Mayday (2013) s18e02 Episode Script
Blown Away
A Taiwanese commuter flight landing in bad weather goes horribly wrong.
TransAsia 222, do you copy? I understand that we are going to face a major accident investigation.
People are saying that the typhoon caused the crash.
Speculation on a cause runs rampant.
What was the minimum descent altitude? But the evidence points investigators in a troubling direction.
Unfortunately, the pilots perished in this accident so it's impossible to ask them after the fact what was going on.
(THEME MUSIC) On a rainy summer evening, TransAsia flight 222 is in a holding pattern 3100 feet above the Taiwan Strait.
The pilot flying is Captain Lee Yi-liang.
Heading two-four-zero.
He's a former military pilot with 22 years of commercial experience.
TransAsia 222, heading two-four-zero.
First officer Chiang Kuan-hsing is the pilot monitoring.
He's been in the job for just two-and-a-half years.
TransAsia 222, heading two-four-zero approved.
The pilot flying flies the airplane.
The pilot not flying is overseeing the flying of the airplane and is trained to interject and to intercede if procedures aren't being followed or if the aircraft is in a dangerous situation.
The TransAsia crew is flying an ATR 72 twin-engine turboprop, a popular short-haul airliner.
The ATR 72 has an excellent reputation.
It's been in production since the late 1980s.
There are 54 passengers and four crew on board.
Almost all are Taiwanese nationals.
Flight 222 departed from Kaohsiung City, the second largest city in Taiwan.
It's headed for Magong in the Penghu archipelago, a popular Taiwanese vacation spot.
When we hear Penghu and Magong, we think of summertime and going to the sea and lots of tourists.
Bad weather has delayed their arrival.
Excuse me.
How long before we land? The flight has been circling along with three other aircraft for close to half an hour.
The delay is the result of typhoon Matmo.
The category two storm hit peak intensity a day earlier with winds of nearly 90 miles an hour.
Taiwan is located in a tropical area so it's normal that we get typhoons, even in the summer.
There was a typhoon just passing through the Taiwan area and moving into China.
So there was thunderstorms, heavy rain and very strong wind, gust wind.
But now the weather in Magong is starting to improve, so air traffic control starts bringing in the circling planes.
Uni Air 7647, Magong runway two-zero now open.
Visibility 1,600 meters.
State your intention.
Uni Air 7647, request runway two-zero approach.
There were a total four airplanes in the air at the time waiting to get into Magong airport.
The TransAsia captain checks the approach chart, preparing for his turn to land.
Visibility 1,600.
We can now use two-zero.
TransAsia 222, you're next in line.
Say your intention.
TransAsia 222, request runway two-zero VOR.
TransAsia 222, roger.
Fly heading zero-two-three-six-zero radar vector.
VOR approach.
A VOR is a type of radio navigation device that's commonly used to either help the aircraft navigate over large areas of land or more specifically as part of an instrument landing system.
Ladies and gentlemen, we are about to begin our approach to Magong airport.
Please ensure that your tray tables are safely stowed and that your seatbelts are fastened.
Uni Air 7647, clear to land.
The first of four flights waiting to land has now been cleared and will soon be on the ground.
Magong tower, TransAsia 222.
Eight miles from airport for VOR runway two-zero.
TransAsia 222, Magong tower, runway two-zero, continue approach.
Cabin crew prepare for landing.
Um Passing five miles.
Okay.
Flap 15.
One of the biggest differences between pilots who do short haul flights versus pilots who do much longer flights is quite simply the short haul pilots will have more take-offs and landings.
Speed check.
Flap 15 set.
And take-offs and landings and of course the approach to landing is often the busiest, most stressful part of the flight.
The ATR 72 is just minutes from the runway.
TransAsia 222, runway two-zero, wind two-five-zero degree one-niner knots.
Clear to land.
Copy, runway two-zero, wind copy, clear to land, TransAsia 222.
Clear to land.
Flaps 30.
Extending the wing flaps gives the plane the extra lift it needs at the slower landing speed.
Flaps 30, gear down.
Automation: 500.
Um, three hundred.
Set altitude 300.
The captain calls out an altitude for his first officer to dial into the autopilot.
Altitude set three hundred.
Two hundred.
The captain decides to go lower.
The plane is now less than 30 seconds from the ground.
Have you seen the runway? No.
- No? - No, sir.
Oh.
Okay.
Okay.
GPWS: Terrain.
Terrain.
Pull up.
Go around! Go around.
The captain tries to abort the landing and climb out.
Go around! But it's too late.
TransAsia flight 222 has crashed into the village of Xixi, less than a mile from the Taiwanese airport where it was scheduled to land.
Incredibly, some passengers have survived the horrifying accident.
All they can do now is wait for help.
Taiwanese rescuers race to the crash site of TransAsia flight 222.
They soon discover that of the 58 people who were onboard, 48 are dead.
It was about some time after seven o'clock in the evening.
I was watching the news and there is, uh, the breaking news headline on the TV.
Thomas Wang of Taiwan's Aviation Safety Council will lead the investigation into the puzzling crash.
When I see the image coming out from the news then I understand that we are going to face a major accident investigation.
Relatives of passengers and crew gather at nearby hospitals for news about the fate of their loved ones.
The light of day reveals the full scale of the devastation in the Taiwanese village of Xixi.
The fiery crash of TransAsia 222 not only killed 48 people onboard the plane, it also injured 5 villagers.
The small community is reeling.
When we arrived at the crash site, all the, the victims they had all been to the hospital already.
So we can only see the wreckage and that several houses had been destroyed by the airplane.
