The World at War s01e24 Episode Script
The Bomb (February - September 1945)
North Field, in the island of Tinian, in the Marianas, In the Summer of 1945, this age the biggest air base of the world.
Here, in 5 of August, the first bomb of Uranian was placed in a B-29 bomber call Enola Gay, in honor of the mother of the pilot.
One day later, before dawn, the Enola Gay unglued.
Its white one was Hiroshima.
The World in War The Bomb February-September of 1945 In 12 of April of 1945, Franklin Roosevelt, president of the United States of America, it died suddenly.
The nation cried the death of the leader.
It has 12 years, it had recouped the nation of the deepenings of the economic depression.
Now them it had led to the side of the victory in a World-wide War.
Two months before dying, Roosevelt had been in Yalta, Russia, establishing the foundation politics of the world postwar period.
The Roosevelts and the Churchills wanted to restore the democracy in the East of the Europe, mainly in the Poland.
They had asked for the Stalin to confirm the Russian support against Japan three months later of the defeat of Germany.
In an livened up environment, the Three Great ones had found that they had fond of an agreement.
Yalta was same the high point of the relation between the three men.
The victory was close, the Germans if removed, e had many things to decide, beyond the military subjects, e the future of the Poland one became of new the point most difficult.
It is interesting to see that as much Roosevelt as Churchill they had found that they had an agreement with Stalin.
The problem of the Poland, e of the East of the Europe, he was that the occidental people wanted an elect government freely.
The Soviets wanted a government sympathizer of Russia.
They had found that the Ocidente she had perceived and accepted this.
Of the point of view of them, the Poland, she would not be friend of the East, nor of none of the countries of the Balkans.
They had found that they had some agreements on the influence spheres with Mr.
Churchill, they had left Greece practically in English hands, they could have some influence in the Hungria, in the Romenia, Bulgaria e mainly in the Poland.
I felt in Yalta that the Russians thought.
that we had in fact accepted this requirement.
After de Yalta, Roosevelt it only lived more two months.
Exactly then, it and Churchill they were undeceived how much to the interpretations that the Russians gave to the agreements.
The very intense telegram exchange of the two sides between Stalin and Roosevelt it left sufficiently clearly that Roosevelt, before dying, wise person who Stalin not she was fulfilling the agreements.
I find that it was badly because the military developments they had fortified the Russian side e the Russians had found necessary to take in account the opinion occidental person in Yalta.
Months later, this necessity disappeared because the war went to them well.
Therefore, they had discarded some of the agreements that had made.
E had applied this mainly in the Poland.
Roosevelt was seen as a friend of the Russians.
Its successor, Harry Truman, he was a stranger in such a way stops they as for the council members.
I left stops.
As soon as Roosevelt died, I was to see Mr.
Truman.
It wanted to have the certainty of that it wise person the position of the relations, because it had as much euphoria in air on the warm relations that they existed between the Allies.
I arrived in the house one week after Roosevelt dying.
My first experience with President Truman.
I discovered that was an eager reader, therefore it had read all the telegrams e through them understood the difficulties that we went to have.
The arrival of the minister of Foreign affairses, Molotov, Washington, in 23 of April, it gave to a chance the Truman to prove as it said that "We would make front to the Russians.
" Although the visit to give hopes to the problem of the Poland, one knew that Russia signs a pact of friendship of 20 years with the Polish government in Warsaw.
This Polish government did not have members pro-occidental people, only pro-Soviets.
The occidental leaders they had been angry and insane.
Molotov visited Truman, e the secretary of Stettinious State, head of Alger Hiss.
At that time, the Polish situation was, to be likeable, crystallized.
The Russians advanced, they seemed not to give importance to the type of provisory government that the British and the Americans they would like to see.
Therefore, great protests they were directed the Russians.
Truman decided to fincar the foot.
It had one dom for this.
In this visit, as it is known for that it is in books of History, it accused Molotov with breaking of agreements, then in this hour.
It was a strange thing stops if to make in the way of the war, that not yet it was earns, with an important ally, but made it.
E finished with Molotov saying: "They had never spoken to me thus in the life.
" E Truman said:"If it kept the agreements, would not speak to it thus.
" He seemed a professor.
Stettinious, that was present, it said me, in the following day, that still it was shaken.
It said:"I found that the conference went to finish.
" It was an unhappy colloquy.
She was one of the first colloquies diplomatical that Truman had e was not a declaration diplomatics of the part of Truman.
It used the solid language of the Missouri, that she was very clear, e Molotov already had spoken with other people thus, but never they had spoken to it thus.
It was very annoying e I find that.
I was with the impression of that it it found that was a new voice, not it of Roosevelt, but of a more aggressive president.
When it took ownership two weeks before, Truman said that it went to follow the politics of Roosevelt.
But this sudden severity with Molotov it worried the Secretary of the War, Henry Stimson.
In the following day to the confrontation, Stimson said the Truman of something that it could change these relations.
Stimson wrote the Truman: "I find that it is very important I to speak with you as soon as possible on a highly private subject.
I spoke in this after taking ownership, but not yet I spoke in this due to pressure that has suffered.
However, it has one weight such in our foreign relations e an important effect in everything what I think on this subject, that I find that must know of that it is treated as soon as possible.
" In the following day, 25 of April, Stimson explained the Truman that its vision of the foreign politics, she was dominated for the perspective imminent of an atomic power, e the agreements that could to make with Russia in exchange for the allotment of atomic secrets.
It was the first time that Truman was informed on the atomic bomb e of its potential diplomatist.
The Stimson asked for stops to preside over a committee to decide its military use.
In this height, and great secret, two types of atomic bombs they had been created: based one in Uranian, e to another one with an element manufactured for the man, the plutonium.
The bomb of Uranian did not need to be tested, but only had one.
Of plutonium, the most easy ones of to produce in great amounts, they would have of being tested before.
The first one would be ready in July.
A special unit of the Force Aerial it had practiced the tactics that it involved to launch a bomb enormous, with great precision, e later running away more fast possible.
The commander of the unit he was Colonel Paul Tibbets.
Until this height, any error in the bombings of 150, 180 meters were considered very good.
I said to them:"If the error it will be of 30 meters the 25 a thousand feet, then, they are in the limit.
I want that it is less than 30.
" They had said me as soon as they did not go to obtain e I said that not wise person reason.
They had said that not yet it had been made and I said that it was not reason.
For they say what me, the practical one leads to the perfection.
I said to practice until obtaining to make.
Of the bases in the Marianas islands, American B-29 bombers already they attacked Japanese cities with more conventional weapons.
At the beginning, the results were not good.
General Curtis LeMay he developed new tactics: raides arsonists of low altitude.
With aerial photos it can if to establish a general area, but it does not need.
They did not obtain to prevent the collateral damages e with certainty that we set on fire many Japanese buildings that they did not have to see with the industry of the armament.
She is one of the sad things that not if it obtains to prevent in the war.
In 9 of March of 1945, arsonists had been plays in Tokyo, destroying 40 km2 of the city.
more in this night of that in all England during the Blitz.
The majority suffocated with the fire storm.
