight
may have actually struck first
due to a miscommunication
earlier in the flares.
However, I don't think
that that is necessarily true,
as we can see in this famous photo taken
during the first wave.
Within it, we can see a
major spout from a torpedo
on what appears to be the opening attack
of the USS West Virginia,
and meanwhile, the airfield
appears to be mostly unscathed.
Also, noteworthy in this
photo is a clear indication
of the timeline of events.
Here, in a close-up, we
can see the USS Utah hit
in the first torpedo
attack from the north flight
already listing heavily,
and also here the fact that
the inner row of battleships
has no smoke or fire,
including the USS Arizona,
indicating that the high-level
bombers have not yet struck.
This puts the sequence
of events into perfect order.
So at almost the exact same moment,
perhaps a minute or two apart,
the Val dive bombers arrived
to strike the Ford Island airfield.
This flight were assigned
to take out the hangars
and aircraft at this air base,
and to render the runway useless.
Here, the famous hangar was hit by bombs
and machine gunfire,
which today still stands
and bears the scars from this attack.
One minute later, Zeros
and other Vals arrived
and opened up the attack
on the US Army aircraft
in the center of the island of Oahu.
Striking these smaller
airstrips was crucial
to prevent fighters from getting airborne
to hit the raiding bombers,
or worse, to potentially counter-attack
against the Japanese carrier fleet.
The Zeros would stray first,
hitting the grounded aircraft
that had been closely grouped
together to prevent sabotage.
Then the dive bombers came
in from above finishing the job
and striking hangars and
other important structures.
A similar method of attack
would follow at Wheeler Airfield,
Hickam Airfield, Ewa Mooring Mast Airfield,
as well as Kaneohe Bay Naval Air Station
on the northeast of the island.
Meanwhile, the second most effective attack
was now beginning,
a high-level bombing
attack on Battleship Row.
This would come from the dead south,
lining up with Battleship Row
to give them the highest chance of success.
Fuchida in his own high-level bomber
would help to lead this strike.
Here, on his map, we can see
the small red circles
indicating the reported hits
of the high-level bombers'
1,700-pound armor-piercing bombs.
We can see that hits were
landed on the USS Maryland
and the USS Tennessee,
both of which were protected
from the torpedo attacks
due to their location,
but would be heavily damaged
by these high-altitude bombers.
And then the final target in the crosshairs
of the high-altitude bombers
would be the USS Arizona.
According to Fuchida's post-mission report,
the Arizona would be hit by
four armor-piercing bombs,
the most of any battleship at Pearl.
One of these bombs would land a blow
that would take more life than perhaps
any other single moment of
the war for the American Navy
when it pierced the deck
of the mighty battleship
and ignited the forward magazine,
resulting in a cataclysmic
explosion that killed 1,177
of the 1,512 crewmen on board.
Fascinatingly, this would be
the most noteworthy mistake
on Fuchida's after-action map,
as the USS Arizona of all ships was listed
as only severely damaged, rather than sunk.
This would be because the black smoke
and fires from the Arizona were so thick
that it completely obscured
his view of the ship,
and he was not able to confirm her sinking.
As the remaining Japanese Zeros
and Vals attacked a few airfield targets
with their remaining ammunition,
the first wave strike came to a close,
and the attackers
returned to the carrier fleet.
The entire ordeal had taken a half hour,
but the morning was not yet over.
Approximately 20 minutes later,
the second wave consisting
of 171 aircraft arrived
at Pearl Harbor to continue the attack.
This second strike would include
no B5N bombers with torpedoes,
but instead a greater
number of high-level bombers,
as well as many more D4A Val dive bombers.
Accompanying them as
well would be 35 A6M Zeros
assigned to escort and
defend this second wave.
The target of this
second strike was primarily
the leftover hangars,
aircraft, and surviving ships,
and this time, the attackers would approach
from the eastern side of Oahu.