In the beginning, we do not understand why the aircraft will fly into a residential area instead of landing on the runway.
Wang knows that all across Taiwan people will soon be demanding answers.
We are looking for evidence to help us to explain why the aircraft crashed.
Okay everybody, you know what to do.
Let's get to work.
We are looking for the recorders, the flight data recorder and the cockpit voice recorder.
They also hope to find the plane's flight controls and the two engines.
We are looking for any evidence can show us that whether there is any malfunction.
As the salvage team gathers the wreckage, investigators begin mapping the crash site.
Show me on the map here.
It's then that they make their first major discovery.
Okay.
Thank you very much.
Apparently there's wreckage all the way over here.
The first point of impact was not in the village.
It was in a nearby forest.
Let's get somebody out there, see what they can find.
The first impact point, that area with trees is about 200 meters away from the residential area.
Investigators can now see that the plane was not lined up with the runway on its descent.
For some unknown reason, it was off course.
Why were they so far off course? At this early stage in the investigation, the cause of the crash is still a mystery.
But already the team has recovered the black boxes.
The devices could provide many of the answers they're looking for.
In the beginning phase, we do not want to speculate too much.
So at that time we just collect all the evidence we can find and uh, wait for the, uh, recorders readout to come out.
At investigation headquarters in Taipei, the team begins sorting evidence while they wait to see what the black box data will reveal about the TransAsia crash.
What have you found? But already media reports are filled with speculation.
People are saying that the typhoon caused the crash.
Well let's see what effect the typhoon had.
Right.
So we got the flight track up there.
Wang wants to know exactly how close flight 222 was to the eye of the storm at the time of the crash.
We know they took off at 5:45 pm and they were coming in for a landing at 7:00 pm.
Matmo is the third typhoon in the western Pacific in less than three weeks.
This doesn't look like it was the typhoon.
The weather data shows that at the time of the crash the typhoon was 142 nautical miles northwest of Penghu and moving away from the islands.
The typhoon was almost out of range.
Magong was not in the eye of the storm.
But Thomas Wang knows that the airport could still have been affected by the typhoon's outer rain bands.
Typhoon Matmo probably was just a medium-sized typhoon.
But even that will bring a lot of water and of course strong winds.
They need to know how the distant typhoon was affecting airport weather conditions at the moment of the crash.
They take a closer look at the weather data.
Wind speed 11 knots gusting to 21 knots, well within the operational limits of the aircraft.
They calculate that winds may have been strong enough to push the commuter plane off course, but not enough to cause a catastrophic upset.
What about the visibility? I've got images from the airport at that time.
Visibility will be a very key issue for us to understand whether the flight crew can visually locate the runway or not.
They study CCTV surveillance footage of the airport starting from about 30 minutes before the plane went down.
Okay, pretty clear.
Then suddenly the rain comes in.
From the CCTV we can see the runway, we can see some uh signage on the airport and then we can see it was raining.
Can you bring up the images from just before the crash? They know that TransAsia 222 crashed at 7:06 pm.
The airport images from just before that time reveal some stunning evidence.
That's starting to be more than just rain.
That's, that's a serious storm.
After seven o'clock, it start to getting stronger.
We got heavy rain showers and the visibility decreased very quickly just after seven o'clock.
Pilots are required to have a minimum range of clear visibility in order to land.
Investigators estimate that at the time of the crash, visibility was so limited the TransAsia crew would not have been able to see the runway until they were practically on top of it.
Visibility can't be more than a couple hundred meters.
How could they have been allowed to land? Taiwanese investigators need to understand why TransAsia flight 222 was allowed to land in Magong when visibility at the airport was severely limited.
Visibility was no more than 500 meters.
Why did you let them land? They put their questions to the air traffic controller who was on duty the night of the crash.
The controller has to inform the flight crew for certain information such as runway in use, the visibility and wind conditions.
The weather report said that it was fine.
At 1900 hours they reported a visibility of 1600 meters.
Uni Air 7647, Magong runway two-zero now open.
Visibility 1600 meters.
State your intention.
Sixteen hundred meters of visibility is the required minimum for the approach the TransAsia crew was flying.
These are from the time of the crash.
Clearly, the visibility was less than the minimum.
All you had to do was look out the window to see that.
Well, that's what we were told.
Where do you get your weather data from? It it comes from the weather centre here at the airport.
Magong airport is a joint civilian and military facility.
Weather data is collected and distributed by the military.
I'm gonna go check outside.
An observer goes outside to check conditions at least every 30 minutes.
Weathermen had to record a lot of information like temperature, wind direction, air pressure.
Investigators learn that at 6:58 on the evening of the crash, eight minutes before the fatal impact, the weather observer returned to the office after checking conditions.
It's raining harder out there but visibility is still fine.
The visibility at the time the flight crew decided to land on that runway was within limits.
Good evening air traffic control.
Local observations: Visibility of 1600 meters through thunderstorm rain, uh scattered clouds for 200 feet.
The weather observer reported to the control tower at 7:02 pm, four minutes before impact.
At the same time, the rain picked up in intensity.
During the approach, the visibility worsened.
I'm going out again to do another check.
The visibility was decreasing from 1600 feet to 800 feet all the way down to 500 feet because the heavy rain.
By the time the controller received the updated report at ten past seven, it was already too late.
TransAsia 222, do you copy? TransAsia, Magong tower.
Come in.
He could not possibly have informed the crew.
They had already crashed.
Thanks very much for your time.
It's now clear that weather conditions at Magong airport changed rapidly in the minutes before the crash.
But for Thomas Wang, a delayed weather report does not explain the disaster.