LeMay attacked now city after city.
It seemed that the B-29 obtained to defeat alone Japan.
Only when General Arnold he asked directly: "How much harder time the war" it is that we congregate in them and we think about the subject e we conclude that we would not have whiter in September e without targets, we do not imagine a war.
In the Spring of 1945, Japan was defenseless face to the aerial power naval e of the Americans.
The majority of the merchant navy and of Japanese war is sunk.
An efficient blockade moves away the Japan of the overseas armies, it hinders the use of aviation due to fuel e threatens the population with the hunger.
The American bombers they attacked the will, supporting the devastadores raides arsonists.
Many Japanese politicians had perceived that the country did not go to obtain to aguentar much more.
they had disembarked in Okinawa, the 560 km of the continent.
They had faced a fierce resistance.
But with the start of the battle, the Party of the Japanese Peace it obtains a new government led for Admiral Suzuki.
When the government of Suzuki took ownership, the military situation was deplorable, e more, the economic situation of our nation she was sufficiently obvious.
The military command it tried, let us say, to suck the last drop of the blood of the nation to continue the useless war, but one became obvious for any sensible man that we were in the limit.
The young officers in army, the extremistas, they found that we had to fight until the o end until all the men to have died.
But the minister of the War, general Anami, did not agree.
It found that if we fought until Americans to invade the continent e later we attacked forces of them in beaches, we could negotiate the peace in terms more favorable to Japan.
But Truman would not go to negotiate.
It said this to the Congress, in May, after the German defeat.
Our requirement has been, e continues to be, the unconditional surrender.
I want that the entire world knows that this direction must and will go to remain without alterations and limitations.
Truman faced now two great problems: as to deal with the Russians in the Europe, e if asked for to fulfill to them the promise to attack Japan.
In Russian Germany, troops e occidental changed gifts, but Churchill already sent urgent messages the Truman informing that Russia raised a curtain of iron in the Europe.
The Three Great ones had of if to congregate with urgency, before the armies of the democracy they melted.
Truman had a new secretary of State, James Byrne.
It wanted to finish the war against Japan before the entrance of Russia e to also cause problems to Asia occidental person.
I had always present that.
that it was important to finish the war before of the entrance of the Russians.
Stimson did not want to precipitate in the Europe or the Extreme East before the bomb being ready.
It wrote the Truman: "In a tram of problems of this level the atomic secret will be the key.
It seems me terrible to risk to this level in the diplomacy without having one trunfo in the sleeve.
" Truman guaranteed the Stimson: the meeting of the Three Great ones "it was postponed up to 15 of July for thus terms more time.
" A friend of Roosevelt where Stalin trusted, Harry Hopkins, Moscow in the end of May was sent to alliviate the pressure of the subject of the Poland.
It said that he had calmed the situation.
Stalin also promises to turn over against Japan in 8 August.
While Hopkins was in Moscow, the committee of Stimson arrived at a decision.
The committee that studied the atomic bomb it recommended unanimously that it had soon to be used, without acknowledgments, against a great Japanese military target.
"Only this", thought Stimson, "it would give the psychological blow that could to lead to the Japanese surrender.
" Although to agree to some council members of Truman, that the Japanese had to receive an ultimatum that it would leave clearly that they could to be with the Emperor, it opposed to announce it this until the bomb to have been tested.
But after the war, it wrote: "It is possible, to the light of the final surrender, that a previous exposition clarified e more of the American will to keep the Emperor it could have led to an end anticipated of the war.
" Eisenhower is received as a hero after the victory in the Europe.
In this day, the White House, Truman is asked for to it that it has accepted plans of the state secretaries to invade Japan in November.
When we catch the papers to leave, Mr.
Truman said:"Mr.
McCloy, nobody leaves daqui without voting.
It finds that I have another alternative?" I looked at for Stimson Colonel.
It liked that we called it colonel instead of secretary.
I looked at for Stimson e it said:"He can speak.
" I started to speak and said that we had to go to the doctor if, in this height, we did not start to think in an outcome politician of the war instead of a military outcome.
It said that it went to send one message with the terms.
Mr.
Truman said:"Which are its terms? What it thinks?" It had not prepared stops me the surrender points, in the hour, but it said: "First, we say that they can be with the Mikado, but as constitutional monarch.
They have to have a representative government.
From there they have access, but not control on raw materials to have a viable economy.
" E said that in the best way that could.
It said:"Moreover, we have a new force that it comes under the form of a new type of energy that it will go to revolutionize the wars, with one to be able destructive immense.
" I found that it had to speak of the bomb.
To speak of the bomb, exactly in that select group, it was as if they were shocked, because it was a secret.
It was comparable to say "Caveira and Tíbias" in Yale, something that if does not have to make.
But Mr.
Truman said:"He was exactly this that I intended, to have everything in writing this.
" In this height, Stimson it supported my position, but later, Mr.
Byrnes, that he was not present, it vetoed the idea of offering the Mikado to them.
If it only can speculate what it could have happened if it made to arrive this message to the Japanese government with the terms that I indicated, including the Mikado.
I always found, to the light of information that we had on the trend of some Japanese extremistas military, I always found that this age the best solution, that thus we would have prevented to use the bomb.
In this height, the battle for Okinawa was almost in the end.
a bloody antevisão of what it would be the invasion of the continent.
For the Japanese, the lesson was still more hard.
One hundred a thousand had died e for the first time, the soldiers the thousands had surrendered it.
With the end of the last resistance, in 22 of June, the new Japanese government gave the first step for the peace.
In the end, we had to negotiate with the military adversaries, that is, America and England, but the High Command one opposed categorically to think about such thing, in negotiating being able with them enemy.
The only great power that it was not with the enemies, it was the Soviet Union because nominally the Pact of Neutrality still existed e this age the only possibility to have peace.
The possibility pointed with respect to North.
We speak of this with the Military Command e the Military Command it decided, reluctantly, to accept our order of to negotiate with the Soviet Union to be able to arrive at the final destination that it was Washington and London.
But he was the minister of the Businesses Foreigners Chinese, not Japanese, that it was congregated with Stalin.
An enormous Japanese army still it occupied parts of China, including the Manchúria.
The Russians and the Chinese negotiated Stalin to attack this army.
When Truman was stops the Europe in 7 of July, to congregate with Stalin and Churchill, it wise person, for intercepted messages, that Japan wanted the end, but one did not surrender unconditionally.
Truman and Byrnes had some options to the choice: they could modify the terms of the surrender, they could encourage the Russians to invade the Manchúria, they could use the atomic bomb or to invade the Japanese continent.
Truman decided to play bombs atomic in Japan without informing.
But this, waited it, would go to finish the War Pacific it, before the entrance of the Russians.
E would go to increase the power of American negotiation in the Europe.
The decision already had been taken when Truman arrived at meeting in 15 of July.
In the following morning, before the dawn, in a remote desert in New Mexico, Robert Oppenheimer and the team that he constructs the bomb, they had attended the first atomic explosion.
I remember a phrase of Hindu Holy Writs, the Bhagavad Gita.