Here, we can see one of the photos
from the high-level bombers on this raid
to get a good picture of what exactly
the harbor looked like at
the start of the second wave.
Due to the fact that
no carriers were present
and many of the battleships
had already taken heavy damage,
some of the primary targets of this attack
would be the ships at the docks
on the east side of the harbor.
These hits can be seen on Fuchida's map,
as he remained behind after
the first wave left to watch
and report the success of the second wave.
Here, we can see multiple
destroyers that were hit hard,
including the USS Shaw,
which famously exploded in dry docks
creating this iconic image.
- Also, the USS Nevada
became a notable target,
as she had tried to get
underway and exit the harbor.
She, however, became a
prime target for the dive bombers
of the second wave,
and was hit by what
Fuchida lists as eight bombs
shortly before she was run aground.
We also see that some of
the other Vals did indeed
try to finish off the battleships
that appeared to still be afloat.
This included the California
and the USS Maryland,
who each took multiple direct hits
from the second wave dive bombers.
The Zeros would also have
their work cut out for them
in the second wave,
as a handful of American
fighters did get into the air,
and there were still aircraft left
for strafing on the ground.
But for the most part,
the second wave was
less eventful than the first,
and American antiaircraft
crews were more alert
for the second attack,
resulting in a few more Japanese losses.
At 10:00 a.m. Hawaii Time,
the second wave was gone,
headed back to the carriers.
In the first two waves,
they had lost 29 aircraft,
no doubt good results
for the high-risk attack.
The third wave of the attack,
which was ready and willing,
was withdrawn at the
order of Admiral Nagumo,
who thought that the risk
of a third strike outweighed the return.
It appeared that the American
fleet was already crippled,
and his fleet was now surely within range
of American land-based bombers.
Thus, to protect the fleet, he withdrew,
and brought the attack to an end.
In addition, the carriers were not present,
and their location was unknown.
Should the American carriers
locate the Japanese fleet
while the third wave was still underway,
it could have disastrous
results for the Kido Butai.
Furthermore, if the
Japanese were to take off now
and strike Pearl with the third wave,
they would not return until
the darkness of evening,
and nighttime carrier
landings were not yet a tactic
that the Imperial Navy had mastered.
Thus, Nagumo believed
the right decision was
to withdraw the third strike.
Originally, Admiral Yamamoto
supported this decision,
but later stated that he regretted it,
and that a third wave
could've potentially done
substantially more damage
to the American fleet,
and specifically the oil reserves.
Miraculously, Mitsuo Fuchida,
the lead pilot for the
attack on Pearl Harbor,
and the author of the famous
Japanese damage report map
would survive not only the attack,
but also the remainder of the war.
In the Battle of Midway,
while on board the Akagi,
he was injured during the morning attacks
by American aircraft.
He would receive two broken ankles,
and was removed from
his duties as a combat pilot.
He would spend the rest of the war
as a staff officer in the Imperial Navy,
and was actually in Hiroshima at the time
of the atomic bombing in 1945.
Yet he would once again survive,
even though many of
his party traveling with him
at that moment would later
die of radiation poisoning.
He would eventually go on
to become a devout Christian,
and spent many of his
later years traveling the world
and spreading the gospel.
For the Japanese fleet, however,
despite the withdrawal of the third wave
and the missing American carriers,
the attack was indeed a success.
It accomplished the crippling
of the American Pacific Fleet
and sunk four American battleships,
giving the Japanese a crucial headstart
and an advantage on their
campaign in the South Pacific.
Unfortunately, it would have the opposite
of its intended effect,
with the attack widely considered dastardly
and underhanded by most Americans,
as no declaration of war
had yet been declared.
Instead of the American
public becoming sick of the war
and not wanting to
wage a drawn-out conflict,
it instead rallied the
American people together
in a quest for revenge.
And as Yamamoto had feared,
it would create an enemy
for Japan that would outlast
and outproduce them
in a long and brutal war.
As always, I'm TJ.
Thanks for watching,
and I'll see you next time.