Altitude set three hundred.
He wonders why the pilots didn't simply abort the landing altogether.
Two hundred.
Every aircraft flight is ultimately the responsibility of the flight crew.
It's up to them to make a decision whether to continue the flight or not continue the flight, because if they don't see the runway they should do the prudent thing and actually execute a missed approach.
At a nearby hangar, investigators sift through the remains of TransAsia flight 222.
They're looking for any sign of a mechanical fault, anything that could explain why the aircraft veered off course and crashed short of the runway.
So we checked all the control surface and the control linkage, and we checked the power plant.
They find nothing that points to a control surface having failed in flight.
Both of the turboprop engines appear to be mechanically sound, and their electronic circuitry all looks normal.
But we find there there's no evidence to show that there is an existing mechanical problem or any problem.
The careful analysis leaves no doubt.
Flight 222 was not brought down by a mechanical or systems failure.
Investigators are going to need another theory.
Why TransAsia Airways flight 222 crashed on approach to Magong is still a mystery, but now investigators have a new tool in their effort to find the cause: the plane's flight data recorder.
The FDR is particularly important in this accident because it has information that can't be gleaned from other sources, such as the settings of the engines, the settings of the flight controls, the manoeuvres that were done before the crash are all going to be in the FDR.
They're not going to be in any other place.
How did you end up way over here? I've got the data all ready now.
They scan through hundreds of data points looking for anything out of the ordinary.
The information confirms earlier findings that flight 222 was mechanically sound.
It did not suffer a systems failure.
Wait a minute.
Then, they spot something.
One minute before impact they were at 200 feet? What was the minimum descent altitude? According to the rules of the approach flight 222 was flying, the pilots must not go below a preset minimum descent altitude, or MDA, until they can see the runway.
If they can't see it, they are to do what's called a missed approach Have you seen the runway? .
.
go around and make another landing attempt No! .
.
or divert to another airport.
It says the minimum descent altitude was 330 feet.
The minimum descent altitude is something that's computed ahead of time by the civil aviation authorities based on the objects on the ground, the terrain and other hazards that are around that runway.
Take a look at this.
Wang can see that for almost 14 seconds the aircraft holds at 200 feet, well below the minimum altitude.
The weather data suggests the pilots wouldn't have been able to see the runway from where they were.
If the visibility was so bad, why did he ignore the MDA? Why would they do this? We need to hear what was going on in that cockpit.
While investigators struggle to understand what went wrong aboard TransAsia 222, Taiwan is in mourning for the 48 lives lost in the crash.
It is the nation's deadliest air disaster in more than a decade.
Vincent Lin, Chairman of TransAsia Airways, tries to ease the pain felt by relatives of the victims.
Critical evidence that could shed new light on the crash is finally available to investigators - the cockpit voice recording.
In this accident it's very important to get the CVR for a couple of reasons.
First, unfortunately, the pilots perished in this accident so it's impossible to ask them after the fact what was going on.
But more importantly, this gives a record during the entire flight of what was said in the cockpit.
Ready? Let's start near the end just before landing.
Investigators hope the recording can reveal why the crew flew below their minimum descent altitude before crashing into a village.
TransAsia 222, request heading two-four-zero.
TransAsia 222, heading two-four-zero approved.
Magong tower, TransAsia 222, eight miles from airport for VOR runway two-zero.
TransAsia 222, Magong tower, runway two-zero, continue approach.
Cabin crew, prepare for landing.
Flap 15 set.
Soon, investigators hear something unexpected.
Gear down.
Okay.
Before landing checklist.
Gear down.
Flaps 30.
Control auto.
Take-off lights on.
Icing lights off.
Runway two-zero, clearance received.
Before landing checklist complete.
Wind two-niner-zero.
Wait, stop.
Was that their before landing checklist? The first officer just blurted it out.
The captain didn't even seem to be listening.
Pilots are supposed to acknowledge each item on a checklist with standardized call and response communication.
Let's keep going.
Um, three hundred.
Altitude set three hundred.
Both pilots did not adhere to standard operating procedures, things such as reading checklists.
Standard operating procedures are vital to aviation safety based on sometimes decades of experience.
So to ignore that decades of experience without a good reason puts the aircraft and the people around them at risk.
The voice recorder from flight 222 is giving investigators a glimpse into how the pilots executed their landing.
Two hundred.
Hold it there.
They knew the minimum descent altitude was 330 feet, but the captain seemed to just ignore that too.
Maybe they can see the runway after all.
Let's find out.
While approaching 200 feet, they disengage the autopilot.
Disengaged.
The captain is now controlling his descent by hand.
Turning off the autopilot simply means that they are turning off any automated flight functions and the airplane is fully under manual control of the captain and the first officer.
The investigators listen closely for any indication that the crew could actually see the runway ahead.
Have you seen the runway? No, sir.
When they descend to 200 feet, they are still looking for the runway.
- No? - No, sir.
Oh, okay.
Okay.
Okay.
When they descend to 72 feet they are still looking for the runway.
It then takes the crew a full 13 seconds before they decide to take any action.
Go around! Go around! Given the speed the aircraft was flying, they could have traversed several hundred meters in a 13-second span.
GWPS: Pull up.
Terrain.
Terrain.
Pull up.
The fact that they spent any time at all in that condition really increased the likelihood that they would hit the ground or hit an object on the ground.
So we're pretty much sure they cannot see the runway, but they decide to just descend the aircraft, try to find the runway.
Ahhhh! Why did they wait so long to do anything? I want to hear it again, from the beginning.
Anti-skid test.