Vishnu.
it is trying to persuade the prince making its duty e to impress it, it assumes its form with some arms and it says: "Now I am the death, annihilator of the worlds.
" I find that all we think this, in a way or another one.
The plutonium bomb blew up with the force of 20 a thousand tons of TNT.
In the hour of the explosion, the desert it was changedded into glass.
In July of 1945, the economy of Japan was arrasada e its defenseless cities against the attacks of the B-29.
Although the army to remain virtually unbroken, the armament industries of Japan they had been destroyed.
A million of civilians had died.
Others as many millions had been without house.
For the American Air Force, the surrender was for briefing.
For them, it was a situation without exit e the B-29 sobrevoavam Japan to the will e they could not make nothing.
We could destroy any target without great opposition.
This desperate situation it made with that they did not have will to continue.
By chance, they tried to leave the war it has three months, before leaving exactly.
They had asked for to the Russians that they acted as intermediate, that they tried to negotiate the exit of the war, e the Russians were confusing until having finished the War in the Europe to be able to enter in the War of the Pacific before finishing.
Stalin and Molotov had opposed to receive the ambassador Japanese before going for the last one meeting of the Three Great ones.
In Potsdam also it was the secretary of the War, Stimson.
It gave information on the test atomic the Truman and Byrnes, that, as it said in the daily one, they had been very satisfied.
"The president was sufficient enthusiastic with this e it saw whenever me spoke of this.
It said that it gave a new confidence to it.
When Stimson counted Churchill of the successful test, Churchill said that this explained the enthusiasm of Truman e that it also felt itself thus.
" The English and the Americans not they knew if they would count to the Russians.
Some said that its weight in the influence diplomatics it would only be evident later to have been used in Japan.
After a meeting, when we were of exit, Truman caught in the interpreter e was if to find with Stalin e said to it in few words what they had discovered and the effect that the atomic bomb would have.
Stalin alone assented with the head and was thankful e the expression of it not if it modified of all.
It was only thus.
It was an enormous disillusion.
We find that it went to be abismado, but it reacted as if it was an incident.
If already it had knowledge, if it did not want to show none.
emotion in relation to this, I do not know.
I only know that was everything very easy, e for our disillusion, we follow in front with the agenda.
E this discouraged Stimson, because it found that having disclosed this it would have a great Russian reaction, on the part of the Soviets, to speak with us on the future implications e the future use of this, but it did not receive any encorajamento.
The tactics of Stimson had failed.
The meeting happens before demonstration of the atomic bomb.
Stimson feared that now, the secretary of Byrnes State it used the bomb to influence direct concessions of the Russians.
I find that Mr.
Byrnes thought that this would be a species of.
influence in the diplomatical exchanges.
On the other hand, I find that Stimson Colonel it had a different idea for the use of the bomb.
"It wrote the President asking for direct negotiations in the nuclear case e said that the relations with Russia they could perhaps be irremediably ruined for our boarding to the solution of the bomb with Russia.
If to fail the boarding now e alone to negotiate with them, having exhibited the ownership of this weapon, the suspicion of them e the diffidence of ours objectives will go to increase.
" With the atomic weapons almost ready to use, it was hour of Truman to make a final ultimatum to the Japanese e one more time, the advice of Stimson it was rejected.
Truman and Byrnes had decided not to modify the unconditional surrender when offering the possibility of to keep the Emperor.
My hope is that the people of Japan discovers that the continuous resistance to the forces of the nations.
now joined to make to respect the law and justice, it will be completely fútil.
Still it has time, but little time, for the Japanese to be saved of the destruction that the threat.
The objective of this age to guarantee to them that they would have this decision, e, at the same time, not to start a controversy between us on the position of the Emperor.
When the declaration of Potsdam was published, the Minister of the Businesses Togo foreigners and I, we work many nights e I brought this declaration to the attention of the minister e I explained to it about what one was.
Togo said as soon as was acceptable, e was immediately to the Palace to ask for a hearing.
The Emperor approved the decision of Togo that it had to accept that is to finish of time with the war.
The Togo minister said in the meeting of the government: "We can finish the war without the question of the Emperor.
We can be with the Emperor.
" But, in that height, we, the Japanese government, we ask for.
the mediation of the Russians, e many ministers had said: "We go to see in what this of.
" The Suzuki first-minister said that Japan went to ignore the ultimatum.
Perhaps Russia could to save the honor of Japan.
Stalin not yet signs the declaration of Potsdam.
It still could be the mediator.
Stalin counted the Truman the boarding of the Japanese.
Truman wise person everything, the codes Japanese had been deciphered.
Both had agreed to to ignore the negotiations of peace e Truman was for house in 3 of August.
Without reply of the Japanese, it authorizeed the Air Force to play the atomic bomb as soon as she was ready.
In desperation, the minister of Foreign affairses, Togo, it sent a telegram to the ambassador in Moscow: "Since to postpone one day at this moment, it can result in a thousand years of repentance, I ask for to it that it speaks immediately with Molotov.
" But Molotov not yet received the ambassador.
In 6 of August, two days before the Russians to say that they went to attack Japan, the Enola Gay took off for its trip of 2400 km.
When advancing in the track, vi that it had hundreds of people in the zone where the airplane was stopped.
Some were in front of the control tower.
E the people were there to see what she went to happen without knowing what they saw, but something was different e they wanted to be part of this e to see what it went to happen.
We had a bomb and one airplane that went carries it, e was the commander of the group, Tibbets Colonel, with its crew.
My crew had to fly in formation to the right, during the bombing, for some reasons.
Somebody had to fly there e I was chosen by it for the second mission, if it had one second mission.
We went to have one third airplane to the left, that it would go to move away itself before the bombing e that took cameras.
During first the three hours, we went to fly separately e we encontrariamos in them to 6h of the morning.
The plan was this.
The meeting was successful.
We had one hour and stocking, a little more, to go in formation in one pretty night on the Pacific with the moon and clouds that seemed pompons.
It was a calm night and tranquila, it was not transferred very.
We speak in the airplane, but this is normal in a mission.
Later it had a period of calmness and we were.
I find that were all dreaming, therefore it was everything very calm.
To 8h15 of the morning of 6 of August, the Enola Gay, the 32 a thousand feet, it launched the bomb on Hiroshima.
As soon as the airplane lost that weight I soon made an accented curve, as the Sweeney and Marquand behind me, e we try distanciar in them of the impact point.
In this in case that, since the exit of the airplane, the bomb it had 53 seconds until blowing up.
It is the time that delays to fall to that altitude, 53 seconds.
E thus we had enough time to make the curve.
We had made the curve e we enter in a leveled flight when it seemed that something grasped the airplane shook and it very, because this age the shock wave going up.
I was contented for feeling this, because it gave a relief moment to me.
After all, we work in the bomb during one year.
In those 53 seconds in that it turned the airplane I thought: "It will be that it goes to function" E clearly, the wave that reached in them it indicated that it had functioned.
Therefore, I felt that it had reached the success.
When the bomb came, vi a yellow flash e I was encircled for the blackout.
A wooden building of two floors that were my house, with eight rooms, it was made in pieces it covered and me.