Check.
They return to the CVR, scouring it for clues from early in the recording.
Standby.
After start checklist complete.
What they hear is alarming.
Sir, do we preset next altitude 3-4-0 or 400? Time and again, the pilots struggle with basic procedures.
Uh? Everything from checklists to setting altitude.
Preset next altitude 400.
It's always surprising when you have a recording that indicates that pilots are violating standard procedures.
The recording then gives a strong clue as to why the crew was struggling.
I'm so tired.
Sir, are we holding here? Yes.
Okay.
Right orbit or left orbit? Do a right orbit holding pattern.
In the CVR we clearly heard the pilot was yawning and saying that he was tired.
Given that the pilot was tired, as evidenced by the yawning, this implies that the pilot will not be as sharp when it comes to reacting to situations and to actually carrying out decisions once they're made.
This will make it less likely that the crew as a whole will be able to respond to emergency situations.
Why is he so tired? We need to look into the pilots.
Records show that TransAsia hired first officer Chiang Kuan-hsing three years ago with no previous airline experience.
Captain Lee Yi-liang had been a commercial pilot since 1992.
He'd flown into Magong airport many times in all sorts of weather.
This guy's record was spotless.
It's clear that the captain had much more experience flying than the first officer.
It's when they look at the flight logs of the two pilots that they make an important discovery.
We found that the the flight crew accumulated a lot of flight time compared to other, other domestic airline.
The logs show that over the past 90 days the captain flew 278 hours, the first officer 264 hours.
Over the past three months they flew an average of six flights a day.
When an airline increases the frequency of flights, you may get into a situation where people are more fatigued, where people are flying beyond what is reasonable.
Seven months into the TransAsia investigation, the airline is back in the news.
Hello? What? Again? On February the 4th, 2015, TransAsia Airways flight 235 crashes into a river shortly after take-off from Taipei's Songshan Airport.
Only 14 of the 57 people onboard survive.
It's the same aircraft type and the same airline in the same country.
My initial reaction was: How can there be another huge accident? What is going on at TransAsia? Taiwan's TransAsia Airways has suffered two fatal accidents in seven months.
Investigators can't help but wonder: Is there a systemic problem with the company? My first thought was that a relatively small airline to have two apparently independent accidents in such a short space of time, uh, but upon further review, looking at some of the findings from the second accident, it turns out that there was actually some connectivity between the two.
Poring over financial records and other documents, they analyse TransAsia's corporate history.
This company's been expanding rapidly.
This airline was expanding the routes that they were flying on this particular aircraft.
At the same time they weren't expanding the number of pilots to keep up with that.
So as a result, the pilots who had been flying the ATR 72 were being given more flight segments and more work in other words.
Some of these pilots were flying up to eight flights a day.
Employees complained to management about their workload.
However, the management ignored their complaints and did nothing about the workload.
Investigators now wonder: How did TransAsia's management practices affect their pilots? Okay, gentlemen, whenever you're strapped in we'll start the simulation.
Most importantly, how common was it for pilots to ignore standard operating procedures? They ask a group of the company's ATR 72 pilots to fly the route from Kaohsiung to Magong in a simulator with the added challenge of a nearby typhoon.
We just sit in the jump seat and observe how the flight crew they work together.
To investigators' surprise, pilot after pilot fails to follow the proper procedures.
Thank you very much for your time.
It's a stunning discovery.
Okay, we're done here.
Just about every single one of them ignored standard operating procedures.
My first impression was it should never happen at this time.
That's 2014.
We educate all the pilots we have to do things according to the procedures.
I was surprised that there were still pilots doing something by their own way.
And the investigation in this case discovered that this was not a one-off sort of thing happening just on this flight, but this was something that was systemic within the airline because this shows that this sort of behaviour was normal.
This sort of behaviour was acceptable.
Investigators finally understand what led to the crash of flight 222.
It starts with a tired captain piloting his ninth flight in the past 29 hours Preset next altitude 400.
.
.
working for an airline where standard operating procedures are routinely ignored.
The remnants of a typhoon delay the flight's arrival in Magong.
Though the winds are not strong enough to upset the plane, they are strong enough to blow the flight slightly off-course.
Ladies and gentlemen, we're about to begin our approach to Magong airport.
The pilots then ignore one of the most basic rules of aviation.
Assuming the runway will eventually appear ahead of them through the rain, they fly below their minimum descent altitude.
Altitude set three hundred.
It appears that the first officer complied with the variation from standard operating procedure.
Two hundred.
And so in this case, I think it was a hazardous behaviour to not speak up and challenge the captain when rules are being violated.
Have you seen the runway? No! Oblivious to how close they are to disaster, they drop low enough to hit a tree, sealing their fate.
Ah! Well in a situation where you have an organization not adhering to procedures, there are many ways to correct this.
First, the airline management itself could have stepped in and said, look, we're gonna start flying according to procedures or we're not gonna fly at all.
In their final report, investigators call on TransAsia to fully review its safety management system and pilot training program.
They ask Taiwan's Civil Aeronautics Administration to strengthen its oversight of airlines.
And they recommend that the Air Force Command find better ways of reporting airport weather conditions.
But when the recommendations are published in January 2016, they come too late to help TransAsia.
Financial struggles force the company out of business later that same year.
TransAsia Airways no longer exists.
When I heard that this company was closing, I was surprised.
We thought that they would become a better airline over time.
So it was unfortunate when we heard that they were shutting down.
Captions edited by Ai-Media ai-media.
tv What was really disheartening was to see that this was in a sense preventable.