When I came me, it was all black as it breu to my return.
I tried to raise me, but it had a broken leg.
I tried to speak, but vi that it had broken six teeth.
When I repaired that it had the face e the burnt coasts, that it had one cut that went of the shoulder until a waist, I tracked down until a edge of the river e when I arrived there, vi hundreds of bodies floating.
It was there that I perceived, shocked, that they had reached all the city of Hiroshima.
The day was clearly when we play the bomb.
It was one day of sun and visibility was complete, therefore, when we come back, e we pass for Hiroshima, we saw a cloud going up.
In this height, passed two minutes, the cloud.
it was in our altitude.
We were the 33 a thousand feet.
E the cloud was there e continued going up in boiling, as if it was rolling and boiling.
The surface did not pass of.
a black point in boiling.
The only possible comparison it is with a tar barrel.
It was this that seemed.
Where before it had a city, with houses, building and everything what it was seen to that altitude, now destroços were only seen black color and in boiling back in low.
We take off photos fastest possible.
My concern later it was to leave from there soon.
I found a line infindável of refugee, all without any part of clothes in the body, e the skin of the face, of the arms and the chest it are pulled out and it was hung, however, they not they had any expression.
They ran away in deep silence.
I found that it was a procession of ghosts.
What we report they had been the effect.
The bombing conditions were limpid, the target is reached and the results they were better of what we imagine.
This was the sent message.
Later a question was alone to leave all to speak, to place everything for it are.
The enthusiasm passed e a routine trip became.
By the way, it was in such a way a routine that I left the Bob Lewis to lead with the automatic pilot, e I was to sleep for first time in 30 hours.
He was very tired.
In a war that if drags we have decreases due to the secondary effect of the exhaustion, privation, illnesses and things of the sort.
To forward everything more fast possible it is a moral responsibility that it says respect to all.
It is truth that we knew that the war had finished, if we waited a little, would go to finish, because the Japanese were negotiating, e we knew this because we had deciphered the codes of them e we heard the communications of them.
I find that president Truman it made well in using the bomb, because of certain form it sped up the negotiations same e saving one day, I find that the penalty was valid.
It had of being.
I found that was completely unnecessary, because when they had played the bomb in Hiroshima we were in negotiations with the Soviet government, to the search of an anticipated end for the hostilities e we were completely exaustos.
E the Navy and the Army also, the few also they became.
more receptive to the idea of the peace.
It is a terrifying subject to approach e the United States have conscientious and unconsciously a great complex of guilt because of the use of the bomb.
But Truman took the decision, having in account the military necessities, e based on a impartial analysis, on the part of the proper Japanese.
The information indicate that they would have fought until the o end.
They had fought until the o end in some of the islands although the surrender, e the Emperor would not have the courage to order to stop, e would not have the support to make it.
When it knew of the atomic bomb I was frightened e said that the American people was cruel.
At the time, I thought if Americans would be civilized, but at the same time, I found that it was a key it Japan to finish the war.
The Japanese government delayed two days to know what it was the bomb atomic and its effect.
Others 70 a thousand had been wounded.
they had been destroyed or damaged.
President Truman, when knew the notice, it classified it as the greater event of History.
The Group of Peace in the Japanese government waited that the bomb persuaded the faction warlike to accept the surrender.
In the meeting of the government in 9 of August, the notice had been still more disturbing.
In the previous night, in Moscow, Molotov receives finally the Japanese ambassador e said that Russia to it it went to declare war to Japan.
Eight hours later, three months after the defeat of Germany, e as Stalin had fiance', Russia attacked the army Japanese in the Manchúria.
The Japanese hopes of a Russian mediation finished.
The American hopes to finish the war before the Russian envolvement they were frustrated.
In this same morning, the Americans played one plutonium bomb in Nagasaqui.
It killed 60 a thousand people.
Exactly thus, the militant Japanese they asked for a surrender without occupation.
The Party of the Peace alone wanted to preserve the position of the Emperor.
For the first time, to break the impasse, emperor Hirohito, was called to decide.
It chose the peace.
I never have to forget the emotion at that moment.
All had started to cry, therefore, I looked at for the face of the Emperor.
It was silenced, but.
it used white gloves e cleaned the face some times, therefore, it had.
We could see that the Emperor, Its Majesty the Emperor, she was crying.
I never have to forget the emotions felt in that one room at that moment.
In 10 of August, the Japanese they had informed that they went to surrender if the Emperor could be.
In 12 of August, the Allies they send a cautious message.
In this height, the army of Japan it was almost rebelling itself.
Exactly that a thousand atomic bombs played same e that Japan was completely devastado, we cannot forget that it was in game the honor of Japan, the pride of the Japanese at the time that they found that the only exit honrosa of the war it was not the surrender, but to fight until the o end.
The Americans had played pamphlets asking for the Japanese surrender.
This almost ruined the maneuver delicate of the Party of the Peace.
This would have caused many problems.
The civilians and welded by all the country they did not have knowledge of what it was transferred.
If they knew that the government it was negotiating with U.
S.
A.
, the situation if would have become impossible.
Until it could have led to a revolution.
I found that we had to take one decision more fast possible.
One more time, in 14 of August, the Emperor congregated itself with the divided Court-martial e said to it that they had to accept the ultimatum of the Allies.
He himself would go to announce this in the following day.
In this night, a group of young officers invaded the Palace e tried to steal the writing of the message of the Emperor.
They had not obtained to find.
The blow fails.
To the noon of 15 of August, the Japanese people heard for first time the voice of the Emperor.
"The war", said it, "it did not advance in benefit of Japan.
By the way, the enemy started to use a new and cruel bomb.
If to continue to fight, it will go to not only result in a tremendous collapse e in the elimination of the Japanese nation, as well as in the total destruction of the civilization human being.
Therefore, we have to support the insuportável.
" When the Emperor if directed to the nation in its speech, I know.
that 99 men in each 100 they had been frightened.
They waited that the Emperor it asked for to them to fight, therefore, the shock was tremendous e all the officers, mainly youngest, that they had said that they would go to fight until the o end, they had been of course people without illusions.
Some until had tried to disclose themselves against the surrender decision taking for the government.
In certain way, it can be said that the bombings e the sudden attack of Russia to Japan, they had helped finally the war.
If these events had not occurred, Japan, at the time, would not go to leave to fight.
The war finishes, but the deaths not.
The illnesses caused for radiation, not anticipated, they would go to kill thousand in years that if would follow.
In the morning of 2 of September of 1945, couraçado the American Missouri it was anchored in Tokyo.
The new minister of the Businesses Foreigners, Shigemitsu, it enters on board limping stops to sign the declaration of surrender.
The commander of the Allies, General MacArthur: I invite now the representatives of the Emperor of Japan e of the Japanese government e of the Japanese imperial quarter-general to sign the declaration of surrender in the indicated places.
The assistant of the minister, Kase, he observed the ceremony.
Vi thousand of sailors in that enormous ship same e to our front, they were representative being able of them victorious in military uniforms that they shone as gold.
E to the look for they thought as it is that Japan some time it found it could defeat that them.