There were many opportunities to have stopped this or to correct it before the accident happened.
Unfortunately, none of them happened.
TransAsia 222, do you copy? I understand that we are going to face a major accident investigation.
People are saying that the typhoon caused the crash.
Speculation on a cause runs rampant.
What was the minimum descent altitude? But the evidence points investigators in a troubling direction.
Unfortunately, the pilots perished in this accident so it's impossible to ask them after the fact what was going on.
(THEME MUSIC) On a rainy summer evening, TransAsia flight 222 is in a holding pattern 3100 feet above the Taiwan Strait.
The pilot flying is Captain Lee Yi-liang.
Heading two-four-zero.
He's a former military pilot with 22 years of commercial experience.
TransAsia 222, heading two-four-zero.
First officer Chiang Kuan-hsing is the pilot monitoring.
He's been in the job for just two-and-a-half years.
TransAsia 222, heading two-four-zero approved.
The pilot flying flies the airplane.
The pilot not flying is overseeing the flying of the airplane and is trained to interject and to intercede if procedures aren't being followed or if the aircraft is in a dangerous situation.
The TransAsia crew is flying an ATR 72 twin-engine turboprop, a popular short-haul airliner.
The ATR 72 has an excellent reputation.
It's been in production since the late 1980s.
There are 54 passengers and four crew on board.
Almost all are Taiwanese nationals.
Flight 222 departed from Kaohsiung City, the second largest city in Taiwan.
It's headed for Magong in the Penghu archipelago, a popular Taiwanese vacation spot.
When we hear Penghu and Magong, we think of summertime and going to the sea and lots of tourists.
Bad weather has delayed their arrival.
Excuse me.
How long before we land? The flight has been circling along with three other aircraft for close to half an hour.
The delay is the result of typhoon Matmo.
The category two storm hit peak intensity a day earlier with winds of nearly 90 miles an hour.
Taiwan is located in a tropical area so it's normal that we get typhoons, even in the summer.
There was a typhoon just passing through the Taiwan area and moving into China.
So there was thunderstorms, heavy rain and very strong wind, gust wind.
But now the weather in Magong is starting to improve, so air traffic control starts bringing in the circling planes.
Uni Air 7647, Magong runway two-zero now open.
Visibility 1,600 meters.
State your intention.
Uni Air 7647, request runway two-zero approach.
There were a total four airplanes in the air at the time waiting to get into Magong airport.
The TransAsia captain checks the approach chart, preparing for his turn to land.
Visibility 1,600.
We can now use two-zero.
TransAsia 222, you're next in line.
Say your intention.
TransAsia 222, request runway two-zero VOR.
TransAsia 222, roger.
Fly heading zero-two-three-six-zero radar vector.
VOR approach.
A VOR is a type of radio navigation device that's commonly used to either help the aircraft navigate over large areas of land or more specifically as part of an instrument landing system.
Ladies and gentlemen, we are about to begin our approach to Magong airport.
Please ensure that your tray tables are safely stowed and that your seatbelts are fastened.
Uni Air 7647, clear to land.
The first of four flights waiting to land has now been cleared and will soon be on the ground.
Magong tower, TransAsia 222.
Eight miles from airport for VOR runway two-zero.
TransAsia 222, Magong tower, runway two-zero, continue approach.
Cabin crew prepare for landing.
Um Passing five miles.
Okay.
Flap 15.
One of the biggest differences between pilots who do short haul flights versus pilots who do much longer flights is quite simply the short haul pilots will have more take-offs and landings.
Speed check.
Flap 15 set.
And take-offs and landings and of course the approach to landing is often the busiest, most stressful part of the flight.
The ATR 72 is just minutes from the runway.
TransAsia 222, runway two-zero, wind two-five-zero degree one-niner knots.
Clear to land.
Copy, runway two-zero, wind copy, clear to land, TransAsia 222.
Clear to land.
Flaps 30.
Extending the wing flaps gives the plane the extra lift it needs at the slower landing speed.
Flaps 30, gear down.
Automation: 500.
Um, three hundred.
Set altitude 300.
The captain calls out an altitude for his first officer to dial into the autopilot.
Altitude set three hundred.
Two hundred.
The captain decides to go lower.
The plane is now less than 30 seconds from the ground.
Have you seen the runway? No.
- No? - No, sir.
Oh.
Okay.
Okay.
GPWS: Terrain.
Terrain.
Pull up.
Go around! Go around.
The captain tries to abort the landing and climb out.
Go around! But it's too late.
TransAsia flight 222 has crashed into the village of Xixi, less than a mile from the Taiwanese airport where it was scheduled to land.
Incredibly, some passengers have survived the horrifying accident.
All they can do now is wait for help.
Taiwanese rescuers race to the crash site of TransAsia flight 222.
They soon discover that of the 58 people who were onboard, 48 are dead.
It was about some time after seven o'clock in the evening.
I was watching the news and there is, uh, the breaking news headline on the TV.
Thomas Wang of Taiwan's Aviation Safety Council will lead the investigation into the puzzling crash.
When I see the image coming out from the news then I understand that we are going to face a major accident investigation.
Relatives of passengers and crew gather at nearby hospitals for news about the fate of their loved ones.
The light of day reveals the full scale of the devastation in the Taiwanese village of Xixi.
The fiery crash of TransAsia 222 not only killed 48 people onboard the plane, it also injured 5 villagers.
The small community is reeling.
When we arrived at the crash site, all the, the victims they had all been to the hospital already.
So we can only see the wreckage and that several houses had been destroyed by the airplane.
In the beginning, we do not understand why the aircraft will fly into a residential area instead of landing on the runway.
Wang knows that all across Taiwan people will soon be demanding answers.
We are looking for evidence to help us to explain why the aircraft crashed.
Okay everybody, you know what to do.
Let's get to work.
We are looking for the recorders, the flight data recorder and the cockpit voice recorder.
They also hope to find the plane's flight controls and the two engines.
We are looking for any evidence can show us that whether there is any malfunction.
As the salvage team gathers the wreckage, investigators begin mapping the crash site.
Show me on the map here.
It's then that they make their first major discovery.
Okay.
Thank you very much.
Apparently there's wreckage all the way over here.
The first point of impact was not in the village.
It was in a nearby forest.
Let's get somebody out there, see what they can find.
The first impact point, that area with trees is about 200 meters away from the residential area.
Investigators can now see that the plane was not lined up with the runway on its descent.
For some unknown reason, it was off course.
Why were they so far off course? At this early stage in the investigation, the cause of the crash is still a mystery.
But already the team has recovered the black boxes.
The devices could provide many of the answers they're looking for.
In the beginning phase, we do not want to speculate too much.
So at that time we just collect all the evidence we can find and uh, wait for the, uh, recorders readout to come out.
At investigation headquarters in Taipei, the team begins sorting evidence while they wait to see what the black box data will reveal about the TransAsia crash.
What have you found? But already media reports are filled with speculation.
People are saying that the typhoon caused the crash.
Well let's see what effect the typhoon had.
Right.
So we got the flight track up there.
Wang wants to know exactly how close flight 222 was to the eye of the storm at the time of the crash.
We know they took off at 5:45 pm and they were coming in for a landing at 7:00 pm.
Matmo is the third typhoon in the western Pacific in less than three weeks.
This doesn't look like it was the typhoon.
The weather data shows that at the time of the crash the typhoon was 142 nautical miles northwest of Penghu and moving away from the islands.
The typhoon was almost out of range.
Magong was not in the eye of the storm.
But Thomas Wang knows that the airport could still have been affected by the typhoon's outer rain bands.
Typhoon Matmo probably was just a medium-sized typhoon.
But even that will bring a lot of water and of course strong winds.
They need to know how the distant typhoon was affecting airport weather conditions at the moment of the crash.
They take a closer look at the weather data.
Wind speed 11 knots gusting to 21 knots, well within the operational limits of the aircraft.
They calculate that winds may have been strong enough to push the commuter plane off course, but not enough to cause a catastrophic upset.
What about the visibility? I've got images from the airport at that time.
Visibility will be a very key issue for us to understand whether the flight crew can visually locate the runway or not.
They study CCTV surveillance footage of the airport starting from about 30 minutes before the plane went down.
Okay, pretty clear.
Then suddenly the rain comes in.
From the CCTV we can see the runway, we can see some uh signage on the airport and then we can see it was raining.
Can you bring up the images from just before the crash? They know that TransAsia 222 crashed at 7:06 pm.
The airport images from just before that time reveal some stunning evidence.
That's starting to be more than just rain.
That's, that's a serious storm.
After seven o'clock, it start to getting stronger.
We got heavy rain showers and the visibility decreased very quickly just after seven o'clock.
Pilots are required to have a minimum range of clear visibility in order to land.
Investigators estimate that at the time of the crash, visibility was so limited the TransAsia crew would not have been able to see the runway until they were practically on top of it.
Visibility can't be more than a couple hundred meters.
How could they have been allowed to land? Taiwanese investigators need to understand why TransAsia flight 222 was allowed to land in Magong when visibility at the airport was severely limited.
Visibility was no more than 500 meters.
Why did you let them land? They put their questions to the air traffic controller who was on duty the night of the crash.
The controller has to inform the flight crew for certain information such as runway in use, the visibility and wind conditions.
The weather report said that it was fine.
At 1900 hours they reported a visibility of 1600 meters.
Uni Air 7647, Magong runway two-zero now open.
Visibility 1600 meters.
State your intention.
Sixteen hundred meters of visibility is the required minimum for the approach the TransAsia crew was flying.
These are from the time of the crash.
Clearly, the visibility was less than the minimum.
All you had to do was look out the window to see that.
Well, that's what we were told.
Where do you get your weather data from? It it comes from the weather centre here at the airport.
Magong airport is a joint civilian and military facility.
Weather data is collected and distributed by the military.
I'm gonna go check outside.
An observer goes outside to check conditions at least every 30 minutes.
Weathermen had to record a lot of information like temperature, wind direction, air pressure.
Investigators learn that at 6:58 on the evening of the crash, eight minutes before the fatal impact, the weather observer returned to the office after checking conditions.
It's raining harder out there but visibility is still fine.
The visibility at the time the flight crew decided to land on that runway was within limits.
Good evening air traffic control.
Local observations: Visibility of 1600 meters through thunderstorm rain, uh scattered clouds for 200 feet.
The weather observer reported to the control tower at 7:02 pm, four minutes before impact.
At the same time, the rain picked up in intensity.
During the approach, the visibility worsened.
I'm going out again to do another check.
The visibility was decreasing from 1600 feet to 800 feet all the way down to 500 feet because the heavy rain.
By the time the controller received the updated report at ten past seven, it was already too late.
TransAsia 222, do you copy? TransAsia, Magong tower.
Come in.
He could not possibly have informed the crew.
They had already crashed.
Thanks very much for your time.
It's now clear that weather conditions at Magong airport changed rapidly in the minutes before the crash.
But for Thomas Wang, a delayed weather report does not explain the disaster.
Altitude set three hundred.