We go to pray so that the peace either returned to the world e that preserves it forever to God.
This ceremony is finished.
Here, in 5 of August, the first bomb of Uranian was placed in a B-29 bomber call Enola Gay, in honor of the mother of the pilot.
One day later, before dawn, the Enola Gay unglued.
Its white one was Hiroshima.
The World in War The Bomb February-September of 1945 In 12 of April of 1945, Franklin Roosevelt, president of the United States of America, it died suddenly.
The nation cried the death of the leader.
It has 12 years, it had recouped the nation of the deepenings of the economic depression.
Now them it had led to the side of the victory in a World-wide War.
Two months before dying, Roosevelt had been in Yalta, Russia, establishing the foundation politics of the world postwar period.
The Roosevelts and the Churchills wanted to restore the democracy in the East of the Europe, mainly in the Poland.
They had asked for the Stalin to confirm the Russian support against Japan three months later of the defeat of Germany.
In an livened up environment, the Three Great ones had found that they had fond of an agreement.
Yalta was same the high point of the relation between the three men.
The victory was close, the Germans if removed, e had many things to decide, beyond the military subjects, e the future of the Poland one became of new the point most difficult.
It is interesting to see that as much Roosevelt as Churchill they had found that they had an agreement with Stalin.
The problem of the Poland, e of the East of the Europe, he was that the occidental people wanted an elect government freely.
The Soviets wanted a government sympathizer of Russia.
They had found that the Ocidente she had perceived and accepted this.
Of the point of view of them, the Poland, she would not be friend of the East, nor of none of the countries of the Balkans.
They had found that they had some agreements on the influence spheres with Mr.
Churchill, they had left Greece practically in English hands, they could have some influence in the Hungria, in the Romenia, Bulgaria e mainly in the Poland.
I felt in Yalta that the Russians thought.
that we had in fact accepted this requirement.
After de Yalta, Roosevelt it only lived more two months.
Exactly then, it and Churchill they were undeceived how much to the interpretations that the Russians gave to the agreements.
The very intense telegram exchange of the two sides between Stalin and Roosevelt it left sufficiently clearly that Roosevelt, before dying, wise person who Stalin not she was fulfilling the agreements.
I find that it was badly because the military developments they had fortified the Russian side e the Russians had found necessary to take in account the opinion occidental person in Yalta.
Months later, this necessity disappeared because the war went to them well.
Therefore, they had discarded some of the agreements that had made.
E had applied this mainly in the Poland.
Roosevelt was seen as a friend of the Russians.
Its successor, Harry Truman, he was a stranger in such a way stops they as for the council members.
I left stops.
As soon as Roosevelt died, I was to see Mr.
Truman.
It wanted to have the certainty of that it wise person the position of the relations, because it had as much euphoria in air on the warm relations that they existed between the Allies.
I arrived in the house one week after Roosevelt dying.
My first experience with President Truman.
I discovered that was an eager reader, therefore it had read all the telegrams e through them understood the difficulties that we went to have.
The arrival of the minister of Foreign affairses, Molotov, Washington, in 23 of April, it gave to a chance the Truman to prove as it said that "We would make front to the Russians.
" Although the visit to give hopes to the problem of the Poland, one knew that Russia signs a pact of friendship of 20 years with the Polish government in Warsaw.
This Polish government did not have members pro-occidental people, only pro-Soviets.
The occidental leaders they had been angry and insane.
Molotov visited Truman, e the secretary of Stettinious State, head of Alger Hiss.
At that time, the Polish situation was, to be likeable, crystallized.
The Russians advanced, they seemed not to give importance to the type of provisory government that the British and the Americans they would like to see.
Therefore, great protests they were directed the Russians.
Truman decided to fincar the foot.
It had one dom for this.
In this visit, as it is known for that it is in books of History, it accused Molotov with breaking of agreements, then in this hour.
It was a strange thing stops if to make in the way of the war, that not yet it was earns, with an important ally, but made it.
E finished with Molotov saying: "They had never spoken to me thus in the life.
" E Truman said:"If it kept the agreements, would not speak to it thus.
" He seemed a professor.
Stettinious, that was present, it said me, in the following day, that still it was shaken.
It said:"I found that the conference went to finish.
" It was an unhappy colloquy.
She was one of the first colloquies diplomatical that Truman had e was not a declaration diplomatics of the part of Truman.
It used the solid language of the Missouri, that she was very clear, e Molotov already had spoken with other people thus, but never they had spoken to it thus.
It was very annoying e I find that.
I was with the impression of that it it found that was a new voice, not it of Roosevelt, but of a more aggressive president.
When it took ownership two weeks before, Truman said that it went to follow the politics of Roosevelt.
But this sudden severity with Molotov it worried the Secretary of the War, Henry Stimson.
In the following day to the confrontation, Stimson said the Truman of something that it could change these relations.
Stimson wrote the Truman: "I find that it is very important I to speak with you as soon as possible on a highly private subject.
I spoke in this after taking ownership, but not yet I spoke in this due to pressure that has suffered.
However, it has one weight such in our foreign relations e an important effect in everything what I think on this subject, that I find that must know of that it is treated as soon as possible.
" In the following day, 25 of April, Stimson explained the Truman that its vision of the foreign politics, she was dominated for the perspective imminent of an atomic power, e the agreements that could to make with Russia in exchange for the allotment of atomic secrets.
It was the first time that Truman was informed on the atomic bomb e of its potential diplomatist.
The Stimson asked for stops to preside over a committee to decide its military use.
In this height, and great secret, two types of atomic bombs they had been created: based one in Uranian, e to another one with an element manufactured for the man, the plutonium.
The bomb of Uranian did not need to be tested, but only had one.
Of plutonium, the most easy ones of to produce in great amounts, they would have of being tested before.
The first one would be ready in July.
A special unit of the Force Aerial it had practiced the tactics that it involved to launch a bomb enormous, with great precision, e later running away more fast possible.
The commander of the unit he was Colonel Paul Tibbets.
Until this height, any error in the bombings of 150, 180 meters were considered very good.
I said to them:"If the error it will be of 30 meters the 25 a thousand feet, then, they are in the limit.
I want that it is less than 30.
" They had said me as soon as they did not go to obtain e I said that not wise person reason.
They had said that not yet it had been made and I said that it was not reason.
For they say what me, the practical one leads to the perfection.
I said to practice until obtaining to make.
Of the bases in the Marianas islands, American B-29 bombers already they attacked Japanese cities with more conventional weapons.
At the beginning, the results were not good.
General Curtis LeMay he developed new tactics: raides arsonists of low altitude.
With aerial photos it can if to establish a general area, but it does not need.
They did not obtain to prevent the collateral damages e with certainty that we set on fire many Japanese buildings that they did not have to see with the industry of the armament.
She is one of the sad things that not if it obtains to prevent in the war.
In 9 of March of 1945, arsonists had been plays in Tokyo, destroying 40 km2 of the city.
more in this night of that in all England during the Blitz.
The majority suffocated with the fire storm.
LeMay attacked now city after city.
It seemed that the B-29 obtained to defeat alone Japan.
Only when General Arnold he asked directly: "How much harder time the war" it is that we congregate in them and we think about the subject e we conclude that we would not have whiter in September e without targets, we do not imagine a war.
In the Spring of 1945, Japan was defenseless face to the aerial power naval e of the Americans.
The majority of the merchant navy and of Japanese war is sunk.
An efficient blockade moves away the Japan of the overseas armies, it hinders the use of aviation due to fuel e threatens the population with the hunger.
The American bombers they attacked the will, supporting the devastadores raides arsonists.
Many Japanese politicians had perceived that the country did not go to obtain to aguentar much more.
they had disembarked in Okinawa, the 560 km of the continent.
They had faced a fierce resistance.
But with the start of the battle, the Party of the Japanese Peace it obtains a new government led for Admiral Suzuki.
When the government of Suzuki took ownership, the military situation was deplorable, e more, the economic situation of our nation she was sufficiently obvious.
The military command it tried, let us say, to suck the last drop of the blood of the nation to continue the useless war, but one became obvious for any sensible man that we were in the limit.
The young officers in army, the extremistas, they found that we had to fight until the o end until all the men to have died.
But the minister of the War, general Anami, did not agree.
It found that if we fought until Americans to invade the continent e later we attacked forces of them in beaches, we could negotiate the peace in terms more favorable to Japan.
But Truman would not go to negotiate.
It said this to the Congress, in May, after the German defeat.
Our requirement has been, e continues to be, the unconditional surrender.
I want that the entire world knows that this direction must and will go to remain without alterations and limitations.
Truman faced now two great problems: as to deal with the Russians in the Europe, e if asked for to fulfill to them the promise to attack Japan.
In Russian Germany, troops e occidental changed gifts, but Churchill already sent urgent messages the Truman informing that Russia raised a curtain of iron in the Europe.
The Three Great ones had of if to congregate with urgency, before the armies of the democracy they melted.
Truman had a new secretary of State, James Byrne.
It wanted to finish the war against Japan before the entrance of Russia e to also cause problems to Asia occidental person.
I had always present that.
that it was important to finish the war before of the entrance of the Russians.
Stimson did not want to precipitate in the Europe or the Extreme East before the bomb being ready.
It wrote the Truman: "In a tram of problems of this level the atomic secret will be the key.
It seems me terrible to risk to this level in the diplomacy without having one trunfo in the sleeve.
" Truman guaranteed the Stimson: the meeting of the Three Great ones "it was postponed up to 15 of July for thus terms more time.
" A friend of Roosevelt where Stalin trusted, Harry Hopkins, Moscow in the end of May was sent to alliviate the pressure of the subject of the Poland.
It said that he had calmed the situation.
Stalin also promises to turn over against Japan in 8 August.
While Hopkins was in Moscow, the committee of Stimson arrived at a decision.
The committee that studied the atomic bomb it recommended unanimously that it had soon to be used, without acknowledgments, against a great Japanese military target.
"Only this", thought Stimson, "it would give the psychological blow that could to lead to the Japanese surrender.
" Although to agree to some council members of Truman, that the Japanese had to receive an ultimatum that it would leave clearly that they could to be with the Emperor, it opposed to announce it this until the bomb to have been tested.
But after the war, it wrote: "It is possible, to the light of the final surrender, that a previous exposition clarified e more of the American will to keep the Emperor it could have led to an end anticipated of the war.
" Eisenhower is received as a hero after the victory in the Europe.
In this day, the White House, Truman is asked for to it that it has accepted plans of the state secretaries to invade Japan in November.
When we catch the papers to leave, Mr.
Truman said:"Mr.
McCloy, nobody leaves daqui without voting.
It finds that I have another alternative?" I looked at for Stimson Colonel.
It liked that we called it colonel instead of secretary.
I looked at for Stimson e it said:"He can speak.
" I started to speak and said that we had to go to the doctor if, in this height, we did not start to think in an outcome politician of the war instead of a military outcome.
It said that it went to send one message with the terms.
Mr.
Truman said:"Which are its terms? What it thinks?" It had not prepared stops me the surrender points, in the hour, but it said: "First, we say that they can be with the Mikado, but as constitutional monarch.
They have to have a representative government.
From there they have access, but not control on raw materials to have a viable economy.
" E said that in the best way that could.
It said:"Moreover, we have a new force that it comes under the form of a new type of energy that it will go to revolutionize the wars, with one to be able destructive immense.
" I found that it had to speak of the bomb.
To speak of the bomb, exactly in that select group, it was as if they were shocked, because it was a secret.
It was comparable to say "Caveira and Tíbias" in Yale, something that if does not have to make.
But Mr.
Truman said:"He was exactly this that I intended, to have everything in writing this.
" In this height, Stimson it supported my position, but later, Mr.
Byrnes, that he was not present, it vetoed the idea of offering the Mikado to them.
If it only can speculate what it could have happened if it made to arrive this message to the Japanese government with the terms that I indicated, including the Mikado.
I always found, to the light of information that we had on the trend of some Japanese extremistas military, I always found that this age the best solution, that thus we would have prevented to use the bomb.
In this height, the battle for Okinawa was almost in the end.
a bloody antevisão of what it would be the invasion of the continent.
For the Japanese, the lesson was still more hard.
One hundred a thousand had died e for the first time, the soldiers the thousands had surrendered it.
With the end of the last resistance, in 22 of June, the new Japanese government gave the first step for the peace.
In the end, we had to negotiate with the military adversaries, that is, America and England, but the High Command one opposed categorically to think about such thing, in negotiating being able with them enemy.
The only great power that it was not with the enemies, it was the Soviet Union because nominally the Pact of Neutrality still existed e this age the only possibility to have peace.
The possibility pointed with respect to North.
We speak of this with the Military Command e the Military Command it decided, reluctantly, to accept our order of to negotiate with the Soviet Union to be able to arrive at the final destination that it was Washington and London.
But he was the minister of the Businesses Foreigners Chinese, not Japanese, that it was congregated with Stalin.
An enormous Japanese army still it occupied parts of China, including the Manchúria.
The Russians and the Chinese negotiated Stalin to attack this army.
When Truman was stops the Europe in 7 of July, to congregate with Stalin and Churchill, it wise person, for intercepted messages, that Japan wanted the end, but one did not surrender unconditionally.
Truman and Byrnes had some options to the choice: they could modify the terms of the surrender, they could encourage the Russians to invade the Manchúria, they could use the atomic bomb or to invade the Japanese continent.
Truman decided to play bombs atomic in Japan without informing.
But this, waited it, would go to finish the War Pacific it, before the entrance of the Russians.
E would go to increase the power of American negotiation in the Europe.
The decision already had been taken when Truman arrived at meeting in 15 of July.
In the following morning, before the dawn, in a remote desert in New Mexico, Robert Oppenheimer and the team that he constructs the bomb, they had attended the first atomic explosion.
I remember a phrase of Hindu Holy Writs, the Bhagavad Gita.
Vishnu.
it is trying to persuade the prince making its duty e to impress it, it assumes its form with some arms and it says: "Now I am the death, annihilator of the worlds.