He wonders why the pilots didn't simply abort the landing altogether.
Two hundred.
Every aircraft flight is ultimately the responsibility of the flight crew.
It's up to them to make a decision whether to continue the flight or not continue the flight, because if they don't see the runway they should do the prudent thing and actually execute a missed approach.
At a nearby hangar, investigators sift through the remains of TransAsia flight 222.
They're looking for any sign of a mechanical fault, anything that could explain why the aircraft veered off course and crashed short of the runway.
So we checked all the control surface and the control linkage, and we checked the power plant.
They find nothing that points to a control surface having failed in flight.
Both of the turboprop engines appear to be mechanically sound, and their electronic circuitry all looks normal.
But we find there there's no evidence to show that there is an existing mechanical problem or any problem.
The careful analysis leaves no doubt.
Flight 222 was not brought down by a mechanical or systems failure.
Investigators are going to need another theory.
Why TransAsia Airways flight 222 crashed on approach to Magong is still a mystery, but now investigators have a new tool in their effort to find the cause: the plane's flight data recorder.
The FDR is particularly important in this accident because it has information that can't be gleaned from other sources, such as the settings of the engines, the settings of the flight controls, the manoeuvres that were done before the crash are all going to be in the FDR.
They're not going to be in any other place.
How did you end up way over here? I've got the data all ready now.
They scan through hundreds of data points looking for anything out of the ordinary.
The information confirms earlier findings that flight 222 was mechanically sound.
It did not suffer a systems failure.
Wait a minute.
Then, they spot something.
One minute before impact they were at 200 feet? What was the minimum descent altitude? According to the rules of the approach flight 222 was flying, the pilots must not go below a preset minimum descent altitude, or MDA, until they can see the runway.
If they can't see it, they are to do what's called a missed approach Have you seen the runway? .
.
go around and make another landing attempt No! .
.
or divert to another airport.
It says the minimum descent altitude was 330 feet.
The minimum descent altitude is something that's computed ahead of time by the civil aviation authorities based on the objects on the ground, the terrain and other hazards that are around that runway.
Take a look at this.
Wang can see that for almost 14 seconds the aircraft holds at 200 feet, well below the minimum altitude.
The weather data suggests the pilots wouldn't have been able to see the runway from where they were.
If the visibility was so bad, why did he ignore the MDA? Why would they do this? We need to hear what was going on in that cockpit.
While investigators struggle to understand what went wrong aboard TransAsia 222, Taiwan is in mourning for the 48 lives lost in the crash.
It is the nation's deadliest air disaster in more than a decade.
Vincent Lin, Chairman of TransAsia Airways, tries to ease the pain felt by relatives of the victims.
Critical evidence that could shed new light on the crash is finally available to investigators - the cockpit voice recording.
In this accident it's very important to get the CVR for a couple of reasons.
First, unfortunately, the pilots perished in this accident so it's impossible to ask them after the fact what was going on.
But more importantly, this gives a record during the entire flight of what was said in the cockpit.
Ready? Let's start near the end just before landing.
Investigators hope the recording can reveal why the crew flew below their minimum descent altitude before crashing into a village.
TransAsia 222, request heading two-four-zero.
TransAsia 222, heading two-four-zero approved.
Magong tower, TransAsia 222, eight miles from airport for VOR runway two-zero.
TransAsia 222, Magong tower, runway two-zero, continue approach.
Cabin crew, prepare for landing.
Flap 15 set.
Soon, investigators hear something unexpected.
Gear down.
Okay.
Before landing checklist.
Gear down.
Flaps 30.
Control auto.
Take-off lights on.
Icing lights off.
Runway two-zero, clearance received.
Before landing checklist complete.
Wind two-niner-zero.
Wait, stop.
Was that their before landing checklist? The first officer just blurted it out.
The captain didn't even seem to be listening.
Pilots are supposed to acknowledge each item on a checklist with standardized call and response communication.
Let's keep going.
Um, three hundred.
Altitude set three hundred.
Both pilots did not adhere to standard operating procedures, things such as reading checklists.
Standard operating procedures are vital to aviation safety based on sometimes decades of experience.
So to ignore that decades of experience without a good reason puts the aircraft and the people around them at risk.
The voice recorder from flight 222 is giving investigators a glimpse into how the pilots executed their landing.
Two hundred.
Hold it there.
They knew the minimum descent altitude was 330 feet, but the captain seemed to just ignore that too.
Maybe they can see the runway after all.
Let's find out.
While approaching 200 feet, they disengage the autopilot.
Disengaged.
The captain is now controlling his descent by hand.
Turning off the autopilot simply means that they are turning off any automated flight functions and the airplane is fully under manual control of the captain and the first officer.
The investigators listen closely for any indication that the crew could actually see the runway ahead.
Have you seen the runway? No, sir.
When they descend to 200 feet, they are still looking for the runway.
- No? - No, sir.
Oh, okay.
Okay.
Okay.
When they descend to 72 feet they are still looking for the runway.
It then takes the crew a full 13 seconds before they decide to take any action.
Go around! Go around! Given the speed the aircraft was flying, they could have traversed several hundred meters in a 13-second span.
GWPS: Pull up.
Terrain.
Terrain.
Pull up.
The fact that they spent any time at all in that condition really increased the likelihood that they would hit the ground or hit an object on the ground.
So we're pretty much sure they cannot see the runway, but they decide to just descend the aircraft, try to find the runway.
Ahhhh! Why did they wait so long to do anything? I want to hear it again, from the beginning.
Anti-skid test.
Check.
They return to the CVR, scouring it for clues from early in the recording.