" I find that all we think this, in a way or another one.
The plutonium bomb blew up with the force of 20 a thousand tons of TNT.
In the hour of the explosion, the desert it was changedded into glass.
In July of 1945, the economy of Japan was arrasada e its defenseless cities against the attacks of the B-29.
Although the army to remain virtually unbroken, the armament industries of Japan they had been destroyed.
A million of civilians had died.
Others as many millions had been without house.
For the American Air Force, the surrender was for briefing.
For them, it was a situation without exit e the B-29 sobrevoavam Japan to the will e they could not make nothing.
We could destroy any target without great opposition.
This desperate situation it made with that they did not have will to continue.
By chance, they tried to leave the war it has three months, before leaving exactly.
They had asked for to the Russians that they acted as intermediate, that they tried to negotiate the exit of the war, e the Russians were confusing until having finished the War in the Europe to be able to enter in the War of the Pacific before finishing.
Stalin and Molotov had opposed to receive the ambassador Japanese before going for the last one meeting of the Three Great ones.
In Potsdam also it was the secretary of the War, Stimson.
It gave information on the test atomic the Truman and Byrnes, that, as it said in the daily one, they had been very satisfied.
"The president was sufficient enthusiastic with this e it saw whenever me spoke of this.
It said that it gave a new confidence to it.
When Stimson counted Churchill of the successful test, Churchill said that this explained the enthusiasm of Truman e that it also felt itself thus.
" The English and the Americans not they knew if they would count to the Russians.
Some said that its weight in the influence diplomatics it would only be evident later to have been used in Japan.
After a meeting, when we were of exit, Truman caught in the interpreter e was if to find with Stalin e said to it in few words what they had discovered and the effect that the atomic bomb would have.
Stalin alone assented with the head and was thankful e the expression of it not if it modified of all.
It was only thus.
It was an enormous disillusion.
We find that it went to be abismado, but it reacted as if it was an incident.
If already it had knowledge, if it did not want to show none.
emotion in relation to this, I do not know.
I only know that was everything very easy, e for our disillusion, we follow in front with the agenda.
E this discouraged Stimson, because it found that having disclosed this it would have a great Russian reaction, on the part of the Soviets, to speak with us on the future implications e the future use of this, but it did not receive any encorajamento.
The tactics of Stimson had failed.
The meeting happens before demonstration of the atomic bomb.
Stimson feared that now, the secretary of Byrnes State it used the bomb to influence direct concessions of the Russians.
I find that Mr.
Byrnes thought that this would be a species of.
influence in the diplomatical exchanges.
On the other hand, I find that Stimson Colonel it had a different idea for the use of the bomb.
"It wrote the President asking for direct negotiations in the nuclear case e said that the relations with Russia they could perhaps be irremediably ruined for our boarding to the solution of the bomb with Russia.
If to fail the boarding now e alone to negotiate with them, having exhibited the ownership of this weapon, the suspicion of them e the diffidence of ours objectives will go to increase.
" With the atomic weapons almost ready to use, it was hour of Truman to make a final ultimatum to the Japanese e one more time, the advice of Stimson it was rejected.
Truman and Byrnes had decided not to modify the unconditional surrender when offering the possibility of to keep the Emperor.
My hope is that the people of Japan discovers that the continuous resistance to the forces of the nations.
now joined to make to respect the law and justice, it will be completely fútil.
Still it has time, but little time, for the Japanese to be saved of the destruction that the threat.
The objective of this age to guarantee to them that they would have this decision, e, at the same time, not to start a controversy between us on the position of the Emperor.
When the declaration of Potsdam was published, the Minister of the Businesses Togo foreigners and I, we work many nights e I brought this declaration to the attention of the minister e I explained to it about what one was.
Togo said as soon as was acceptable, e was immediately to the Palace to ask for a hearing.
The Emperor approved the decision of Togo that it had to accept that is to finish of time with the war.
The Togo minister said in the meeting of the government: "We can finish the war without the question of the Emperor.
We can be with the Emperor.
" But, in that height, we, the Japanese government, we ask for.
the mediation of the Russians, e many ministers had said: "We go to see in what this of.
" The Suzuki first-minister said that Japan went to ignore the ultimatum.
Perhaps Russia could to save the honor of Japan.
Stalin not yet signs the declaration of Potsdam.
It still could be the mediator.
Stalin counted the Truman the boarding of the Japanese.
Truman wise person everything, the codes Japanese had been deciphered.
Both had agreed to to ignore the negotiations of peace e Truman was for house in 3 of August.
Without reply of the Japanese, it authorizeed the Air Force to play the atomic bomb as soon as she was ready.
In desperation, the minister of Foreign affairses, Togo, it sent a telegram to the ambassador in Moscow: "Since to postpone one day at this moment, it can result in a thousand years of repentance, I ask for to it that it speaks immediately with Molotov.
" But Molotov not yet received the ambassador.
In 6 of August, two days before the Russians to say that they went to attack Japan, the Enola Gay took off for its trip of 2400 km.
When advancing in the track, vi that it had hundreds of people in the zone where the airplane was stopped.
Some were in front of the control tower.
E the people were there to see what she went to happen without knowing what they saw, but something was different e they wanted to be part of this e to see what it went to happen.
We had a bomb and one airplane that went carries it, e was the commander of the group, Tibbets Colonel, with its crew.
My crew had to fly in formation to the right, during the bombing, for some reasons.
Somebody had to fly there e I was chosen by it for the second mission, if it had one second mission.
We went to have one third airplane to the left, that it would go to move away itself before the bombing e that took cameras.
During first the three hours, we went to fly separately e we encontrariamos in them to 6h of the morning.
The plan was this.
The meeting was successful.
We had one hour and stocking, a little more, to go in formation in one pretty night on the Pacific with the moon and clouds that seemed pompons.
It was a calm night and tranquila, it was not transferred very.
We speak in the airplane, but this is normal in a mission.
Later it had a period of calmness and we were.
I find that were all dreaming, therefore it was everything very calm.
To 8h15 of the morning of 6 of August, the Enola Gay, the 32 a thousand feet, it launched the bomb on Hiroshima.
As soon as the airplane lost that weight I soon made an accented curve, as the Sweeney and Marquand behind me, e we try distanciar in them of the impact point.
In this in case that, since the exit of the airplane, the bomb it had 53 seconds until blowing up.
It is the time that delays to fall to that altitude, 53 seconds.
E thus we had enough time to make the curve.
We had made the curve e we enter in a leveled flight when it seemed that something grasped the airplane shook and it very, because this age the shock wave going up.
I was contented for feeling this, because it gave a relief moment to me.
After all, we work in the bomb during one year.
In those 53 seconds in that it turned the airplane I thought: "It will be that it goes to function" E clearly, the wave that reached in them it indicated that it had functioned.
Therefore, I felt that it had reached the success.
When the bomb came, vi a yellow flash e I was encircled for the blackout.
A wooden building of two floors that were my house, with eight rooms, it was made in pieces it covered and me.
When I came me, it was all black as it breu to my return.
I tried to raise me, but it had a broken leg.
I tried to speak, but vi that it had broken six teeth.
When I repaired that it had the face e the burnt coasts, that it had one cut that went of the shoulder until a waist, I tracked down until a edge of the river e when I arrived there, vi hundreds of bodies floating.
It was there that I perceived, shocked, that they had reached all the city of Hiroshima.
The day was clearly when we play the bomb.
It was one day of sun and visibility was complete, therefore, when we come back, e we pass for Hiroshima, we saw a cloud going up.
In this height, passed two minutes, the cloud.
it was in our altitude.
We were the 33 a thousand feet.
E the cloud was there e continued going up in boiling, as if it was rolling and boiling.
The surface did not pass of.
a black point in boiling.
The only possible comparison it is with a tar barrel.
It was this that seemed.
Where before it had a city, with houses, building and everything what it was seen to that altitude, now destroços were only seen black color and in boiling back in low.
We take off photos fastest possible.
My concern later it was to leave from there soon.
I found a line infindável of refugee, all without any part of clothes in the body, e the skin of the face, of the arms and the chest it are pulled out and it was hung, however, they not they had any expression.
They ran away in deep silence.
I found that it was a procession of ghosts.
What we report they had been the effect.
The bombing conditions were limpid, the target is reached and the results they were better of what we imagine.
This was the sent message.
Later a question was alone to leave all to speak, to place everything for it are.
The enthusiasm passed e a routine trip became.
By the way, it was in such a way a routine that I left the Bob Lewis to lead with the automatic pilot, e I was to sleep for first time in 30 hours.
He was very tired.
In a war that if drags we have decreases due to the secondary effect of the exhaustion, privation, illnesses and things of the sort.
To forward everything more fast possible it is a moral responsibility that it says respect to all.
It is truth that we knew that the war had finished, if we waited a little, would go to finish, because the Japanese were negotiating, e we knew this because we had deciphered the codes of them e we heard the communications of them.
I find that president Truman it made well in using the bomb, because of certain form it sped up the negotiations same e saving one day, I find that the penalty was valid.
It had of being.
I found that was completely unnecessary, because when they had played the bomb in Hiroshima we were in negotiations with the Soviet government, to the search of an anticipated end for the hostilities e we were completely exaustos.
E the Navy and the Army also, the few also they became.
more receptive to the idea of the peace.
It is a terrifying subject to approach e the United States have conscientious and unconsciously a great complex of guilt because of the use of the bomb.
But Truman took the decision, having in account the military necessities, e based on a impartial analysis, on the part of the proper Japanese.
The information indicate that they would have fought until the o end.
They had fought until the o end in some of the islands although the surrender, e the Emperor would not have the courage to order to stop, e would not have the support to make it.
When it knew of the atomic bomb I was frightened e said that the American people was cruel.
At the time, I thought if Americans would be civilized, but at the same time, I found that it was a key it Japan to finish the war.
The Japanese government delayed two days to know what it was the bomb atomic and its effect.
Others 70 a thousand had been wounded.
they had been destroyed or damaged.
President Truman, when knew the notice, it classified it as the greater event of History.
The Group of Peace in the Japanese government waited that the bomb persuaded the faction warlike to accept the surrender.
In the meeting of the government in 9 of August, the notice had been still more disturbing.
In the previous night, in Moscow, Molotov receives finally the Japanese ambassador e said that Russia to it it went to declare war to Japan.
Eight hours later, three months after the defeat of Germany, e as Stalin had fiance', Russia attacked the army Japanese in the Manchúria.
The Japanese hopes of a Russian mediation finished.
The American hopes to finish the war before the Russian envolvement they were frustrated.
In this same morning, the Americans played one plutonium bomb in Nagasaqui.
It killed 60 a thousand people.
Exactly thus, the militant Japanese they asked for a surrender without occupation.
The Party of the Peace alone wanted to preserve the position of the Emperor.
For the first time, to break the impasse, emperor Hirohito, was called to decide.
It chose the peace.
I never have to forget the emotion at that moment.
All had started to cry, therefore, I looked at for the face of the Emperor.
It was silenced, but.
it used white gloves e cleaned the face some times, therefore, it had.
We could see that the Emperor, Its Majesty the Emperor, she was crying.
I never have to forget the emotions felt in that one room at that moment.
In 10 of August, the Japanese they had informed that they went to surrender if the Emperor could be.
In 12 of August, the Allies they send a cautious message.
In this height, the army of Japan it was almost rebelling itself.
Exactly that a thousand atomic bombs played same e that Japan was completely devastado, we cannot forget that it was in game the honor of Japan, the pride of the Japanese at the time that they found that the only exit honrosa of the war it was not the surrender, but to fight until the o end.
The Americans had played pamphlets asking for the Japanese surrender.
This almost ruined the maneuver delicate of the Party of the Peace.
This would have caused many problems.
The civilians and welded by all the country they did not have knowledge of what it was transferred.
If they knew that the government it was negotiating with U.
S.
A.
, the situation if would have become impossible.
Until it could have led to a revolution.
I found that we had to take one decision more fast possible.
One more time, in 14 of August, the Emperor congregated itself with the divided Court-martial e said to it that they had to accept the ultimatum of the Allies.
He himself would go to announce this in the following day.
In this night, a group of young officers invaded the Palace e tried to steal the writing of the message of the Emperor.
They had not obtained to find.
The blow fails.
To the noon of 15 of August, the Japanese people heard for first time the voice of the Emperor.
"The war", said it, "it did not advance in benefit of Japan.
By the way, the enemy started to use a new and cruel bomb.
If to continue to fight, it will go to not only result in a tremendous collapse e in the elimination of the Japanese nation, as well as in the total destruction of the civilization human being.
Therefore, we have to support the insuportável.
" When the Emperor if directed to the nation in its speech, I know.
that 99 men in each 100 they had been frightened.
They waited that the Emperor it asked for to them to fight, therefore, the shock was tremendous e all the officers, mainly youngest, that they had said that they would go to fight until the o end, they had been of course people without illusions.
Some until had tried to disclose themselves against the surrender decision taking for the government.
In certain way, it can be said that the bombings e the sudden attack of Russia to Japan, they had helped finally the war.
If these events had not occurred, Japan, at the time, would not go to leave to fight.
The war finishes, but the deaths not.
The illnesses caused for radiation, not anticipated, they would go to kill thousand in years that if would follow.
In the morning of 2 of September of 1945, couraçado the American Missouri it was anchored in Tokyo.
The new minister of the Businesses Foreigners, Shigemitsu, it enters on board limping stops to sign the declaration of surrender.
The commander of the Allies, General MacArthur: I invite now the representatives of the Emperor of Japan e of the Japanese government e of the Japanese imperial quarter-general to sign the declaration of surrender in the indicated places.
The assistant of the minister, Kase, he observed the ceremony.
Vi thousand of sailors in that enormous ship same e to our front, they were representative being able of them victorious in military uniforms that they shone as gold.
E to the look for they thought as it is that Japan some time it found it could defeat that them.
We go to pray so that the peace either returned to the world e that preserves it forever to God.
This ceremony is finished.