Standby.
After start checklist complete.
What they hear is alarming.
Sir, do we preset next altitude 3-4-0 or 400? Time and again, the pilots struggle with basic procedures.
Uh? Everything from checklists to setting altitude.
Preset next altitude 400.
It's always surprising when you have a recording that indicates that pilots are violating standard procedures.
The recording then gives a strong clue as to why the crew was struggling.
I'm so tired.
Sir, are we holding here? Yes.
Okay.
Right orbit or left orbit? Do a right orbit holding pattern.
In the CVR we clearly heard the pilot was yawning and saying that he was tired.
Given that the pilot was tired, as evidenced by the yawning, this implies that the pilot will not be as sharp when it comes to reacting to situations and to actually carrying out decisions once they're made.
This will make it less likely that the crew as a whole will be able to respond to emergency situations.
Why is he so tired? We need to look into the pilots.
Records show that TransAsia hired first officer Chiang Kuan-hsing three years ago with no previous airline experience.
Captain Lee Yi-liang had been a commercial pilot since 1992.
He'd flown into Magong airport many times in all sorts of weather.
This guy's record was spotless.
It's clear that the captain had much more experience flying than the first officer.
It's when they look at the flight logs of the two pilots that they make an important discovery.
We found that the the flight crew accumulated a lot of flight time compared to other, other domestic airline.
The logs show that over the past 90 days the captain flew 278 hours, the first officer 264 hours.
Over the past three months they flew an average of six flights a day.
When an airline increases the frequency of flights, you may get into a situation where people are more fatigued, where people are flying beyond what is reasonable.
Seven months into the TransAsia investigation, the airline is back in the news.
Hello? What? Again? On February the 4th, 2015, TransAsia Airways flight 235 crashes into a river shortly after take-off from Taipei's Songshan Airport.
Only 14 of the 57 people onboard survive.
It's the same aircraft type and the same airline in the same country.
My initial reaction was: How can there be another huge accident? What is going on at TransAsia? Taiwan's TransAsia Airways has suffered two fatal accidents in seven months.
Investigators can't help but wonder: Is there a systemic problem with the company? My first thought was that a relatively small airline to have two apparently independent accidents in such a short space of time, uh, but upon further review, looking at some of the findings from the second accident, it turns out that there was actually some connectivity between the two.
Poring over financial records and other documents, they analyse TransAsia's corporate history.
This company's been expanding rapidly.
This airline was expanding the routes that they were flying on this particular aircraft.
At the same time they weren't expanding the number of pilots to keep up with that.
So as a result, the pilots who had been flying the ATR 72 were being given more flight segments and more work in other words.
Some of these pilots were flying up to eight flights a day.
Employees complained to management about their workload.
However, the management ignored their complaints and did nothing about the workload.
Investigators now wonder: How did TransAsia's management practices affect their pilots? Okay, gentlemen, whenever you're strapped in we'll start the simulation.
Most importantly, how common was it for pilots to ignore standard operating procedures? They ask a group of the company's ATR 72 pilots to fly the route from Kaohsiung to Magong in a simulator with the added challenge of a nearby typhoon.
We just sit in the jump seat and observe how the flight crew they work together.
To investigators' surprise, pilot after pilot fails to follow the proper procedures.
Thank you very much for your time.
It's a stunning discovery.
Okay, we're done here.
Just about every single one of them ignored standard operating procedures.
My first impression was it should never happen at this time.
That's 2014.
We educate all the pilots we have to do things according to the procedures.
I was surprised that there were still pilots doing something by their own way.
And the investigation in this case discovered that this was not a one-off sort of thing happening just on this flight, but this was something that was systemic within the airline because this shows that this sort of behaviour was normal.
This sort of behaviour was acceptable.
Investigators finally understand what led to the crash of flight 222.
It starts with a tired captain piloting his ninth flight in the past 29 hours Preset next altitude 400.
.
.
working for an airline where standard operating procedures are routinely ignored.
The remnants of a typhoon delay the flight's arrival in Magong.
Though the winds are not strong enough to upset the plane, they are strong enough to blow the flight slightly off-course.
Ladies and gentlemen, we're about to begin our approach to Magong airport.
The pilots then ignore one of the most basic rules of aviation.
Assuming the runway will eventually appear ahead of them through the rain, they fly below their minimum descent altitude.
Altitude set three hundred.
It appears that the first officer complied with the variation from standard operating procedure.
Two hundred.
And so in this case, I think it was a hazardous behaviour to not speak up and challenge the captain when rules are being violated.
Have you seen the runway? No! Oblivious to how close they are to disaster, they drop low enough to hit a tree, sealing their fate.
Ah! Well in a situation where you have an organization not adhering to procedures, there are many ways to correct this.
First, the airline management itself could have stepped in and said, look, we're gonna start flying according to procedures or we're not gonna fly at all.
In their final report, investigators call on TransAsia to fully review its safety management system and pilot training program.
They ask Taiwan's Civil Aeronautics Administration to strengthen its oversight of airlines.
And they recommend that the Air Force Command find better ways of reporting airport weather conditions.
But when the recommendations are published in January 2016, they come too late to help TransAsia.
Financial struggles force the company out of business later that same year.
TransAsia Airways no longer exists.
When I heard that this company was closing, I was surprised.
We thought that they would become a better airline over time.
So it was unfortunate when we heard that they were shutting down.
Captions edited by Ai-Media ai-media.
tv What was really disheartening was to see that this was in a sense preventable.
There were many opportunities to have stopped this or to correct it before the accident happened.
Unfortunately, none of them happened.